Liquidity provision in the interbank foreign exchange market by Van Gysegem, Frederick
  
 
 
 
 
 
Liquidity Provision in the Interbank Foreign 
Exchange Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frederick Van Gysegem 
2013 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Michael Frömmel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration of Ghent University, in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor in Economics 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIQUIDITY PROVISION IN THE INTERBANK FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE MARKET 
 
by Frederick Van Gysegem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Doctoral Jury 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Marc De Clercq Dean, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. 
 Universiteit Gent 
  
Prof. Dr. Patrick Van Kenhove Secretary, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
 Universiteit Gent 
  
Prof. Dr. Michael Frömmel Advisor, Universiteit Gent 
  
  
Prof. Dr. William De Vijlder Universiteit Gent 
  
  
Prof. Dr. Michael J. Moore Warwick Business School 
 University of Warwick 
  
Prof. Dr. Koen Schoors Universiteit Gent 
  
  
Prof. Dr. David Veredas Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management 
 Université libre de Bruxelles 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During my PhD, I experienced how intimidating a blank sheet of paper can be. It confronts 
you with questions such as “Where to start?”, but also “Where did it all start?”. The second 
question can be even more difficult to answer than the first. In any case, the decision to enroll 
for a PhD program in economics/ finance in 2008, right after my master studies, came at a 
time when there were many things I wanted to understand. In those days, financial markets 
were in the center of the attention of society. The markets were constantly in the headlines of 
the news, and they were apparently dictating the decisions of world leaders. Although their 
importance was obvious, their functioning remained to a large extent a mystery to me: it was 
a world of complex products, populated by actors who all claim to be rational and who follow 
sophisticated strategies. In those days, I met my advisor, Prof. Dr. Michael Frömmel, who 
was teaching a course on Investment Analysis. His course made me even more interested in 
the topic, and by the time the course was over, I had even more questions than before I started 
it (they became more advanced, though). It was Michael who took the initiative, and who 
offered me a platform to focus on the questions I had. Already very early, he introduced me to 
market microstructure. Immediately after this introduction, the working title of my PhD 
became “Essays in Market Microstructure”. I am very grateful to Michael that he offered me 
the opportunity to do a PhD in the first place, and that he directed me towards this exciting 
field. He gave me already from the very beginning the opportunity to develop a wide range of 
skills, and allowed me to broaden my horizons in many different ways. As advisor, he was 
willing to consider all suggestions and ideas I came up with, and we had many open 
discussions. Furthermore, he always had some words of encouragement (and these words 
were from time to time very welcome), and he – crucially – always supported me.  
The members of my reading commission also made a significant contribution to this work. I 
greatly appreciate the time they took to read and evaluate my work, as their comments 
allowed me to improve my dissertation. In addition, they were all important to me in very 
different ways: Prof. Dr. William De Vijlder was willing to discuss my future plans, Prof. Dr. 
Michael J. Moore was so kind to host me at Queen’s University Belfast, and Prof. Dr. David 
  
Veredas organized an exciting and thought-provoking graduate course on market 
microstructure in 2010. 
While recognizing the importance of my advisor and my reading commission in the making 
of this dissertation, I also want to acknowledge some other people that were around me in the 
last five years. In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter wrote “Economic progress [in capitalist society] 
means turmoil”.1 My personal experience is that this attempt to make progress in economics 
also meant some form of (personal) turmoil. Having people around who are sincerely 
interested in what you are doing, but who can at the same time help you to put things in 
perspective are essential. 
I want to thank every former and current member of the department of financial economics: 
you were all very nice colleagues. There was always somebody there to share daily joys and 
sorrows, and I enjoyed the interesting discussions and daily talks with you a lot. I especially 
want to thank my colleague and co-author Xing Han for the pleasant collaboration. Our 
meetings were always very stimulating, and I learned a lot from them. A special thank as well 
to Selien De Schryder, who became so much more than an officemate (even in times when 
central banks across Europe became her home base). 
A very warm thank goes to my friends. Whether I got to know them over the last five years, 
during my graduate or undergraduate years or even earlier… they are all important to me, and 
they are great people with whom it is nice to spend time and share experiences, such as an 
intensive badminton game, a good concert, a great opera, an exciting board game, the green 
countryside,… and a good glass of wine or some tasty food. Who I definitely know from 
before I started my PhD is my family and my family in law. At very crucial points in my life, 
they believed in me. Many of them supported me actively and unconditionally over the years, 
and contributed in that way to where I stand today. I am very grateful to them. 
And finally, I want to thank Vincent. He was standing by my side during the making of this 
dissertation, and we truly shared the ups and downs associated with it. He always believed in 
me. He also showed a lot of patience, and his unconditional support in so many ways was 
indispensable. 
 
 
Frederick Van Gysegem 
December 2013 
                                                 
1
 Schumpeter, Joseph, 1942, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper. 
 9 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Figures…………………………………………………………...……………………11 
List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………...…….13 
 
Overview of the Dissertation…………………………………………………………...…….15 
Samenvatting van het Proefschrift……………………………………………………………19 
 
Chapter 1: Exchange Rate Policy in Central and Eastern European Countries 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 26 
2. Evolution of exchange rate regimes .................................................................................. 27 
3. De jure versus de facto exchange rate regimes ................................................................. 28 
4. Exchange Rate Regimes and Volatility ............................................................................ 30 
5. Exchange rate regimes and monetary policy .................................................................... 33 
5.1 Overview of the “de jure” monetary policy in the CEEC’s since 1994 ......................... 33 
5.2. Research on the de facto monetary policy in the CEEC’s ............................................ 36 
6. Exchange rate regimes and interventions ......................................................................... 40 
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 41 
 
Chapter 2: News, Liquidity Dynamics and Intraday Jumps: Evidence from the HUF/ 
EUR Market 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 56 
2. Data ................................................................................................................................... 60 
3. Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 64 
3.1. Jump Detection .............................................................................................................. 64 
3.2. Event study methodology .............................................................................................. 68 
4. Jumps and news announcements ...................................................................................... 70 
5. Jumps and liquidity dynamics ........................................................................................... 72 
5.1 Liquidity dynamics prior to the jumps ........................................................................... 73 
5.2 Liquidity dynamics during and after the jump ............................................................... 74 
6. Further Analysis ................................................................................................................ 78 
6.1 Predictability of jumps using probit analysis ................................................................. 79 
6.2 Post-jump price discovery .............................................................................................. 81 
6.3 Post-jump order submission strategy ............................................................................. 82 
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 84 
 
Chapter 3: Spread Components in the Hungarian Forint-Euro Market: Evidence from a 
Theoretical Spread Decomposition Model 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 116 
10 
 
2. The foreign exchange market and data description ........................................................ 117 
3. The analysis of spreads ................................................................................................... 118 
4. Empirical model .............................................................................................................. 120 
5. Empirical results ............................................................................................................. 122 
6. Concluding remarks ........................................................................................................ 127 
 
Chapter 4: Bid-Ask Spread Components on the Foreign Exchange Market: Quantifying 
the Risk Component 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 144 
2. The foreign exchange market: characteristics and advantages ....................................... 146 
3. Cost components of the bid-ask spread .......................................................................... 147 
4. Model .............................................................................................................................. 148 
5. Empirical results ............................................................................................................. 152 
5.1 Data .............................................................................................................................. 152 
5.2 The bid-ask spread and its determinants ...................................................................... 152 
5.3 Intraday patterns ........................................................................................................... 153 
5.4 Results ..................................................................................................................... 154 
6. Applications .................................................................................................................... 159 
6.1 Peak vs. non-peak times ............................................................................................... 159 
6.2 Speculative attacks ....................................................................................................... 160 
7. Summary ......................................................................................................................... 163 
 
Technical Note: The Reconstruction of the HUF/ EUR Limit Order Book using Book 
Data…………………………………………………………………………………………179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Exchange Rate Policy in Central and Eastern European Countries 
Figure 1: Exchange rate regimes in CEEC’s ............................................................................ 43 
Figure 2: Filter- and smoothed probabilities for EU accession countries ................................ 44 
Figure 3: “De Jure” Monetary Policy Regimes in CEEC's ...................................................... 45 
Figure 4: The band distance…………………………………………………………………..46 
Figure  5: The derivation of the band distance element from the historical exchange rate peg 
values for Hungary (Forint/ Deutsche mark)…………………………………………………47 
Figure 6: The derivation of the band distance element from the historical exchange rate peg 
values for the Czech Republic (Czech koruna/ Deutsche mark)………………..………........48 
 
Chapter 2: News, Liquidity Dynamics and Intraday Jumps: Evidence from the HUF/ 
EUR Market 
Figure 1: Average daily quote and total volume traded over the sample period. .................... 87 
Figure 2: Intraday distribution of ticks (CET). ........................................................................ 87 
Figure 3: Intraday distribution of jumps. ................................................................................. 88 
Figure 4: Price reversal after a jump ........................................................................................ 88 
Figure 5: Bid-ask spread (SWPQS) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. .. 89 
Figure 6: Volume traded (VOL) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. ....... 89 
Figure 7: Order imbalance (OI) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. ........ 90 
Figure 8: Mean bid depth at best quote (BRDTHB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the 
event window. .......................................................................................................................... 90 
Figure 9: Mean ask depth at best quote (BRDTHA) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the 
event window. .......................................................................................................................... 91 
Figure 10: Mean bid depth (DPTHB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 91 
Figure 11: Mean ask depth (DPTHA) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 92 
Figure 12: Volume of  lim. buy orders (LOB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event 
window. .................................................................................................................................... 92 
Figure 13: Volume of lim. sell orders (LOS) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event 
window. .................................................................................................................................... 93 
 
Chapter 3: Spread Components in the Hungarian Forint-Euro Market: Evidence from a 
Theoretical Spread Decomposition Model 
Figure 1: Decomposition by half-year. .................................................................................. 129 
Figure 2: Decomposition by trade size. .................................................................................. 129 
 
Chapter 4: Bid-Ask Spread Components on the Foreign Exchange Market: Quantifying 
the Risk Component 
Figure 1: Average daily quote and total volume traded over the sample period ................... 165 
Figure 2: Number of ticks per hour (CET). ............................................................................ 165 
Figure 3: Expected bid-ask spread (HUF/ EUR; Intraday median) ....................................... 166 
Figure 4: Expected quantity traded (Mill HUF; Intraday median) ......................................... 166 
Figure 5: First decimal number of best bid/ best ask (HUF/EUR) ......................................... 167 
Figure 6: Second decimal number of best bid/ best ask (HUF/ EUR) ................................... 167 
Figure 7: First dec. bid-ask spread (HUF/ EUR) ................................................................... 168 
Figure 8: Second dec. bid-ask spread (HUF/ EUR) ............................................................... 168 
12 
 
Figure 9: Spread and volume traded around the speculative attack ....................................... 169 
Figure 10: Spread components around the speculative attack (January 2003) ...................... 169 
 
Technical note: The Reconstruction of the HUF/ EUR Limit Order Book using Book 
Data 
Figure 1: Detail of the reconstructed book (Feb. 13, 2003 from 15:45 till 16:15) ................. 183 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
List of Tables 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: News, Liquidity Dynamics and Intraday Jumps: Evidence from the HUF/ 
EUR Market 
Table 1: Summary statistics ..................................................................................................... 95 
Table 2: Order descriptives. ..................................................................................................... 95 
Table 3: Book descriptives. ...................................................................................................... 96 
Table 4: Prevalence and size of jumps. .................................................................................... 96 
Table 5: Positive vs. negative jumps. ....................................................................................... 97 
Table 6: Jumps and scheduled macroeconomic announcements. ............................................ 98 
Table 7: Share of jumps explained by news announcements. .................................................. 99 
Table 8: Liquidity dynamics around positive jumps .............................................................. 100 
Table 9: Liquidity dynamics around negative jumps ............................................................. 101 
Table 10: Probit regression of the jump probability and Tobit regression of the jump 
magnitude ............................................................................................................................... 102 
Table 11: Regression of price change on order flow. ............................................................ 102 
Table 12: Resiliency after jumps ............................................................................................ 103 
Table 13: Regression of depth change on lagged transitory volatility. .................................. 103 
 
Chapter 3: Spread Components in the Hungarian Forint-Euro Market: Evidence from a 
Theoretical Spread Decomposition Model 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the dataset .......................................................................... 131 
Table 2: Two-way decomposition of the spread. ................................................................... 132 
Table 3: Three-way decomposition of the spread. ................................................................. 133 
Table 4a: Comparison with selected previous studies (Two-way decomposition)…………134 
Table 4b: Comparison with selected previous studies (Three-way decomposition)………..135 
 
Chapter 4: Bid-Ask Spread Components on the Foreign Exchange Market: Quantifying 
the Risk Component 
Table 1: Summary statistics ................................................................................................... 171 
Table 2: Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression ...................................... 172 
Table 3: Correlation matrix .................................................................................................... 173 
Table 4: Regression results and spread components. ............................................................. 174 
Table 5: Regression with ad hoc specification ....................................................................... 175 
Table 6: Spread components during peak and non-peak times .............................................. 175 
Table 7: Spread components around speculative attack ......................................................... 176 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
Overview of the dissertation 
 
 
 
 
Market liquidity captures how easy it is to convert an asset into cash and is a key-variable of 
interest when trading on financial markets and when investigating them. Moreover, liquidity 
also determines the speed at which information about an asset can be processed and it affects 
as well the asset’s expected return. From a policy perspective, liquidity is an important factor 
for the stability of the global financial system. In this thesis, we study market liquidity by 
looking at the interaction amongst different types of participants on the Hungarian forint/ euro 
interbank foreign exchange market.  
In the first chapter we start from a very general level – in an international finance framework 
– by surveying the literature on exchange rate policy in Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC’s). In 2004, a first wave of CEEC’s joined the European Union. As a result, 
these countries all have the common long-term goal of joining European Monetary Union. 
Joining the monetary union is, however, conditional on the realization of the Maastricht 
criteria, and these criteria include stability of the exchange rate inside the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM II). Despite their common goal, the CEEC’s opted for different 
exchange rate policies. Furthermore, their exchange rate policies were subject to frequent 
changes and adjustments. In this chapter, we describe the official exchange rate arrangements 
in the CEEC’s, but we also consider the difference between de jure and de facto exchange rate 
regimes. Next, we survey the literature on exchange rate volatility and the link with exchange 
rate policy and monetary policy. Therefore, we consider switches between volatility regimes. 
A big difference between the timing of these switches and the dates of the respective policy 
changes may hint at a lack of credibility of the policy, including the unpeaceful exits from the 
pegs in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Finally, we survey the literature on the influence of 
monetary authorities on the exchange rate. Here we look, amongst other things, to central 
bank intervention and central bank communication in CEEC’s.   
From the next chapter onwards we switch on the microscope, and look at the market 
microstructure of the interbank foreign exchange market. Throughout these chapters we use 
detailed data for the Hungarian forint/ euro market – which operates as an electronic limit 
order book – in 2003 and 2004. In the second chapter we investigate the link between news 
announcements, jumps (which are basically price discontinuities) and market liquidity. In a 
first stage we detect the intraday jumps, and show that they are prevalent and important: there 
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is at least one price jump on 18.20% of the trading days contained in our sample period, and 
42.59% of the price variation on these jump days can be attributed to the jumps. We also find 
that positive and negative jumps are symmetric in terms of both frequency and size. 
In a second stage, we try to link the intraday jumps with public news announcements. Here 
we consider both scheduled public news (e.g. GDP, PPI, trade balance information,…) and 
unscheduled public news (e.g. central bank interventions, polls, surveys, political 
changes,…). They can be respectively linked with 16% of the jumps and 30.4% of the jumps, 
which implies that more than half of the jumps cannot be explained by public information.  
Hence, we would like to take a closer look at the actual genesis of jumps: are they caused by 
(public or private) information inflow, noise trades or insufficient liquidity? We therefore 
study in a third stage the dynamics of liquidity in a two-hour window around the jumps. We 
look at liquidity as a multi-dimensional variable and distinguish the tightness dimension (the 
difference between the best bid and the best ask), the immediacy dimension (the amount of 
euro or forint traded), resiliency (the pace at which the price reverts to former levels after it 
changed in response to large order flow imbalances), the overall depth (the amount of euro or 
forint available in the limit order book) and the depth at the best quotes. As a result, we find 
that jumps do not happen when liquidity is unusually low, but rather when there is an 
unusually high demand for immediacy concentrated on one side of the order book. Moreover, 
this result is independent of whether the jump can be linked to a public news announcement 
or not, and our findings suggest that it is information inflow that causes the jump. Moreover, a 
dynamic order placement process emerges after a jump: more limit sell (buy) orders are added 
to the book subsequent to a positive (negative) jump. We attribute this to endogenous 
liquidity providers on the market. Attracted by the higher reward for providing liquidity, they 
submit limit orders at the side where it is needed the most. 
In a fourth and last stage, we provide some further analyses and apply a probit model that 
shows that none of the liquidity variables offers predictive power for a jump occurrence 
(consistent with what we find for the dynamics of liquidity around jumps) or for the 
magnitude of the jump. In addition, we find that more limit orders relative to market orders 
are submitted to the book after the jump, and that the post-jump order flow is in general less 
informative than in normal trading periods. Overall, our results provide insight into the origin 
of jumps and map the impact of endogenous liquidity provision on this market without 
designated market makers. 
17 
 
In the last two chapters, we zoom in on the process of endogenous liquidity provision. We 
focus in these chapters on the link between the tightness dimension/ bid-ask spread and the 
cost of providing liquidity. We distinguish respectively order processing costs (the operational 
costs of providing market making services, such as wages of traders, floor space rent, fees that 
have to be paid to the platforms,…), inventory holding costs (the cost of holding an unwanted 
inventory, which results from accommodating incoming orders) and adverse selection costs 
(the cost of engaging in a transaction with a market participant who has superior information). 
In the third chapter we provide evidence using an established, structural model that allows 
us to split up the spread into these different cost components. We find that over the two years, 
40.09% of the bid-ask spread can be explained by inventory holding costs, 38.34% can be 
explained by order processing costs and 21.57% can be explained by adverse selection costs. 
Our results differ in some ways from previous results for the foreign exchange market where 
the same methodology was used, and are to some extent more intuitive. In comparison with 
the existing studies, the tier of the market we analyze, the completeness of the data, the size of 
the market and institutional differences between markets seem to play an important role. 
Furthermore, we find that the estimated spread on large trades is over the whole dataset 
32.35% higher than the spread on small trades. We show that this higher spread is caused by a 
higher combined inventory holding and adverse selection cost.  
In the fourth chapter, we follow a novel direction. Here we study the bid-ask spreads using 
an empirical spread decomposition model and specify the individual spread components 
explicitly. The combined inventory holding and adverse selection cost is here modeled as an 
option premium. This is very intuitive, and has the advantage that the risk can be quantified 
using option valuation techniques. We provide the first complete forex results for this type of 
model, and show that the combined component accounts for 52.52% of the bid-ask spread. 
Furthermore, we provide evidence for an endogenous tick size of 0.05 HUF/ EUR and we 
also estimate the number of liquidity providers based on the results for the risk component.  
In addition, the empirical approach we follow in this chapter allows us to examine two 
interesting spread patterns: the stylized difference in spreads between peak-times and non-
peak times and the spread pattern around a speculative attack against the Hungarian forint in 
the beginning of 2003. First, we confirm the stylized difference in spreads between peak-
times and non-peak times. As a matter of fact, during non-peak times the spread is more than 
double as high as during peak-times. We find that this is caused by an increase in the risk 
component, and if we elaborate on the origin of it we show that it is not only the calculated 
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option premium that increases but also the sensitivity to this option premium. Clearly, the 
increase in the premium still underestimates the actual increase in risk for the liquidity 
provider. We explain this by the increased probability that the liquidity provider will have to 
keep his position overnight. 
Second, we map the spread pattern around the speculative attack. Prior to the attack, the 
spread decreases until it reaches a level below the endogenous tick size. This decrease is 
caused by a strong decrease in the risk component. During the speculative attack, the spread 
increases massively, as a result of the rising risk component. The order processing 
component, on the other hand, decreases at the same time. This pattern is consistent with 
increased competition amongst liquidity providers who are well aware of the increased risk 
that their activity during this period of high speculation involves. After the attack, both the 
order processing component and risk component increase. Consequently, the tightness of this 
market is much lower than before the attack. Overall, this chapter demonstrates the relevance 
of an option based decomposition approach for understanding how liquidity is provided on 
the interbank foreign exchange market. 
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Samenvatting van het proefschrift 
 
 
 
 
Marktliquiditeit omvat hoe makkelijk het is om een investering in een financieel actief om te 
zetten in contanten en is van essentieel belang wanneer men handelt op financiële markten of 
wanneer men deze markten onderzoekt. Overigens bepaalt de liquiditeit van een actief 
eveneens de snelheid waarmee informatie kan worden geïncorporeerd in de prijs, en 
beïnvloedt zij ook de verwachtte opbrengst van het actief. Vanuit het standpunt van een 
beleidsmaker is liquiditeit belangrijk voor de stabiliteit van het globale financiële systeem. In 
dit proefschrift bestuderen wij marktliquiditeit door de interactie tussen verschillende types 
actoren in de handel op de Hongaarse forint/ euro wisselmarkt voor banken in kaart te 
brengen. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk vertrekken we heel algemeen vanuit het denkkader van de 
internationale financiën. We geven een overzicht van de bestaande wetenschappelijke 
literatuur over wisselkoersbeleid in de landen uit Centraal- en Oost-Europa (hierna CEEC’s 
genoemd). In 2004 is een eerste groep CEEC’s toegetreden tot de Europese Unie. Bijgevolg 
hebben al deze landen het gemeenschappelijke doel om finaal toe te treden tot de Europese 
Monetaire Unie (EMU). Toetreden tot de EMU is echter slechts mogelijk mits naleving van 
de Maastricht criteria, die onder andere stabiliteit van de wisselkoers binnen het Europese 
Wisselkoersmechanisme (ERM II) omvatten. Niettegenstaande hun gemeenschappelijke doel, 
hebben de CEEC’s geopteerd voor verschillende types van wisselkoersbeleid. Verder is hun 
wisselkoersbeleid regelmatig gewijzigd. In dit hoofdstuk beschrijven we in eerste instantie het 
officiële wisselkoersbeleid van de verschillende CEEC’s, maar houden we eveneens rekening 
met het verschil tussen “de jure” en “de facto” wisselkoersbeleid. Vervolgens geven we een 
overzicht van de wetenschappelijke literatuur omtrent de volatiliteit van de wisselkoers, en 
het verband met wisselkoersbeleid en monetair beleid. We focussen hierbij vooral op 
veranderingen tussen volatiliteitsregimes. Zij kunnen ons – in combinatie met gegevens over 
het beleid – een indicatie geven van de geloofwaardigheid van het beleid: indien 
veranderingen in de volatiliteitsregimes en veranderingen in het beleid op verschillende 
momenten plaatsvinden, duidt dit op een gebrek aan geloofwaardigheid van het beleid. Dit 
was bijvoorbeeld het geval toen Tsjechië en Slovakije hun vaste wisselkoers ongepland 
verlieten. We sluiten dit hoofdstuk af met een overzicht van de wetenschappelijke literatuur 
over de invloed van monetaire beleidsmakers op de wisselkoers. Hier beschouwen we, onder 
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andere, interventies van centrale banken en communicatie door centrale banken in de 
CEEC’s.   
In de rest van het proefschrift zetten we de microscoop aan, en concentreren we ons op de 
microstructuur van de handel op de wisselmarkt voor banken. Over de verschillende 
hoofdstukken heen gebruiken we hier gedetailleerde data van de Hongaarse forint/ euro markt 
– die functioneert aan de hand van een limiet orderboek – in 2003 en 2004. In het tweede 
hoofdstuk onderzoeken we het verband tussen aankondigingen van nieuws, jumps (die in 
essentie discontinuïteiten zijn in de prijs) en marktliquiditeit. In eerste instantie sporen we 
daartoe jumps gedurende de dag op, en tonen we aan dat zij vaak voorkomen en belangrijk 
zijn: er is ten minste één jump gedurende de dag op 18,20% van de handelsdagen die onze 
dataset bevat, en 42,59% van de prijsvariatie op deze dagen kan toegewezen worden aan de 
jumps. We vinden verder ook dat positieve en negatieve jumps symmetrisch zijn in termen 
van frequentie en grootte. 
In tweede instantie gaan we jumps gedurende de dag in verband brengen met aankondigingen 
van nieuws. We beschouwen hier zowel geplande publieke aankondigingen (zoals 
bijvoorbeeld BBP, index van de producentenprijzen, handelsbalansinformatie,…) als 
ongeplande publieke aankondigingen (zoals bijvoorbeeld interventies door de centrale bank, 
bevragingen, politieke veranderingen,…). Zij kunnen respectievelijk in verband worden 
gebracht met 16% van de jumps en 30,4% van de jumps, wat impliceert dat meer dan de helft 
van de jumps niet kunnen worden verklaard door publieke informatie.  
We zouden dan ook meer inzicht willen verkrijgen in de genese van jumps: worden zij 
veroorzaakt door een instroom van publiek of privaat nieuws, noise handel of onvoldoende 
liquiditeit? Om hierop een antwoord te krijgen, gaan we in derde instantie de 
liquiditeitsdynamiek bestuderen in de twee uren rond jumps. We beschouwen liquiditeit hier 
als een variabele die meerdere dimensies heeft, en onderscheiden de strakheid (het verschil 
tussen de beste biedprijs en de beste laatprijs), de directheid (de hoeveelheid euro of forint die 
verhandeld wordt), veerkracht (de snelheid waarmee een prijs zich terug herstelt naar een 
eerder niveau, nadat hij gewijzigd is door een groot onevenwicht in de orderstroom), de diepte 
van het orderboek (de hoeveelheid euro of forint die beschikbaar is in het orderboek) en de 
diepte tegen de beste prijs. Onze analyse toont dat jumps niet gebeuren op een moment dat de 
liquiditeit ongewoon laag is, maar eerder wanneer er een ongewoon hoge vraag naar 
directheid is die geconcentreerd is op één zijde van het limiet orderboek. Dit resultaat geldt 
overigens zowel voor jumps die in verband kunnen worden gebracht met de aankondiging van 
nieuws, als voor jumps voor dewelke dit niet het geval is, en onze resultaten suggereren dat 
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het een instroom van informatie is die de jump veroorzaakt. Verder zien we dat door de jump 
een dynamisch proces ontstaat waarbij limiet verkooporders worden geplaatst na een 
positieve jump en limiet kooporders na een negatieve jump. We schrijven dit toe aan 
endogene liquiditeitsvoorzieners op deze markt. Aangetrokken door de hogere compensatie 
voor het voorzien van liquiditeit op de markt, voegen zij limiet orders toe aan de zijde van het 
orderboek waar dit het meest nodig is.  
In vierde instantie voeren we enkele verdere analyses uit en passen we een probit model toe 
dat aantoont dat geen enkele van de dimensies van liquiditeit in staat is om een nakende jump 
te voorspellen (in overeenstemming met wat we vonden in de sectie over de 
liquiditeitsdynamiek rond jumps) of de grootte ervan. Verder vinden we ook dat het relatief 
aandeel van limietorders ten opzichte van marktorders toeneemt na een jump, en dat de 
orderstroom na de jump minder informatie bevat dan onder normale omstandigheden. Globaal 
genomen verschaffen onze resultaten inzicht in de oorsprong van jumps, en brengen zij de 
impact van endogene liquiditeitsverschaffers in kaart op deze markt waar geen speciale 
marktmakers zijn aangesteld. 
In de laatste twee hoofdstukken wordt er ingezoomd op het proces waarbij liquiditeit op een 
endogene manier wordt aangeboden. We focussen hierbij op de link tussen de strakheid van 
de markt/ het verschil tussen de bied- en laatprijs (hierna de spread genoemd) en de kostprijs 
van het aanbieden van liquiditeit. We onderscheiden respectievelijk order verwerkingskosten 
(hierna OPC genoemd, de operationele kosten van het aanbieden van liquiditeit, zoals de 
lonen van handelaren, de huur van de kantoren, honoraria die dienen te worden betaald,…), 
voorraadkosten (hierna IHC genoemd, de kostprijs van het aanhouden van een ongewenste 
voorraad) en averechtse selectiekosten (hierna ASC genoemd, de kostprijs van het handelen 
met partijen die over meer en/ of betere informatie beschikken dan de aanbieder van 
liquiditeit). In het derde hoofdstuk leveren we resultaten met behulp van een gevestigd 
structureel model dat ons toelaat de spread op te splitsen in de verschillende 
kostencategorieën die we hierboven introduceerden. We tonen aan dat over de periode van 
twee jaar, 40,09% van de spread verklaard kan worden door IHC, 38,34% kan verklaard 
worden door OPC en 21,57% kan verklaard worden door ASC. Onze resultaten verschillen op 
sommige vlakken van bestaande resultaten voor de wisselmarkt voor dewelke dezelfde 
methodologie werd gebruikt. Ze zijn tot op zekere hoogte ook meer intuïtief. In vergelijking 
met bestaande studies spelen de aard van de markt die wij beschouwen, de volledigheid van 
onze data, de grootte van de markt en institutionele verschillen een belangrijke rol. Verder 
vinden we dat de geschatte spread die aangerekend wordt bij grotere verhandelde volumes 
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32,35% hoger ligt dan de spread die aangerekend wordt bij kleinere verhandelde volumes. We 
tonen dat de hogere spread in dat geval wordt veroorzaakt door een hogere gecombineerde 
IHC en ASC. 
In het vierde hoofdstuk volgen we een nieuwe richting binnen het onderzoek naar de 
microstructuur van financiële markten. Dit houdt in dat we de spreads bestuderen aan de hand 
van een empirisch model dat ons toelaat de spread op te splitsen in de verschillende 
kostencategorieën. Daarbij wordt elke kost expliciet gespecifieerd en gekwantificeerd, en hier 
wordt de som van de IHC en de ASC gemodelleerd als een optiepremie. Dit is heel intuïtief, 
en heeft als voordeel dat het risico kan worden gekwantificeerd aan de hand van technieken 
voor optiewaardering. We leveren de eerste volledige resultaten voor de wisselmarkt voor dit 
type model, en we tonen dat de gecombineerde risicocomponent instaat voor 52,52% van de 
spread. Verder vinden we bewijs voor een endogene minimale prijsverandering van 0,05 
HUF/ EUR en schatten we het aantal verschaffers van liquiditeit op basis van de resultaten 
voor de risicocomponent. 
Aansluitend laat het empirische model dat we in dit hoofdstuk hanteren toe om twee 
interessante patronen in de spread te bestuderen: het vaste verschil in spread tussen piekuren 
en daluren, en het patroon van de spread rond een speculatieve aanval tegen de forint in het 
begin van 2003. We tonen eerst aan dat de spread tijdens de daluren meer dan dubbel zo hoog 
is als tijdens piekuren. Dit is te wijten aan een toename van de risicocomponent, en als we 
verder ingaan op de oorzaak van deze toename zien we dat niet enkel de optiepremie 
toeneemt, maar ook de gevoeligheid voor deze optiepremie. We leiden hieruit af dat de 
berekende optiepremie het risico voor de verschaffer van liquiditeit nog onderschat. Dit is het 
gevolg van het risico dat hij zijn positie zal moeten aanhouden gedurende de nacht. 
Daarna brengen we het patroon van de spread rond de speculatieve aanval in kaart. Vóór de 
aanval daalt de spread tot hij een niveau bereikt dat onder de endogene minimale 
prijsverandering ligt. Deze daling wordt veroorzaakt door een sterke daling in de 
risicocomponent. Tijdens de aanval neemt de totale spread toe door een sterke stijging van de 
risicocomponent. De OPC dalen tijdens de aanval. Dit patroon kan verklaard worden door 
hogere competitiviteit tussen verschaffers van liquiditeit, die zich tegelijkertijd heel bewust 
zijn van het risico dat zij nemen door liquiditeit te verschaffen in een periode van hoge 
speculatie. Na de aanval nemen zowel de OPC als de risicocomponent toe. Bijgevolg is de 
strakheid van de markt veel lager dan voor de aanval. Globaal genomen toont dit hoofdstuk de 
relevantie aan van een model om de spread op te splitsen aan de hand van opties om te 
begrijpen hoe liquiditeit wordt verschaft op de wisselmarkt voor banken. 
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Abstract 
The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC’s) which joined the European Union 
between 2004 and 2007 show an interesting evolution of their exchange rate regimes. 
Although they all started from a comparable situation and have the common long-term goal of 
joining European Monetary Union, they opted for different exchange rate policies. 
Furthermore, the exchange rate policies were subject to frequent changes and adjustments. 
We first describe the evolution of exchange rate arrangements in CEEC’s, and survey in this 
paper various aspects of their exchange rate policy. 
We start with the discussion of differences between de facto and de jure exchange rate 
regimes. Second, we analyze the impact of exchange rate policy on exchange rate volatility, 
focusing on structural breaks or volatility regimes. While the level of volatility shows the 
external dimension of monetary stability, the break points may help to understand the 
processes that lead to changes in exchange rate arrangements. Third, we highlight the role of 
CEEC's exchange rates in monetary policy rules. Finally we review the literature on central 
bank interventions in CEEC’s. 
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Exchange Rate Policy in Central- and Eastern European Countries 
1. Introduction 
The European Union has grown substantially in the 21st century. The first wave of Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEEC’s) joined in 2004, namely the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (plus Cyprus and Malta), 
while Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007. All countries have the obligation to join 
European Monetary Union. This is, however, conditional on the realization of the Maastricht 
criteria. Since these criteria include stability of the exchange rate inside the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for two years, the exchange rate policy of the CEEC’s is 
of major importance and the question arises which is the ‘best’ exchange rate arrangement for 
CEEC’s. The CEEC’s show an interesting evolution of their exchange rate regimes. Although 
they all started from a comparable situation and have the common long-term goal of joining 
European Monetary Union, they opted for different exchange rate policies. Furthermore, the 
exchange rate policies were subject to frequent changes and adjustments. We first describe the 
evolution of exchange rate arrangements in CEEC’s, and survey in this paper various aspects 
of their exchange rate policy. Since there has been a plethora of works on exchange rates in 
CEEC’s, the survey has to be both, subjective and selective. We are aware of the fact that this 
approach is incomplete and the survey is not intended to be exhaustive. 
A natural starting point is the description of the evolution of (official) exchange rate 
arrangements in the CEEC’s in section 2. However, it is known that what countries announce 
to be their exchange rate regime and what they de facto implement often differs. For this 
reason we review the literature on differences between de facto and de jure exchange rate 
regimes.  
In section 3 we analyze the relation of exchange rate policy and exchange rate volatility. 
Since the CEEC’s frequently modified their exchange rate arrangements, there has been a 
strong focus on structural breaks or volatility regimes. Since the level of volatility is often 
understood as external dimension of monetary stability, one should expect a close relation 
between monetary policy regimes and exchange rate volatility. At the same time, switches 
between volatility regimes that deviate from the dates of the respective policy changes may 
hint at a lack of credibility of policy, including the unpeaceful exits from the pegs in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
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The last sections deal with the influence of monetary authorities on the exchange rate. We 
start in section 4 with the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules. In contrast, 
section 5 reviews the literature on central bank interventions in CEEC’s, including central 
bank communication.  
 
2. Evolution of exchange rate regimes 
The exchange rate regimes in Central and Eastern European countries underwent a 
remarkable evolution in the past two decades. This evolution is illustrated in Figure 1. We see 
that most of the CEEC’s chose a fixed exchange rate1 as a tool in their stabilization strategy 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The standard arguments behind 
the fixed exchange rate are the reduction of transaction costs for external trade and 
macroeconomic stabilization (Halpern & Wyplosz 1997). Additionally, at least two major 
reasons can be given for why countries may not let their currency float freely.
2
 First, small 
open economies are highly susceptible to exchange rate movements; therefore, the exchange 
rate must be considered by monetary authorities even if it is not the primary goal of monetary 
policy (Ball 1999). Most of the EU accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe belong 
to this class of countries. Second, in many emerging and transition countries, financial 
markets are less developed and do not allow domestic firms to borrow in their home currency. 
This is considered to be the original sin (Eichengreen & Hausmann 1999).  Because their debt 
is nominated in foreign currency they will have incentives to peg their exchange rates because 
their debt is nominated in foreign currency, as (Hausmann et al. 2001) argue.  
Even after considering the above mentioned arguments, a country may still not find it 
convenient to commit to an official peg. The political support for the necessary but unpopular 
measures to defend the peg may be very low in emerging and transition countries (Obstfeld & 
Rogoff 1995). Furthermore, under an officially floating regime, adjustments of the exchange 
rate are less visible to the public and less costly politically than devaluations under an official 
peg (Obstfeld 1997). 
 
[Insert here: Figure 1: Exchange rate regimes in CEEC’s] 
 
                                                 
1
 A fixed exchange rate is sometimes referred to as a pegged exchange rate. 
2
 The literature on optimum currency areas surveyed by (De Grauwe 2003) suggests that the choice of a pegged 
exchange rate is feasible only for a limited number of countries.  
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We see in Figure 1 that in the late 1990s, many countries moved to more flexible 
arrangements (Sachs 1996). The Visegrád Group, i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia followed entirely this path (Kocenda 2002). The combined strategy of a fixed 
exchange rate directly after the transition and a more flexible regime later on adds the benefits 
from pegging to the anchor currency to the ability to cope better with volatile capital 
movements in the later period (Corker et al. 2000). 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia opted initially for narrow horizontal bands. 
Subsequently, these fixed exchange rate regimes became more flexible and, after widening 
the bands, the Czech Republic (1997) and Slovakia (1998) declared managed floating or 
freely floating exchange rates.  
Poland and Hungary chose narrow crawling bands that served the dual objectives of 
maintaining competitiveness and moderating inflation (Szapáry & Jakab 1998). In 2000 the 
Polish zloty was declared freely floating. In Hungary the band was widened in 2001 to 15% 
and changed from a crawling to a horizontal band to mirror the exchange rate regime 
envisaged in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-2). Hungary kept a fixed exchange rate 
until early 2008. Early in the transition, other countries opted either for completely fixed 
exchange rates, e.g., the Baltic States and Bulgaria, or rather flexible regimes, e.g., Romania 
and Slovenia.
3
 The Baltic States all stepped in the ERM system. Still, they chose to keep their 
currencies de facto fixed. The reported bandwidth of 15% remains thus purely theoretical. 
Estonia is announced to join the Eurozone on the first of January 2011. 
The development described above follows the so called bipolar view.4 The bipolar view is 
based on the idea that, in a world of high capital mobility, adjustable pegs may be costly and 
difficult to defend so that they will be replaced by either hard pegs, i.e. currency boards and 
currency unions, or absolutely flexible exchange rate systems. The bipolar view is currently a 
mainstream conclusion in exchange rate policy. According to the official classification by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the share of intermediate exchange rate regimes has 
declined during the last decade, as (Fischer 2001) discusses. This confirms the bipolar view. 
 
3. De jure versus de facto exchange rate regimes 
In the previous paragraph we gave an overview of the “de jure” exchange rate regimes of 
the CEEC’s, or in other words “what countries say they are doing”. Still, this may not be what 
                                                 
3
 Exchange rate arrangements chosen by transition countries are discussed in (Mussa et al. 2000) 
4
 The bipolar view is also named as the hollowing out hypothesis or the two-corner hypothesis 
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countries are actually doing. In practice fear of floating and de facto pegging is very common 
(Calvo & Reinhart 2002).
5
 Hence, the IMF acknowledges since 1999 de facto exchange rate 
regimes. The IMF classification remains a hybrid system: it combines data on actual 
flexibility with information on the official policy framework (IMF, 2004). According to the 
hybrid classification, the Slovenian and Romanian exchange rate regimes are crawling pegs, 
whereas these two countries announced to be managed floats. Relying solely on the official 
announcements could be misleading, especially for economies in transition. Knowing whether 
countries follow their officially announced exchange rate is crucial for assessing economic 
performance in terms of growth, volatility, inflation, and sensitivity to crises, as (Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2004) discuss. In the literature most studies are based on de jure classifications until 
the late 1990s. Recent literature, e.g. (Flood & Rose 2005), tries to classify exchange rate 
arrangements in a more realistic manner. 
In general, two main approaches can be followed to identify de facto exchange rate 
regimes. One approach analyzes the development of exchange rates and policy variables that 
are indicative of exchange rate management by the central bank. (Popper & Lowell 1994) take 
this approach for Pacific Basin countries; (Hausmann et al. 2001) and (Levy-Yeyati & 
Sturzenegger 2005) use it on a broad sample of countries. (Schnabl 2004) applies this 
technique to the CEEC’s. The second approach considers the outcomes of implicit exchange 
rate targeting, i.e., the time series of exchange rates. This can be done by comparing exchange 
rate developments with those of some possible anchor currencies. Exemplary for this 
approach is the work of (Haldane & Hall 1991). They analyze the transition of the British 
Pound from a dollar peg to a Deutsche mark peg. Other examples include (Frankel & Wei 
1992), who investigate the influence of the yen on the exchange rate policies of some Asian 
countries and  (Frankel et al. 2001), who consider its impact on other emerging market 
economies. Some CEEC’s have been included in the work of (Bénassy-Quéré 1996), who 
investigates de facto pegs during their early period of transition. (Reinhart & Rogoff 2004) 
stress the importance of market-determined exchange rates and also consider the behavior of 
parallel exchange rates to construct a natural classification algorithm. 
(Frömmel & Schobert 2006) use the approach by (Frankel & Wei 1992) to analyze the de 
facto exchange rate regimes of six CEEC’s, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
                                                 
5
 (Fischer 2001), (Reinhart & Rogoff 2004), (Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger 2005), and (McKinnon & Schnabl 
2004) also support this view. (Rogoff et al. 2004) state that, from an ex post perspective, the de facto exchange 
rate regime differs from the announced one about 50% of time. 
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Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. They use daily data from 1994 to 2004, when most of the 
countries under consideration joined the European Union and estimate the regression: 
 
t
N
i
tiit swds  
1
,  (3.1) 
where st is the currency under observation expressed in special drawing rights that are 
used here as a numeraire,  d is the rate of crawl, t the time parameter and si,t are currencies 
to which st is pegged.  
The currencies si,t are expressed in the same numeraire as st and weighted in the basket 
with some weights wi, which are nonnegative real numbers. The specification of equation (1) 
nests several relevant alternative regimes. A simple peg implies d=0 and N=1, while a 
crawling peg indicates d>0 and N=1. A basket peg results in d=0 and N>1, while and a 
crawling basket implies d>0 and N>1.  
The setting of eq. (3.1) allows testing the de facto exchange rate regime. First one may test 
whether the rate of crawl (d) or the estimated weights (wi) are different from zero. Second it is 
possible to test whether the estimated weights significantly differ from the officially 
announced ones.  
Their findings imply that the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint have most likely 
behaved according to their officially announced regime during their periods of higher 
exchange rate flexibility, while the results for the Czech Republic and Slovakia suggest a 
somewhat higher importance of the euro (and Deutsche mark) than officially announced. The 
Slovenian regime before 2004 matches rather the IMF’s de facto classification as a crawling 
peg than its official announcement of a managed float. Although (Frömmel & Schobert 2006) 
cannot clearly confirm the Romanian regime as a de facto crawling peg, it occasionally 
seemed like a crawling peg to a basket of euro and US dollar. 
 
4. Exchange rate regimes and volatility 
As pointed out above, we observe an increasing degree of exchange rate flexibility for the 
CEEC’s between 1994 and 2004.6 This increased flexibility of the exchange rate, however, 
                                                 
6
 This movement towards more flexible exchange rate arrangements stopped in recent years after several of the 
CEEC’s joined the exchange rate mechanism (ERM2) of the European Monetary System and pegged their 
exchange rate to the euro within a band of ±15 percent. This is the case in particular for Slovakia and Slovenia, 
which had officially announced managed floats prior to their entry to ERM2. Slovenia and Slovakia joined EMU 
in 2007 and 2009, respectively. 
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may not necessarily lead to higher volatility. In support of this, (Krugman 1991) argues that 
widening the fluctuation band will make it more credible, because it gets less likely that 
the fluctuation margins will be reached. Consequently volatility decreases. In contrast,  (Flood 
& Rose 1999) conclude that fixed exchange rate regimes are in general less volatile than 
floats. This was also found by (Hughes-Hallett & Anthony 1997) and (Frömmel & Menkhoff 
2001) for the European Monetary System. (Stancík 2007) corroborates this result for 
the Visegrád countries and Slovenia, but also stresses the importance of trade openness. 
(Frömmel & Menkhoff 2003) additionally show that changes in monetary policy settings 
determine volatility switches for exchange rates of major industrial countries.  
Some empirical results suggest that the effect on volatility of the type of exchange rate 
regime is conditional on the appropriateness of the exchange rate regime. The work of (Berger 
et al. 2000) confirms that the type of exchange rate regime affects volatility, but that 
the “wrong” choice of a peg (that is, the choice of a peg by a country for which a flexible 
exchange rate would be more appropriate) induces higher exchange rate volatility than a peg 
which is in line with the macroeconomic conditions. Accordingly, volatility can here be seen 
as a measure of credibility of an exchange rate arrangement and serves as “a symbolic and 
visible measure of the government’s success in macroeconomic management” (Duttagupta et 
al. 2004). (Fidrmuc & Horváth 2008) apply various GARCH-type models to five new 
member states of the EU and find an inverse relation between credibility of the exchange rate 
regime and exchange rate volatility. 
There are only few works which investigate structural breaks in the exchange rate 
volatility of Central and Eastern European transition economies. (Kocenda 1998) compares 
GARCH estimates for the Czech koruna before and after the exchange rate band was widened 
in 1996 and finds significantly differing volatility patterns. (Kóbor & Székely 2004) apply 
a simple Markov switching model to the exchange rates of the so called Visegrád Group (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) between 2001 and 2003 and find frequent 
regime switches. Their sample period however does not include any change of the officially 
announced exchange rate system. (Kocenda 2005) argues that a lack of coincidence between 
policy changes and structural breaks in exchange rate behavior may hint at policy settings 
which are not consistent with the opinion of market participants and, accordingly, low 
credibility of the system. This is in line with the observation that if the costs of changing 
an exchange rate regime are high, a country may uphold an exchange rate regime even though 
it is not the optimal choice or even sustainable in the long run (Eichengreen & Masson 1998), 
(Juhn & Mauro 2002).  
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(Frömmel 2010) picks up the relation between credibility and volatility and applies a 
Markov switching GARCH model to exchange rates of the Visegrád countries between 1994 
and their entry to the European Union in 2004. Romania joins the sample as a country that 
never announced an official peg.  
The model allows the coefficients in a GARCH volatility equation (see (Bollerslev 1986)) 
to switch between two states:
7
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Where the state process st follows a time-discrete Markov process with two possible 
states.
8
 The process is characterized by the transition matrix P and the probability 
distribution in t = 1: 
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with pij=P(st=j| st-1=i), and Φt = {rt, rt-1, .., r1; } is the set of available information at time 
t, i.e. the set of all realisations of the returns process up to time t and the vector  of 
parameters.  
The model allows then to distinguish a high and a low volatility state, with the switches 
between high and low volatility being of particular interest. As pointed out by (Kocenda 
2005) a coincidence of switches between volatility states and changes of the officially 
announced regimes hint at high credibility and primacy of the policy. Figure 2 shows the 
probabilities of being in the high volatility regime for the five countries. Volatility regimes 
and policy regimes clearly coincide in the cases of Hungary and Poland. The control by policy 
was comparatively high, providing some evidence for the success of gradually increasing 
exchange rate flexibility for exiting a peg (Eichengreen 1999). This is in particular the case 
when countries have liberalized financial markets, as it is typical for the CEEC’s. They need 
to manage their exposure to international capital accounts and are more vulnerable to being 
forced off their currency pegs. This high vulnerability of intermediate exchange rate 
arrangements is also stressed by the results for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which had to 
follow the pressure by markets and leave their pegs during currency crises. Accordingly we 
                                                 
7
  See (Hamilton 1994), p. 237. For details of the model see (Frömmel 2010). 
8
 The model can be easily generalised to k states, as well as the mean process can be modified. This will, 
however, not lead to substantial changes in the model, so we rely on the simple model as described in the 
main text. 
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can observe a switch to the high volatility regime before policy reacted in the course of the 
crisis. In these cases the markets rather than policy drove the evolution of exchange rate 
policy.  
As a conclusion, the results are strongly in favour of gradually and early widening the 
bandwidth of currency pegs. Furthermore crawling pegs instead of horizontal ones seem to be 
advantageous, giving a certain degree of flexibility to react to an evolving environment. The 
credibility of an exchange rate arrangement is a crucial condition for its success and it is 
hardly possible to exit smoothly from a peg when markets expect it. 
 
[Insert here: Figure 2: Filter- and smoothed probabilities for EU accession countries] 
 
5. Exchange rate regimes and monetary policy 
Exchange rate policy and monetary policy are interdependent. For this reason we will 
discuss here the monetary policy in the CEEC’s, which can (again) be looked at from two 
different perspectives: the “de jure” and the “de facto” policy. 
5.1 Overview of the “de jure” monetary policy in the CEEC’s since 1994 
In the Czech Republic, the monetary policy initially followed a strategy of jointly 
targeting the exchange rate and monetary aggregates. Although this policy worked well in the 
early 1990s, increasing capital inflows made the system unsustainable. After widening the 
exchange rate band in March 1996, the Czech National Bank (CNB) switched to a managed 
float in May 1997. Later on, in 1998, monetary policy changed to a strategy of inflation 
targeting because the CNB considered the demand for money to be too unstable to use a 
monetary aggregate as an intermediate target (CNB 1998).
9
 However, during the period of 
inflation targeting, the CNB kept on intervening in the foreign exchange market. (Holub 
2004) argues that these interventions in early 1998 and in 1999/2000 are not consistent with 
inflation targeting. These claims are supported by regular discussions in the central bank's 
council about the equilibrium exchange rate.
10
 An in-depth survey of Czech monetary policy 
can be found in (Böhm & Zdarsky 2005). 
                                                 
9
 From 1998 to 2001, the CNB pursued a net inflation target, i.e. headline inflation minus regulated prices and 
changes in indirect taxes. In 2002 the CNB switched to headline inflation targeting with a continuous and 
declining target band. 
10
 The minutes of the CNB board meeting of December 21, 1999 report that a considerable amount of time was 
spent discussing exchange rate developments. Board members agreed on the importance of guarding against 
inadequate appreciation of the koruna’s nominal exchange rate. From the minutes of October 26, 2000 meeting: 
“A large-volume transaction... was responsible for the koruna’s strengthening against the euro during the past 
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In Hungary the monetary policy concentrated until 2001 on managing the nominal 
exchange rate within a fairly narrow crawling band (Kiss 2005). During 2001, the National 
Bank of Hungary (NBH) widened the band substantially. The following transition from a 
crawling band to a horizontal band coincided with the adoption of inflation targeting. The 
inflation target is surrounded by a one percent tolerance band, which was achieved until 2002. 
According to (Dibooglu & Kutan 2001) and (Barlow 2005), the Hungarian policy mix was 
successful in gaining internal and external stability of the economy. 
Until 1998, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) attempted to combine money and 
exchange rate targets by pursuing a crawling devaluation of the zloty vis-à-vis a basket of 
currencies. This strategy did not result in both intermediate targets being met in full, but it did 
facilitate the reduction of inflation initially. Beginning in 1995, Poland experimented with 
targeting money growth, the interest rate, and the monetary base. However, the NBP did not 
wait for a crisis to widen the exchange rate band substantially. Due to increased financial 
market integration, direct inflation targeting was introduced in the last quarter of 1998, 
although not announced formally until January 1, 1999. Until 2010 the exchange rate didn’t 
play a major role in monetary policy as the NBP didn’t intervene on the foreign exchange 
market. In April 2010 the NBP did intervene, because the strong zloty was considered to be a 
threat for the economic growth in Poland. The intervention was preceded by more than a 
month of efforts of the NBP to talk the zloty down. The central bank declared after this 
intervention that it “can’t exclude intervening again”.  
Although no official commitment is made to any specific exchange rate or inflation path, 
statements of officials from the National Bank of Romania openly express that monetary 
policy has aimed at a certain exchange rate path to maintain external competitiveness. The 
2001 Annual Report states that the central bank is trying to change this policy: “The support 
was mainly aimed at enlarging the monetary policy's room for maneuvers through abolishing 
intensive reliance on the exchange rate as an instrument providing an underpinning to external 
competitiveness” (NBR 2001). In discussions with the IMF, Romanian authorities have 
mentioned that they pursue twin objectives of gradual disinflation and maintaining a 
sustainable external position by using the exchange rate as an implicit nominal anchor (IMF 
2003). The Romanian authorities also mentioned the use of an informal euro/ dollar basket, 
                                                                                                                                                        
few days. However, attention was drawn to the fact that, in the present phase of completing state share 
privatization, this distinct type of divergence could occur again, and even possibly lead to new exchange rate 
levels. The CNB would carefully monitor and analyze any developments in this direction.” 
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which should be replaced gradually by only the euro as the reference exchange rate on the 
path to EU accession. 
Slovakia focused from the beginning on exchange rate stability, combined with tracking a 
broad money aggregate, namely M2. Following policies in the Czech Republic, the National 
Bank of Slovakia (NBS) widened its exchange rate band in January 1997 and changed to a 
managed float in October 1998. The NBS has used inflation bands as an informal guide for 
monetary policy since 1999 but the authorities do not consider this strategy to be formal 
inflation targeting. According to (Beblavy 2002), current monetary policy in Slovakia can be 
characterized as implicit inflation targeting with a significant amount of discretion. 
Furthermore, the exchange rate still plays an important role, even though it is officially 
floating. For example, the stated monetary program for 2000 reports: “NBS expects 
appreciation pressures. It is ready to intervene …, the intent of NBS will be to stabilize the 
foreign exchange rate approximately at the current level” (NBS 1999). 
Slovenia's official policy was monetary targeting until switching to a two-pillar strategy 
similar to that of the European Central Bank in 2001. Within this official framework, the 
Bank of Slovenia states that it “pursues the core aim of monetary policy, namely price 
stability, by simultaneously modifying the quantity of money in circulation and the exchange 
rate. In order to maintain control over the money supply in the face of the free flow of capital, 
the Bank must adjust interest rates and the exchange rate interdependently” (BOS 2002). 
However, if the Bank pursues only price stability as its primary objective in a managed 
floating exchange rate regime, it would not need to adjust exchange rate developments in 
reaction to capital flows. Rather, the statement reveals implicit dual objectives, namely 
internal price stability and an exchange rate target. 
The Bulgarian policy was over the whole period characterized by a firm focus on a fixed 
exchange rate. There was one break in the monetary policy in mid-1997, together with the 
launch of the currency board. The stabilization of inflation and inflation expectations then 
became also important objectives of the Bulgarian National Bank. Some authors argue that 
after the introduction of these objectives Bulgaria reached the lowest and most stable inflation 
rates combined with the highest and most stable output growth since the beginning of the 
transition process (Hristov & Zaimov 2003). One should however not neglect that Bulgaria 
was in a period of hyperinflation before the introduction of the above mentioned objectives, 
which makes a comparison difficult. 
In the Baltic States the monetary policy was, because of the currency board arrangements 
in these countries, characterized by exchange rate targeting. For Estonia there was a strong 
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focus on the exchange rate since the early nineties (Hartsenko 2002). Latvia and Lithuania 
were in exactly the same situation (Repse 1999; BOL 2007).  
The “de jure” exchange rate policies are summarized in Figure 3. Based on these brief 
histories, we conclude that, despite the fact that countries announce fairly flexible exchange 
rate regimes officially, central banks in transition economies pay considerable attention to the 
exchange rate in monetary policy, which is often embedded in broader macroeconomic 
programs. In the next section we focus on the research on de facto monetary policy. 
 
[Insert here: Figure 3: “De Jure” Monetary Policy Regimes in CEEC's] 
5.2. Research on the de facto monetary policy in the CEEC’s  
An important tool to analyze the de facto exchange rate regime is the Taylor rule, which 
was first proposed in 1993. The Taylor rule suggests that interest rates would be changed 
according to the deviation of inflation from a target and an output gap (Taylor 1993). Other 
studies often focus on the comparison of the actual setting of policy rates by central banks 
with what would have been predicted by the Taylor rule as a benchmark. However, as 
(Peersman & Smets 1999) among others emphasize, the Taylor rule should be perceived as a 
descriptive instrument to understand the interest rate setting behavior of central banks rather 
than as a normative guide for monetary authorities. The empirical literature on such interest 
rate rules for industrial countries has grown significantly during the past decades and has 
proven the ability of interest rate rules to describe the interest rate setting behaviour of central 
banks
11
.  
In contrast, research in the context of emerging market economies and particularly 
transition economies is of more recent origin and relatively scarce. An important finding is 
that central banks in emerging market economies tend to look beyond inflation and focus on 
other objectives as well, most prominently on exchange rate changes. (Mohanty & Klau 2004) 
find that many central banks in their sample of emerging market economies change interest 
rates systematically in response to exchange rate changes. For some countries the response is 
even found to be stronger than that to the inflation rate or the output gap.  
There are few papers on monetary policy rules in CEEC’s. This is due to several reasons. 
First, the time series available are comparatively short. They usually start in the middle of the 
1990s. Second, most CEEC’s have not followed one single strategy of monetary policy and 
                                                 
11
 For monetary policy rules in the context of inflation targeting see Neumann and von Hagen (2002) and the 
references therein. 
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also gradually made their exchange rates more flexible (See Figure 1 and Figure 3). Third, it 
is not quite clear which target values for inflation the CEEC’s followed, as most countries 
introduced inflation targeting and explicit inflation goals only between 1997 and 2001. The 
unstable and dynamic economic situation in the CEEC’s makes this task even more 
demanding. 
However, there have been recently some attempts to describe the monetary policy in 
selected CEEC’s using interest rate rules: (Maria-Dolores 2005) estimates Taylor rules for the 
Visegrad countries Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia between 1998 and 2003 
and comes to the conclusion that the Taylor rule describes the interest rates well for all 
countries but Slovakia. Similarly to the original Taylor rule, the rules used by (Maria-Dolores 
2005) do not consider exchange rate movements. The lagged interest rate, however, is 
included. The same set of countries is considered by (Paez-Farell 2007), whereas the sample 
periods differ from country to country. He compares different versions of interest rate rules 
and finds that there is a reaction to exchange rate movements. (Angeloni et al. 2007) estimate 
interest rate rules for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland from 1995-2004. They 
introduce the US dollar interest rate as a proxy for inflationary pressures of global origin and 
dummies for the years preceding the adoption of inflation targeting. (Yilmazkuday 2008) 
applies Taylor rules to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for the period 1994-2007. He 
includes the exchange rate in the interest rate rule, but also considers structural breaks. 
(Moons & Van Poeck 2008) focus on the period 1999-2003 and find that the accession 
countries do not differ substantially from the current EMU members with respect to the 
interest rate setting behavior. Furthermore it seems that the potential new entrants have 
witnessed a notable tendency for increased convergence during the last years. Finally, 
(Horváth 2009) analyzes the policy neutral rate in the Czech Republic from 2001 to 2006 
using a time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. The results indicate that 
the policy neutral rate decreases gradually over the course of the sample period showing a 
substantial interest rate convergence to levels comparable to the euro area.  
All of these studies conclude that a Taylor-like rule is helpful in understanding monetary 
policy of the CEEC’s. However, in most cases inflation coefficients are found to be far below 
unity, thus violating the so-called Taylor principle. If the Taylor principle holds, the policy 
rate should move more than one-for-one with increases in the inflation rate and thereby raise 
the real interest rate. If the monetary policy rule violates the Taylor principle, it will mean that 
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the central bank does not react adequately on bringing down inflation.
12
 This result is 
counterintuitive as the CEEC’s have experienced a remarkable degree of disinflation during 
the last 15 years. The literature suggests mainly two explanations: (Angeloni et al. 2007) 
argue that part of the reaction on inflation is captured by the coefficient on the US interest rate 
included in their equation. An increase in global inflation would then lead to a composed 
reaction, which is partly due to domestic inflation via the conventional inflation coefficient 
and partly due to foreign inflation via the coefficient on the foreign interest rate. One might 
similarly argue that the exchange rate included in the interest rate rule partially takes the 
reaction on inflation, as it anchors expectations on future monetary policy. Another argument, 
proposed by (Golinelli & Rovelli 2005) is that the reaction to an increase in inflation may be 
modest, if the initial interest rate compared to inflation was set high enough. Thus a smaller 
coefficient means that in the course of the disinflation process monetary policy is getting even 
more aggressive. The scenario seems to be well applicable to the CEEC’s. However, one 
would at least expect the inflation coefficient to be close to unity during periods of 
autonomous monetary policy. 
Besides the above mentioned empirical research, the treatment of exchange rate changes 
in monetary policy rules is also discussed in the theoretical literature. (Svensson 2000) 
compares strict inflation targeting (when stabilizing inflation around the inflation target is the 
only objective for monetary policy) with flexible inflation targeting (when there are additional 
objectives for monetary policy). His results also indicate that strict inflation targeting implies 
a vigorous use of the direct exchange rate channel for stabilizing (CPI-) inflation at a short 
horizon. In contrast, flexible inflation targeting ends up stabilizing inflation at a longer 
horizon, and thereby also stabilizes real exchange rates and other variables to a significant 
extent. In comparison with the Taylor rule, the reaction function under inflation targeting in 
an open economy respond to more information, in particular to foreign disturbances. The 
particular importance of the exchange rate for monetary policy rules in the case of emerging 
economies is also stressed by (Amato & Gerlach 2002). 
(Taylor 2001) argues that a monetary policy rule that reacts directly to the exchange rate, 
as well as to inflation and output, sometimes works worse than policy rules that do not react 
directly to the exchange rate and thereby avoid more erratic fluctuations in the interest rate. In 
(Taylor 2002), however, he points out that monetary policy in open economies is different 
from that in closed economies. Open-economy policymakers seem reluctant to considerable 
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variability in exchange rate. In his view they should target a measure of inflation that filters 
out the transitory effects of exchange rate fluctuations and they should also include the 
exchange rate in their policy reaction functions. He leaves open to further research, whether 
the exchange rate should appear on the left- or the right-hand side of the rule – that is, 
whether the policy instrument should be an interest rate or rather a monetary condition index.  
(Frömmel et al. 2009) extend the existing work on monetary policy rules in CEEC’s by 
splitting up the exchange rate into two components, one of them (bt) capturing the “technical” 
reaction to deviations from the central parity in a peg, and the other one (st) measuring 
trends in the exchange rate:  
 tttttt bsyri  
***  (5.1) 
With r* being a long run real exchange rate, t the in inflation rate, t* the inflation gap, 
and yt* the output gap. The “band distance” bt is a nonlinear function of the exchange 
rate’s distance to the edges of the band of a currency peg (if there is one at that time), as 
shown in Figure 4.  
The band distance reflects pressure on the exchange rate, as every time the market rate 
tends to or actually does exceed one of the borders, the central bank is obliged to react by 
interventions and/or interest rate changes. This implies that there should be a strong influence 
of the band distance on the interest rate stance of the monetary policy. The closer the 
exchange rate comes to the intervention margins the stronger the central bank should react, 
and the values of bt increase dramatically during times of crises, when boundaries are reached 
or exceeded.  
 
[Insert here: Figure 4: The band distance] 
 
[Insert here: Figure 5: The Derivation of the band distance element from the historical 
exchange rate peg values for Hungary (forint/ Deutsche mark)] 
 
[Insert here: Figure 6: The Derivation of the band distance element from the historical 
exchange rate peg values for the Czech Republic (Czech Koruna/ Deutsche Mark)] 
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the evolution of the band distance element as an example for 
Hungary (crawling peg) and the Czech Republic (horizontal peg) respectively. Obviously the 
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band distance takes in general higher values if the exchange rate pegs are narrow (i.e., during 
the first parts of the respective sample periods). Furthermore the violation of the band during 
the Czech exchange rate crisis 1997 substantially increased the pressure on the Czech interest 
rate policy. 
(Frömmel et al. 2009) estimate equation (5.1) in a cointegration approach and let the 
coefficients vary depending on whether the exchange rate regime is classified as “fixed” or 
“floating” regime. They find that, during the “fixed exchange rate regime” the Taylor 
principle is violated, but the band distance explains most of the interest rate variation. This is 
in line with the argument by (Angeloni et al. 2007), see above. In contrast, in the “flexible 
exchange rate regime” for all countries but Slovakia the Taylor principle is fulfilled. Their 
approach therefore leads to a substantial improvement of empirical results. 
Two interesting features stand out. First, the exchange rates of Central and Eastern 
European countries often had appreciating pressure during fixed regimes and therefore, were 
close to the strong edge of the narrow bands (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). Second, the values 
increase dramatically during times of crises, when boundaries are reached or exceeded (see 
Figure 6). 
 
6. Exchange rate regimes and interventions 
Monetary policy influences the exchange rate. In this section we review how central bank 
interventions and central bank communication can influence the exchange rate. A basic 
insight of the research on central bank interventions (for surveys see e.g. (Sarno & Taylor 
2001; Vitale 2007)) is that interventions are able to move the exchange rate. They affect the 
first two moments of the exchange rate (Scalia 2008) and the impact is usually stronger in 
emerging than in developed countries (Canales-Kriljenko 2003). This may be due to less 
sterilization, the market's size and organization.  
Besides direct interventions central bank communication may also be seen as a form of 
intervention, that is – although less obvious at first sight – able to affect the exchange rate as 
well (Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2007). There is a huge amount of research providing some 
ambiguous empirical evidence on an exchange rate impact of central bank communication 
(see the survey in (Blinder et al. 2008)). The impact of verbal interventions or communication 
stems from their role in anchoring expectations on future monetary policy, i.e. the signaling or 
expectation channel of monetary policy (Sarno & Taylor 2001), but also by functioning as a 
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coordination advice for market participants (Reitz & Taylor 2008). Thus, communication may 
complement intervention or substitute it (Fratzscher 2008). 
Due to the more dynamic economic environment in a transition economy verbal 
interventions may be more effective than in developed markets. However, again most of the 
work deals with developed markets, mostly for the FOMC, the ECB, the Bank of England and 
the Bank of Japan, and there are only few papers that focus on transition economies: (Rozkrut 
et al. 2007) find for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, that speeches about monetary 
policy affect the exchange rate. (Égert 2007) finds influence of central bank communication 
for Hungary, but not for other CEEC’s. He also concludes that the Hungarian National Bank 
(MNB) used actual interventions very rarely, but mainly relies on verbal interventions. The 
latter is also analyzed by (Frömmel et al. 2010) who estimate the impact of communication by 
central bankers and politicians on high-frequency exchange rates. They find that central bank 
communication mainly affects the exchange rate indirectly via order flow, i.e., signed 
transaction volume.  
 
7. Conclusion  
The exchange rates of CEEC’s have been subject of numerous studies. In this selective 
survey we have described the evolution of exchange rate arrangements of CEEC’s and 
reviewed four aspects of their exchange rate policy: the deviation of de facto from de jure 
exchange rate regimes, the relation between exchange rate volatility and exchange rate 
arrangements, the inclusion of exchange rates in monetary policy rules and the intervention 
policy of CEEC’s.  
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Abstract 
We study intraday jumps on a pure limit order FX market by linking them to news 
announcements and liquidity shocks. First, we show that jumps are frequent and contribute 
greatly to the return volatility. Nearly half of the jumps can be linked with scheduled and 
unscheduled news announcements. Furthermore, we show that jumps are information based, 
whether they are linked with news announcements or not. Prior to jumps, liquidity does not 
deviate from its normal level, nor do liquidity shocks offer any predictive power for jump 
occurrence. Jumps emerge not as a result of unusually low liquidity but rather as a result of an 
unusually high demand for immediacy concentrated on one side of the book. During and after 
the jump, a dynamic order placement process emerges: some participants endogenously 
become liquidity providers and absorb the increased demand for immediacy. We detect an 
interesting asymmetry and find the liquidity providers to be more reluctant to add liquidity 
when confronted with a news announcement around the jump. Further evidence shows that 
participants submit more limit orders relative to market orders after a jump. Consequently, the 
informational role of order flow becomes less pronounced in the thick order book after the 
jump. 
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News, Liquidity Dynamics and Intraday Jumps: 
Evidence from the HUF/EUR Market 
1.  Introduction 
Jumps, which are significant discontinuities in asset prices, have been an important topic 
in financial research over the last few decades.  Empirical research shows that jumps in 
financial time series are common and contribute greatly to asset volatility. As an integral part 
of the underlying price process, they pose extreme price risk for traders and they are of vital 
importance for risk management purposes.  
Our study investigates intraday jumps on the exchange market and their relation to 
macroeconomic news releases and the liquidity dynamics of the limit order book. We study 
the interbank HUF/ EUR exchange market over a two-year sample period (2003 and 2004). 
First, we detect jumps and document their prevalence and size on an emerging foreign 
exchange market, which is characterized by relatively low trading volumes. In previous 
research, jumps have been related with macroeconomic news of various sorts. We investigate 
to what extent these results also hold for this market. Besides scheduled macroeconomic 
announcements, we also incorporate real-time, unscheduled announcements in our dataset. 
Furthermore, it has been put forward by Lahaye et al. (2011) that jumps which cannot be 
related to news announcements can be caused by insufficient market liquidity.  
However, the concept of liquidity is elusive as it has multiple dimensions (Amihud 2002; 
Pástor & Stambaugh 2003; Acharya & Pedersen 2005). For example, Liu (2006) defines 
liquidity as the ability to trade large quantities quickly at low cost and with little price impact. 
Four dimensions, namely trading quantity (depth), trading speed (immediacy), trading cost 
(tightness), and price impact (resiliency) emerge from this definition. As one of our motives is 
to pin down the cause of the jump, we map the different dimensions of liquidity that can be 
observed in the limit order book, and investigate whether there is any systematic pattern prior 
to the jump. We find that the jump itself influences the behavior of market participants, and 
we shed a new light on how traders formalize their “make or take” decision during and after a 
jump. We link our work with empirical regularities regarding traders’ order placement 
strategy, and investigate to what extent they still hold under extreme market conditions.   
By definition, jumps are latent as they are an integral part of the price process, which 
makes them difficult to estimate. In their seminal work, Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard 
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(2004) show that under maintained conditions the quadratic variation process could be 
decomposed into an integrated variation component and a jump component. Moreover, they 
provide two non-parametric measures of volatility designed for the discrete nature of 
empirical high-frequency data: realized variance and realized bipower variation. The former 
measures the quadratic variation while the latter measures the integrated variation. The 
difference between the two provides a consistent estimate of the jump component under 
maintained conditions. In their later work, Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006b) propose 
several finite sample jump detection statistics based on asymptotic distribution theory. Huang 
and Tauchen (2005) further provide extensive simulation evidence in support of the finite 
sample properties of these jump test statistics. The jump detection method has been applied in 
empirical researches of various settings. For example, Andersen et al. (2007a) confirm the 
existence of jumps in FX, equity and treasury markets and make important progress in the 
forecasting realized volatility by separating the jump component from its continuous sample 
path counterpart. Beine et al. (2007) find that coordinated interventions by central banks in 
FX markets cause fewer but more pronounced jumps after accounting for the announcement 
effect.  
More recently, various attempts have been made to modify the jump identification 
method, so that it can pin down the exact timing of the jump at the intraday level. Andersen et 
al. (2007b) and Andersen et al. (2010) present a recursive jump detection method for 
identifying intraday jumps, thereby providing superior information on jumps. Alternative 
methods to detect intraday jumps have also been presented by Lee and Mykland (2008), Jiang 
et al. (2011) and Boudt and Petitjean (201x) among others.  
The advances made in jump detection methods enjoy a burst of recent analysis on the link 
between macroeconomic fundamentals (news) and jumps on various financial markets.  
Huang (2007) confirms that jumps occur more frequently on news-days than on non-news 
days in US futures market. Focusing on US treasury market, Dungey et al. (2009) find that the 
majority of cojumps are associated with scheduled news releases, which is later confirmed by 
Jiang et al. (2011). Placing more emphasis on the general regularity of jump dynamics across 
different asset markets (US stock, Treasury and USD/EUR market), Evans (2011) documents 
that around one-third of the intraday jumps occur immediately after the release of news and 
that the informational shocks explain large proportions of the jump magnitude. In their 
seminal work, Lahaye et al. (2011) analyze the difference in size, frequency and timing of 
jumps across three US stock index futures, one treasury bond futures and four major currency 
pairs, and further link these dynamics to their likely sources (such as informational shocks). 
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Several stylized facts emerge from their work: first, foreign exchange markets experience 
significantly more jumps while the average jump magnitude is smaller compared to other 
asset markets. Second, the link between macroeconomic news and jumps is weaker in foreign 
exchange markets than in other asset markets, which Lahaye et al. (2011) attribute to the 
restricted news dataset and other possible sources of jumps such as idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks commonly observed in the currency markets during the slow trading process.   
Related high frequency studies have also examined the relation between liquidity 
dynamics of the market and jumps. Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2011) find that trading volume, 
as a rough gauge of market liquidity, explains independently a small portion of jumps in the 
US stock market, as trading volume reaches its highest value during the 5 minute interval 
prior to the jump. Using a probit model, Jiang et al. (2011) confirm that lagged liquidity 
shocks are able to predict the occurrence of jumps after accounting for the effect of 
informational shocks. Using an event study approach, Boudt and Petitjean (201x) document 
that jumps are largely driven by a sharp rise in the demand for immediacy, as the number of 
trades increases dramatically prior to jumps, while market depth at the best price does not 
decay as commonly expected. To sum up, potential economic sources of jumps in financial 
markets include scheduled macroeconomic news, unscheduled news releases, and market 
liquidity shocks. 
An independent strand in the microstructure literature has focused on investors’ order 
submission strategies in limit order book markets: the classical “make or take” decisions (see 
Bloomfield et al. 2005, among others). On the theory side, Cohen et al. (1981), Glosten 
(1994), Seppi (1997), Harris (1998), Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Sandås (2001), 
Hollifield et al. (2004), Foucault et al. (2005) and Roşu (2009) develop liquidity-based 
models of limit-order book. The main predictions of these models include that (1) the 
proportion of limit orders relative to market orders increases subsequent to a rise in asset 
volatility, (2) the proportion of limit orders relative to market orders increases subsequent to 
the widening of spreads, and (3) own side depth encourages the submission of market orders. 
On the empirical side, Biais et al. (1995), Griffiths et al. (2000), Ahn et al. (2001), Ranaldo 
(2004) and Cao et al. (2008) have provided consistent evidence with these predictions. More 
recently, experimental and empirical studies based on information-based models of the limit 
order book uniformly suggest that informed traders tend to use, under certain conditions, limit 
orders at the side where liquidity is needed (see Bloomfield et al. 2005; Kaniel & Liu 2006 , 
among others). Bloomfield et al. (2005) posit that, under certain conditions, informed traders 
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change their order aggressiveness over the trading period by submitting limit orders at the 
side where liquidity is scarce as they are less subject to adverse selection costs.  
Jumps are sudden price spikes that pose significant price risk to investors. Obviously, it is 
interesting to examine traders’ “make or take” decisions under these extreme market 
conditions. Moreover, it is of great interest to test whether the predictions regarding traders’ 
order placement strategy still hold conditioning on the occurrence of jumps with and without 
macroeconomic news. In spite of the relevance of the topic, there are to the best of our 
knowledge no works that investigate the order placement strategies around intraday jumps.  
Our article contributes to the empirical studies on jumps in at least three ways: First, we 
apply an established jump identification method to a small and less liquid exchange rate 
market in contrast to existing work which focuses on the most liquid major currency pairs 
such as USD/EUR and USD/GBP. Our aim is to examine to which extent the jump dynamics 
exhibited in these major currencies could be generalized to the other currencies, in particular 
the Hungarian forint. One could expect jumps would be more prevalent in the HUF/EUR 
market than in major exchange rate markets due to its illiquidity and relatively small market 
capitalization as examined in Frömmel et al. (2011). Our results confirm that jumps are large 
and prevalent  in a relatively illiquid market such as HUF/EUR market.  Around 18.2% of our 
sample days are identified as containing at least one intraday jump with the jump component 
contributing nearly one-half of the realized volatility during these jump days.  
Secondly, we extend the announcement effect literature by investigating the link between 
jumps and news releases of various sorts. Our enlarged news dataset covers not only the 
scheduled macroeconomic news announcements, but also the unscheduled news 
announcements which will change investors’ expectation on future fundamentals.  The 
enlarged news dataset also enables us to (informally) compare the relative importance of 
different news categories. Our results suggest that both scheduled and unscheduled news are 
related to jumps with the unscheduled news such as polls, surveys, forecasts and analysis on 
(future) fundamentals producing the most of the jumps (30.4%). 
Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to bridge the gap between 
jump-related literature and the order placement literature. Using event study methodology,  
we zoom in on the dynamics of various liquidity dimensions around jumps, providing a 
comprehensive picture on how the limit order book looks like before, during and after the 
jump. We are the first to do this for this type of analysis for the foreign exchange market. 
Furthermore, we test whether the predictions from limit order book models for order 
placement still hold under these extreme market conditions. We find only a very weak, if any, 
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pattern in liquidity prior to jumps after controlling for the announcement effect. Consistent 
with Boudt and Petitjean (201x), we find that jumps do not emerge as a result of unusually 
low liquidity, but as a result of an unusually high demand for immediacy concentrated on one 
side of the limit order book, implying increased information asymmetry across traders during 
the jump period. Moreover, more limit orders are added to the ask (bid) side subsequent to a 
positive (negative) jump, confirming the existence of discretionary liquidity providers who 
supply liquidity at the side where it is needed the most. We also observe an interesting 
asymmetry in post-jump resiliency, which is clearly higher for negative jumps than for 
positive jumps. Finally, we perform an additional regression-type analysis to show that post-
jump transaction order flow is less informative, as more limit orders relative to market orders 
are submitted to the order book subsequent to jumps. Overall, our results confirm the 
predictions from limit order book models: the submission of limit orders is encouraged by the 
widening of  the spread and increased volatility caused by a  jump. 
To presage our results, the rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a 
pure order-driven FX market in general and our unique dataset in particular. Section 3 
explains our theoretical framework regarding the jump detection method. Section 4 presents 
our empirical findings regarding the jump dynamics and the announcement effect. Section 5 
presents our event-study results on the liquidity dynamics around jumps. Section 6 provides 
further evidence on pre-jump and post-jump liquidity patterns. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
The foreign exchange market 
The foreign exchange market is a two-tier market. Trades on the foreign exchange market 
can be divided into customer trades, i.e. trades between a bank and customers (the ultimate 
end-users, for instance importing and exporting firms, mutual or hedge funds, governments 
and central banks) and interbank trades. In this work we focus on the interbank market, to 
which customers do not have access. It is here that the price formation takes place. The 
market is a pure order-driven market, without designated market maker. Participants can 
submit orders 24h a day. The majority of trades on this market are nowadays done via 
electronic broking systems. Since their introduction in 1992 their share in total transaction 
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volume has steadily increased, depending on the country, from 4 to 6 per cent in 1995 to more 
than 55% of the interbank market in 2010 (BIS 1996, 2010).
14
 
There are two main platforms competing in the foreign exchange market: Reuters D3000 
and EBS (Electronic Broking System). In our analysis we rely on the Reuters D3000 system. 
As an electronic limit order book it contains buy and sell orders in a price-time priority. Euro 
sale and purchase offers are placed at limit prices. Besides these limit orders, consisting of the 
maximum respectively minimum price and the quantity offered to be traded, it is also possible 
to place a market order, i.e., an order without a specified price. They are immediately matched 
with the best corresponding limit order and thus more aggressive. While limit orders add 
liquidity to the limit order book, market orders take liquidity from the book. The following 
matches may lead to a trade: two limit orders that are matched up by the system, or a market 
order that is matched up with the best limit order on the opposite side.  
The HUF/EUR market 
Our dataset consists of all quotes, i.e., limit and market orders, on the HUF/EUR interbank 
market that have been placed during the years 2003 and 2004 via the Reuters D3000 broking 
system. Because at this time the competing system EBS did not offer services for the 
HUF/EUR market, the dataset covers the complete trading on electronic brokerage platforms, 
and thus the major part of  the total market activity (which would also include OTC trades). 
The HUF trade accounted during or sample period for only 0.22% of the global turnover on 
the FX market (BIS 2005). This dataset was also described in Gereben and Kiss M. (2006). In 
Table 1 we present various summary statistics for the activity on this market, such as the 
number of quotes and trades and the distribution over trade size for the whole sample period 
and for each year individually. 
The reconstruction of the limit order book 
Our dataset contains the price, the quantity in euro that was offered or asked, whether it 
was a market or a limit order and the exact time when the order was placed and when it 
disappeared. We observe whether the order was withdrawn or whether it was executed, i.e., 
matched with another limit or market order. We do not observe the identity of the traders.Our 
analysis requires information on the state of the limit order book at the intraday level. We 
therefore reconstruct the order book, and update it whenever a new event occurs (limit order 
submission, market order submission, limit order cancellation). When a new limit order is 
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 The share of electronic trading in interbank trading is by some authors even estimated at 85% of the total 
interbank activity (Sager & Taylor 2006). 
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submitted, the order book is (re-)calculated by adding all activated limit orders to the relevant 
side of the book.
15
 When a new market order is submitted, it is verified whether the activated 
orders that leave the book upon submission of the order cover the market order. If not, the 
liquidity available for the activated limit orders at the opposite side of the book is adapted. A 
marketable limit order is treated in the same way as a market order, but if it has not been filled 
completely it will stay in the book with a reduced volume.
 16
 Cancelation of existing limit 
orders is also taken into account: it is verified whether orders leave the book before the next 
order is submitted to the trading platform. Each time this happens, a new event is identified 
and added to the time series of limit order book states. The event time will here be the 
removal time of the order. To obtain the new order book state the post-event orders are sorted 
according to price and time priority. 
The output of the limit order book reconstruction process is a series of observations in 
event-time, with for each event a timestamp at 10 ms. precision and all orders at the bid and 
ask side (with their respective quotes, quantities, record numbers, entering and removal 
times). For very short periods zero or negative spreads can be observed. Their presence can be 
explained by the absence of clearing agreements between certain banks (in this case, the two 
banks who have posted the best orders at the respective sides of the book do not have such an 
agreement). As other banks, which do have clearing agreements with the issuers of the best 
orders from both sides, can take advantage of this situation, these zero or negative spreads are 
short-lived.  
We leave out legally recognized holidays in Hungary and weekends.
17 
Figure 1 shows 
graphically the evolution of the HUF/EUR quote and the volume traded via the electronic 
limit order book. Furthermore, we only use data from 7am till 7pm CET. Figure 2 shows the 
bimodal intraday distribution of ticks (with e.g. the quantity of ticks displayed at 5 containing 
all ticks between 5am till 6am). After the time filter, we still cover almost the complete 
market activity. Table 2 shows key characteristics of the orders submitted to the market over 
the sample period, split up per half-year. The type of orders is shown to be very stable over 
time: 15-16% of the orders are market orders, 54-60% of the orders are limit orders which are 
cancelled without execution and 25-30% of the orders are limit orders which are partly 
                                                 
15
 Activated orders are the orders which have been entered before the event time, and which have not left the 
book at the event time. Activated orders should not be confused with active orders (i.e. orders which initiate a 
trade). 
16
 A marketable limit order is a limit order that can be immediately executed, because its price is equal to or 
better than the best quote from the opposite side of the book. 
17
 For 2003 these were: 1/01, 15/03, 21/04, 1/05, 9/06, 20/08, 23/10, 1/11, 25/12 and 26/12. For 2004 these were: 
1/01, 15/03, 12/04, 1/05, 31/05, 20/08, 23/10, 1/11, 25/12 and 26/12. 
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matched with market orders or with marketable limit orders. This implies that only 30-35.20% 
of the limit orders are executed to some extent. This share is fully in line with what has been 
found for the GBP/ USD and the EUR/ GBP pair, for which the identical ratio was 
respectively 36.10% and 27.50% over 2003 and 2004 (Kozhan et al. 2012). Cancellations are 
used strategically by foreign exchange traders: they are used to display liquidity which is 
removed before it can be taken, but also to adapt the trader’s quotes to the market 
environment. When we look to the order size, we find that major part (71-79%) of the orders 
have a size of € 1 mill., which is the minimum size. The fact that trades for the minimum size 
dominate is consistent with a widespread use of order splitting strategies by traders (in an 
attempt to minimize the market impact, see also Kyle (1985). Table 3 presents basic 
descriptives of the limit order book. The quoted spread increases in the second half of 2003 
(from 0.31 to 0.39 HUF/EUR) and decreases in 2004 (till 0.24 HUF/EUR). The average 
breadth (the quantity available at the best quote) is, interestingly, always bigger on the bid 
side. The same accounts for the average depth over the whole order book. In the second half 
of 2003 and the second half of 2004 we observe a sudden and large increase in depth at the 
bid side. This unusually high depth is caused by positive outliers: in the periods 24/9/2003-
9/10/2003 and 10/11/2004-31/12/2004 there are unusually high orders added to the bid side 
(however, away from the best quote). The number of price levels at the bid side is on average 
6-7. At the ask side there seems to be a slight increase in the average number of levels (from 
5.64 in the first half of 2003 till 7.35 in the second half of 2004). 
The advantage of our dataset for the analysis of jumps and their link with liquidity is 
threefold. First, on the foreign exchange market orders can be submitted on a continuous 
basis. There are, in contrast to for example equity markets, no opening or closing sessions that 
can affect the data. As the observed price and liquidity can never be driven by these artificial 
operations, the dynamics between announcements and liquidity should become clear more 
easily. Secondly, we are able to observe the complete liquidity as there are no orders which 
display only part of their total volume (iceberg orders). By consequence we have a clear view 
on the supply and demand on the market. Thirdly, we cover the lion’s share of the market 
activity on the HUF/EUR market (most of  the trading activity on the HUF/EUR market takes 
place via electronic limit order books, and we completely cover this form of trading). 
Compared to other studies, our dataset is unusually rich. This is to our knowledge the only 
study in which a complete tick-by-tick database and a full order book over a timespan as long 
as two years is used for the foreign exchange market.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Jump Detection 
Realized variance and Bipower variation 
We assume that the log-price p(t) of the underlying asset follows a continuous-time jump-
diffusion process (i.e. a Brownian semimartingale with finite jump process), as is traditionally 
used in asset pricing (Andersen et al. 2007b; Lee & Mykland 2008; Evans 2011):  
  ( )   ( )    ( )  ( )   ( )  ( ) [3.1] 
where μ(t) is the continuous and bounded drift term, σ(t) a strictly positive stochastic 
volatility process with a sample path that is right continuous and has well defined limits, 
W(t) a standard Brownian motion, q(t) is a counting process with possible time-varying 
intensity λ(t) (which implies P[dp(t) = 1]= λ(t) dt), and k(t) ≡ p(t) - p(t-) is the size of the 
corresponding discontinuous jump in the underlying log-price movement, provided the 
jump exists.  
Given the above theoretical setup, the quadratic variation (QV) for the cumulative return 
process over a fixed time interval T, consists of both, the continuous volatility component and 
the contribution of jumps to volatility. It is defined as:  
[   ]  ∫  
 ( )   ∑   ( )
     
 
 
 [3.2] 
According to Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004),  a non-parametric measure of the 
daily return variation, realized variance (RV), is defined as the summation of the M high 
frequency intra-daily squared returns within day i:  
    ∑    
 
 
   
 [3.3] 
where ri,j is the return in the interval j out of M intervals on day i.
18
  
Based on the theory of quadratic variation (Barndorff-Nielsen & Shephard 2004, 2006a), 
realized variance converges to its probability limit, the increment of the quadratic variation 
process as the sampling frequency M tends to infinity: 
                                                 
18
 We refer to ri as the return on day i, and to rij as the return in interval j on day i. Therefore daily and intradaily 
returns are linked by  

M
j jii rr 1 ,  , with a total of M subintervals for each day. 
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    ∫  
 ( )   ∑   ( )
       
 
   
 [3.4] 
Therefore, the realized variance is a consistent estimator of the total return variation 
regardless of the existence of within-day jumps.  
To decompose the continuous sample path component from the QV process, Barndorff-
Nielsen and Shephard (2006a) introduce the scaled realized bipower variation (BPV), defined 
as the summation of the product of adjacent absolute high frequency returns standardized by a 
constant: 
       
  ∑               
 
   
 [3.5] 
where   =  (   )  √    and 
)1,0(~ Nu .  
Under some further assumptions
19
 regarding the underlying log-price dynamics in 
equation [3.1], the (scaled) realized bipower variation converges uniformly in probability to 
the integrated volatility as M tends to infinity (for a proof see Theorem 2 in Barndorff-Nielsen 
and Shephard (2004)): 
     ∫  
 ( )  
 
   
 [3.6] 
Therefore, the difference between the realized variance and the (scaled) realized bipower 
varition provides a consistent estimation of the pure jump contribution to the quadratic 
variation process within the day, as M tends to infinity: 
         ∑  
 ( )
       
 [3.7] 
Based on the relation between realized variance and bipower variation it is then possible 
to construct tests for the occurrence of jumps, see Huang and Tauchen (2005) for a survey. 
We rely on the ratio test statistics (Z) to identify statistically significant jumps (See Huang and 
Tauchen 2005): 
                                                 
19
 As is further demonstrated in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006a), the only additional assumption 
required is that the stochastic volatility σ(t) is independent of the standardized Brownian motion W(t) in equation 
[3.1] 
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with the tripower quarticity (TQ) defined as   
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 [3.9] 
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)⁄        .  
Under maintained assumptions, equation [3.8] implies that the ratio statistic follows 
standard normal distribution. Following the literature we set the significant level to α = 
0.0001 and therefore the critical value is           .  
Microstructure noise and jump measurements 
In practice, the assumed regularity of the log-price movement is contaminated by market 
microstructure frictions such as discrete price tick, bid-ask spread bounce and etc. On the one 
hand, the existence of microstructure noise in the underlying log-price process renders 
realized variance an inconsistent estimator of its probability limit (the quadratic variation) 
(Andersen et al. 2007b). On the other hand, both the realized bipower variation and tripower 
quarticity are biased against the finding of significant jumps due to the noise-induced first-
order autocorrelation revealed in the high frequency return series. To alleviate the adverse 
effect of microstructure noise on jump detection scheme, we tackle the problem in two ways: 
first, we choose a ten-minute sampling frequency at which the microstructure frictions no 
longer present a distorting influence on realized variance (Andersen et al. 2010)
20
. Second, we 
modify the calculation of realized bipower variation and tripower quarticity by replacing the 
adjacent absolute returns in equation [3.5] and [3.9] with their staggered counterparts to break 
up the spurious autocorrelation pattern observed in the high frequency return series (similar to  
Andersen et al. (2007a); Beine et al. (2007); Evans (2011); among others): 
                                                 
20
 The volatility signature plots in Andersen et al. (2010) suggests that there’s a systematic declining pattern in 
the realized variance measure as the sampling frequency increases in the range of 5 to 300 seconds, which 
destabilizes our measurement of RV (and hence the difference between RV and BPV), therefore, a 10-minute 
sampling scheme seems an appropriate, albeit somewhat conservative, method to control microstructure noise.  
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 [3.11] 
The staggered version of realized bipower variation and tripower quarticity is then used in 
equation [3.8] to compute the new ratio test statistic for jump detection. Huang and Tauchen 
(2005) show that the ratio Z-statistic with staggering offers improved size and power 
properties in finite sample simulation and is quite robust to the size of microstructure noise.  
When the null hypothesis that there is no intraday jump is rejected based on the daily test 
statistic, we apply the sequential intraday jump detection scheme proposed by Andersen et al. 
(2010) to identify all the intraday jumps and their associated timing within the day.
 21
 This 
sequential intraday jump detection scheme consists of several steps. If the ratio statistic (Z) is 
significant at day i, we first assume that only one intraday return contributes to the significant 
Z-stat and then proceed as follows: 
 Step 1: We record the significant ratio statistic Zi and extract the series of the M intraday 
(geometric) returns {                 } within day i.  
Step 2: For each intraday return      ( j=1,2,…,M ) at day i, we generate a modified series 
{                            } by replacing the jth element with the average of the 
remaining M-1 returns (denoted as       ), while keeping the rest unchanged. Then we 
recalculate the RV measure and its corresponding Z-stat (denoted as   
( )
) with the 
following two formulas: 
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[3.13]       
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 Jiang and Oomen (2008) and Jiang et al. (2011) use a similar sequential jump identification scheme with the 
slight difference that they use the median of the remaining intraday returns to calculate the revised ratio 
statistics.  
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Hence, we obtain a series of M revised Z-stats {  
( )
   
( )
      
( )
} for the ith sample 
day.
22
   
Step 3: We calculate the differences between the original Z-stat and (each of) the new Z-
stats {     
( )      
( )         
( )
}. The significant jump return      is identified 
when the following mathematical expression achieves its maximum.  
 {       } (      {     }
     
( )
) [3.14] 
Step 4: We retain the revised Z-stat (  
( )
) identified in Step 3. If   
( )
 is less than the pre-
set critical value, we conclude that there is only one jump on day i. However, if it still 
exceeds the critical value, we then assume that a second intraday jump exist on day i and 
start over again from Step 1 to Step 4 with the new geometric return series 
{                                    } of M-1 elements.
23
 
The above recursive procedure continues until all the intraday jumps within day i  are 
identified. In this way, we are able to detect all the intraday jumps throughout the 2-year 
sample period.   
3.2. Event study methodology 
Following the literature, we analyze the intraday liquidity dyanamics around jumps using 
the intraday event study methodology in Section 5 (see Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Gomber et al. 
2013; Mazza 2013 , for similar application). We employ a variety of liquidity measures 
commonly used in the empirical literature to capture the different dimensions of the market 
liquidity (eg. Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Mazza 2013). Appendix I gives a full-fledged 
definition of all the liquidity measures used in the study. 
The event study approach proceeds as follows: first, we construct a centered jump event 
window which includes the six 10-minute intervals before and after the jump event. Second, 
we exclude intraday jumps which are clustered in time in order to avoid contagion effect. That 
is, when two jumps occur within the same day, they must be separated in time by at least two 
hours. Otherwise, both of the jumps are excluded from our sample. For similar concerns, days 
                                                 
22
 Following Andersen et al. (2010) and Jiang et al. (2011), we do not change the value of  BPV and TQ based on 
the revised intraday return series. The theoretical justification is that BPV and TQ are asymptotically robust to 
the existence of jump(s). 
23
 More generally, after identifying n jumps (n>1), we filter out the n significant jumps to obtain a new series of 
geometric returns with M-n elements. The revised RV measure is then computed by first summing up the squared 
returns of the remaining M-n elements, and then scaling the summation by a factor of M/(M-n).  
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with three or more jumps are also excluded from the final sample. Third, all liquidity 
measures are standardized to make them comparable across days and intraday periods. Given 
the fact that liquidity measures are highly skewed at the intraday level and have strong 
seasonal patterns, we opt for the novel standardization procedure highlighted in Boudt and 
Petitjean (201x). Appendix II provides a detailed description on the standardization 
procedure. Fourth, we aggregate across individual jump events for a single point estimate. We 
favor the median value, rather than the mean value, of the standardized liquidity measure 
across individual events as our point estimator. The rationale behind our preference is well-
grounded. First, liquidity measures such as number of trades, trading volume, and depth (per 
ten minutes) have a lower bound of zero, while in theory they do not have an upper bound. 
Therefore, the distribution of their standardized value remains highly skewed, which is also 
confirmed in our sample. Second, as argued by Boudt et al. (2011), the median of the 
standardized liquidity measures on non-jump days will be 1 for depth and volume measures 
and 0 for order and depth imbalance measures by construction. In that case, the interpretation 
of the median of the standardized liquidity measure is quite straightforward: it shows the 
(percentage) deviation from the typical levels during the same time of the day. Fifth, a 
Wilcoxon rank sum test on the median is performed to evaluate the null hypothesis that price 
jumps do not have any effect on liquidity. In order words, liquidity measures tend to stay at 
their normal level around jumps (median value of the standardized liquidity measures is zero). 
The alternative hypothesis is that liquidity measures are either abnormally lower or higher 
than their normal level around jumps. 
It is important to mention that we explicitly distinguish between positive jump events and 
negative jumps events, as positive jumps are mostly linked with large market buy orders 
combined with the paucity of liquidity at the ask side while negative jumps are linked with 
large market sell orders combined with the paucity at the bid side. In other words, we expect 
the liquidity dynamics around positive jumps and negative jumps to mirror each other in the 
mechanical sense: what we, for example, see on the bid side during a positive jump interval 
should be compared with what we see on the ask side during a negative jump interval.  
Therefore, we distinguish in our final event study between positive jump events and negative 
jump events. For each category, we further divide them into positive (negative) jumps events 
associated with news announcements and positive (negative) jumps events without news 
announcements.  
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4. Jumps and news announcements  
Prevalence and size of jumps 
In this subsection, we investigate the jump intensity and magnitude for the HUF/EUR 
rates, which is a relatively illiquid market compared to major currencies such as USD/EUR. 
The results are summarized in Table 4. We detect 90 realized jump days with at least one 
intraday jump. There are 125 intraday jumps in total (see Table 5). The jump intensity—
defined as the ratio of realized jump days to total trading days—is 18.2% for our sample 
period, which is quite similar to the jump frequency found in prior literature on the major 
currency markets: Beine et al. (2007) report a jump intensity of 10%–13% for the USD/EUR 
and JPY/USD markets between 1987 and 2004. Andersen et al. (2007a) document a 14% 
jump frequency for the DEM/ USD rates between 1986 and 1999. Lahaye et al. (2011) report 
that the jump frequency lies within the range of 22%–25% for the USD/EUR, USD/GBP, 
USD/JPY and USD/CHF markets between 1987 and 2004. We further find that the average 
time length between two jump days (in the literature mostly refered to as the “jump duration”) 
is 6.6 days. We also calculate to what extent the jump component contributes to the realized 
variance on realized jump days. On average, 42.59% of the price variation on jump days can 
be attributed to jumps. This is also in line with previous work on major currencies. For 
example, Evans (2011) report a jump contribution of 35.80% on the the USD/ EUR market.  
When comparing positive and negative jumps (see Table 5), we find that the differences 
both in terms of frequency and magnitude are small and not statistically significant. 
Therefore, we can conclude that jumps are symmetric in terms of both frequency and size. 
This is consistent with previous research on major currency markets (Lahaye et al. 2011). 
We find that intraday jumps are concentrated on two periods, one in the morning (between 
8:00 and 8:20 (CET)) and one in the afternoon (between 15:50 and 16:50 (CET)). We see that 
66.67% of the jumps takes place during these timespans.  
Jumps and public news announcements
24
 
By theory, price tends to jump to the new equilibrium level immediately after new 
information (shocks) has been revealed to the market. Therefore, one obvious source of jumps 
is prescheduled macroeconomic news. These announcements represent potential shocks to the 
market if the statistics released do not match the market expectations.
25
 Previous research in 
                                                 
24
 The data on news announcements is collected from the Dow Jones Factiva database, which contains all the 
historical (news) data from the leading newswires such as Reuters and Dow Jones newswires.  
25
 Unfortunately, we cannot observe the surprise component of the announcement. 
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this field suggests that nonfarm payroll, central bank announcements, and trade balance 
shocks are the major news items that are most closely linked with foreign exchange jumps 
(Neely 2011). In this work, we also adopt a variety of macro news items such as the releases 
of GDP, PPI and trade balance information in Hungary and the European Union. To account 
for possible cross-currency pressure such as cojumps and global liquidity shocks (see Banti et 
al. 2012), we also include the macroeconomic announcements from the United States, leading 
EU countries such as Germany and France, and neighbouring CEEC countries such as 
Poland.
26, 27
 Following Lahaye et al. (2011), we attribute the jump occurrence to a news event 
using a 60-minute matching window centered around the jump. That is, if  a news event takes 
place between the 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after the jump interval, we assume that 
the jump is directly linked with it. Table 6 summarizes our findings for the 125 intraday 
jumps we identified. We can link 16% of the detected jumps with scheduled news 
announcements. The conditional probability of observing a jump given a particular sort of 
news item is the highest for GDP releases for Hungary (25%), followed by inflation releases 
for Germany (8.33%) and inflation releases for Poland (8.33%). Given a jump, there is no 
clear pattern as which type of news has a high probability of having caused the jump (not a 
single type of news has a higher conditional probability than 1.60%). 
In addition to linking jumps with prescheduled macroeconomic announcements, we also 
investigate the linkage between unscheduled news announcements and the jumps. The 
theoretical justification behind is that real-time news reports also influence market 
participants’ expectation on the fundamentals regarding the exchange rates. A more detailed 
illustration on the theoretical underpinning of the exchange rate determination is given in 
(Evans & Lyons 2005).  Following Copeland (2005), we restrict the potentially relevant, 
unscheduled news items to one of the following categories of news reports: 1) central bank 
interventions, 2) polls, surveys, forecasts, analyses by financial institutions and leading 
economists, and 3) political changes and/or natural disasters. Table 7 presents our results in 
                                                 
26
 The motivation for incorporating macroeconomic announcements for other economies is two-folded. First, 
market participants form their expectations on macroeconomic statistics for the European Union based on the 
release of national statistics, which takes place earlier than the release of the aggregated statistics. Secondly, 
recent empirical evidence on cojumps on foreign exchange markets showed that fundamental shocks to one 
currency pair can put substantial risk on linked markets (Lahaye et al. 2011; Neely 2011). 
27
 Our list of the prescheduled macroeconomic news items is comprehensive. We include CPI, GDP, current 
account balance, public sector balance, MPC meetings-base rate decisions, retail sales for Hungary; PPI, CPI, 
GDP, unemployment rate, retail trade, indusrial production, current account balance, public sector balance, 
external trades, labor costs, M3 for EU, Germany and CEEC courntries (if available); PPI, CPI, non-farm 
payroll, GDP advance, GDP preliminary, GDP final, trade balance, industrial production, umemployment rate, 
consumer confidence, new home sales, construction spending, ISM index for the US. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, US non-farm payroll, GDP releases and unemployment rates do not cause any jumps 
during our sample periods.  
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detail. We can link a significant part of the jumps (30.4%) with unscheduled news 
announcements. Amongst the 15 largest jumps, 4 jumps can be explained by this type of news 
(as much as the number of jumps that can be explained by scheduled macroeconomic news 
announcements). Overall, our results suggest that unscheduled, real-time news is another 
important source of jumps. Still, nearly half of the jumps remain unexplained, which is 
possibly due to the prevalence of private information in the FX market. Informed traders 
capitalize on their private information by taking up the liquidity of the order book, forcing the 
price to jump to a new level. Section 5 and 6 provide more in-depth evidence on our 
conjectures of informed trading by examing the liquidity dynamics around the jump.  
 
5. Jumps and liquidity dynamics 
In addition to investigating the link between public news and jumps, a proper 
understanding of jumps and where they come from requires an in-depth analysis of the 
interaction that takes place in the book around jumps. Conventional wisdom suggests that a 
jump reflects the inability of the limit order book to absorb relatively large market orders 
quickly. Therefore, large market orders have to walk up or down the book for execution. 
However, this mechanical view neglects the role of limit order flows when a jump occurs. In 
fact, the limit order book is a platform where interaction, among informed traders, market 
makers (liquidity providers) and noise traders, takes place via market and limit orders. The 
sudden increase of volatility impacts the liquidity of the market as traders (dynamically) 
revise their order placement strategy (such as order aggressiveness and order size). Therefore, 
built on theoretical models of the limit order book developed in previous research (Glosten 
1994; Foucault 1999), we further develop hypotheses on the dynamic relation between price 
jumps and the different dimensions of liquidity.
28
 We compare our findings with results for 
Dow Jones stocks, and these are currently the only other results for this type of analysis. 
In this section we describe the liquidity dynamics prior to, during and after jumps, 
incorporating both the mechanical and dynamical view (as they both can matter). The findings 
in this section shed a new light on what the cause is of jumps, whether there is a stylized 
liquidity pattern that preceeds jumps and how the jump affects the interaction that takes place. 
We apply here the event study approach (cf. supra). We are concerned about potential 
                                                 
28
 Here we use a broader definition of news, which includes now also private news such as the customer order 
flow observed by the market participant. The assumption that jumps are information-based is supported by the 
fact that we observe an increased imbalance of the order flow during jumps, which is a common proxy for 
information. Additional evidence can be found in the price reversal pattern after the jump (See Figure 4)  
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contagion between individual jumps, and therefore exclude jumps which are clustered. After 
the filtering procedure (cf. supra), 80 intraday jumps remain in our sample. These jumps will 
be used for the liquidity analysis. For clarification purpose, we present here mainly the 
liquidity dynamics around positive jumps as the liquidity dynamics around positive jumps and 
negative jumps mirror each other.
29
 The detailed results can be found in Table 8 (positive 
jumps) and Table 9 (negative jumps).  
Figure 5 till Figure 13 present boxplots for various indicators on the state of the limit 
order book (and this for each 10 minute interval from 1 hour prior to the jump till 1 hour after 
the jump). The central mark is the median, and the edges of the box are the 25
th
 and 75
th
 
percentiles. The whiskers point at the most extreme observation which is still no outlier.
30
 
5.1 Liquidity dynamics prior to the jumps   
Hypotheses: origin of jumps 
Previous literature suggests that lagged liquidity shocks in the order book such as a 
widened spread, decreased market depth and levered number of trades indicate the occurrence 
of jumps (Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Jiang et al. 2011). Our event study setting provides a 
straightforward way to validate the above predictions. In case there are pre-jump liquidity 
shocks, we should observe the median value of some liquidity variable during the pre-jump 
periods to be significantly different from zero. We distinguish three potential relations 
between preceding liquidity in the book and the occurrence of jumps: 
H1: A price jump will occur when the liquidity in the limit order book is unusually low, 
and cannot absorb a normal market order flow. 
H2: A price jump will occur when the liquidity in the limit order book is normal, and the 
market order flow is unusually high. 
H3: A price jump will occur when a high level of liquidity triggers an even higher flow of 
market orders which cannot be absorbed by the liquidity in the limit order book. 
 
 
                                                 
29
 And where this is not the case, we mention it explicitly. 
30
 Observations are considered to be outliers if they are larger than q3 + 1.5*(q3-q1) or smaller than q1-1.5*(q3-q1) 
with q1 is the 25
th
 percentile and q3 is the 75
th
 percentile. 
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Results 
Prior to a positive jump, there is no significant change in the size-weighted proportional 
quoted spread (tightness).
31
 Nor do we observe any strong trend in trading activies during the 
60 minutes prior to the jump, as trading volume stays at its normal level and transactionorder 
flow is balanced (immediacy). Furthermore, the volume of outstanding limit orders (both 
overall and at the best quote) on the side that has to absorb the jump shows no universal 
pattern in the 60 minutes prior to the jump (depth and breadth). This supports H2. Our 
findings have implications for the predictability of jumps based on the liquidity in the book, a 
topic that we explore further (See: 6.1 Predictability of jumps using probit analysis). 
5.2 Liquidity dynamics during and after the jump 
Hypotheses: interaction during jumps 
In order to interpret our observations during and after the jump, we introduce here three 
types of participants, who follow each different order placement strategies (if any). 
Participants can at each point of time be classified according to the strategy they are 
following. Especially on this type of interbank market, the same agent can apply different 
strategies depending on his specific sitation at that time.
32
 We formulate ex ante predictions 
on the overall outcome of a dynamic order placement strategy by these heterogenous agents. 
 
We distinguish respectively: 
 Informed traders: Participants who act on private information on the future evolution 
of an asset, like they are introduced in Kyle (1985). On the foreign exchange market, 
their information can be based on the customer order flow (Rime 2000). Informed 
traders can be patient (and submit aggresive limit orders) or impatient (and submit 
market orders). The motivation for informed traders to be patient includes lower price 
impact.
33
 They will, however, be impatient when their information is short-lived, or, 
following Bloomfield et al. (2005), when their private valuation lies outside the range 
of the inside quotes. Both patient and impatient informed traders can be present at the 
same time on the market, because they can have heterogenous private beliefs. 
                                                 
31
 We rely on the size-weighted spread, as this measure overweights (underweights) firm (non-firm) quotes. 
32
 In that sense, trader identities would here not be very informative. 
33
 Evidence for the existence of patient informed traders can be found in, amongst others, Eisler et al. (2011) and 
Hautsch and Huang (2012). In these works it is shown that limit orders contain information, as they have a 
permanent price impact. 
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H4: The presence of patient informed traders will, upon arrival of positive (negative) 
information, lead to increased submission of limit orders at the buy (sell) side, against 
competitive quotes. 
H5: The presence of impatient informed traders will, upon arrival of positive (negative)  
information, lead to increased submission of market buy (sell) orders. 
 Market makers: Participants who primarily provide liquidity to the market. Although 
there are no designated market makers on the interbank foreign exchange market, 
participants can be attracted by the profit market making offers. The idea that a market 
making role emerges from the trading process is also referred to as endogenous 
liquidity provision.
34
 Market makers set a spread between the best buy and best sell. 
This is the source of their revenues. When setting the spread, they take the following 
costs into account: order processing costs (representing per unit administration costs 
and fixed costs such as wages, floor space rent,…), inventory holding costs (the cost 
of holding an unwanted inventory) and adverse selection costs (a compensation for the 
risk of trading with a better informed counterparty).
35
 They will typically submit 
competitive limit orders. After a jump, which we found to be trade induced in the 
previous paragraph, the spread rises in a limit order book because the market orders 
are highly imbalanced and one side of the market gets depleted. Market makers are 
attracted by this high spread and post limit orders.
36
 This increase in supply of 
liquidity will improve the best prices, and will bring the spread back to its equilibrium 
value (eg. Goettler et al. 2005). 
H6: The presence of market makers will, upon arrival of information, lead to an increased 
provision of liquidity at the market. 
 Noise traders: Participants who do not trade based on information, but trade based on 
their liquidity needs. Their part of the flow is balanced over time. We do not observe 
noise traders in our results, as we only measure unexpected trading flows and 
unexpected liquidity. 
                                                 
34
 For a recent work dealing with the behaviour of endogenous liquidity providers in comparison to designated 
market makers, see Anand and Venkataraman (2013). 
35
 For an analysis of the importance of these components on this market, see Frömmel and Van Gysegem (2012). 
36
 As a consequence of this increased liquidity provision, the market enters then again a phase of high liquidity 
(which will afterwards again be taken away). This sequence of high liquidity – low liquidity is also referred to as 
a liquidity cycle (See e.g. Foucault et al. 2013) . 
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Results: tightness 
As jumps appear to be trade-induced, the trading volume increases during a jump interval. 
The higher number of transactions consumes the liquidity available in the market, and the 
spread will consequencly in a mechanical way go up. Moreover, liquidity providers tend to 
place limit order further away from the midquote, to avoid being picked off due to the 
increased price risk. However, the widening of the spread in combination with the paucity of 
liquidity at one side of book makes it more rewarding to provide liquidity. Discretionary 
liquidity providers see which side of book requires liquidity and will submit more limit orders 
to this side. These limit orders are designed to benefit from the increased demand for 
immediacy.  
This is also what we observe. During the jump, the spread increases with 25.09%. We see 
that liquidity providers are attracted by this spread, and bring it back to its normal level 20 
minutes after the jump (H6). The spread returns slightly quicker to its normal level after 
negative jumps. 
Results: immediacy 
Previous theoretical work predicts that order submissions tend to be clustered over time 
(amongst others, Kyle 1985; Admati & Pfleiderer 1988; Wang 1994). These findings were 
empirically confirmed by amongst others Campbell et al. (1993) and Covrig and Ng (2004). 
One could expect that by consequence an increase in volume traded will persist for some time 
after the jump. However, as spreads remain high after a jump, transactions are more costly. 
This high spread will impact traders submitting less aggressive limit orders.  
During a jump, market order submissions in the direction of the information increase 
drastically. As a result, the order flow gets more asymmetrical (with an increase of the 
imbalance with 57.89% towards more buy orders), and the trading volume increases by 180%. 
(H2, H5)  
The increased trading activity continues up till 20 minutes after the jump, but there is no 
sign of order flow imbalance ex post positive jumps. Thus, it seems like the increased trading 
after the jump is more balanced. The increase in trading activity is smaller after negative 
jumps, and the activity also returns faster to its normal level. 
Results: depth and breadth 
Mechanically, one would expect that the depth and breadth become unusually low at one 
side of the book during a jump, because informed traders are using the liquidity in one side of 
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the book. Within the framework of a dynamic limit order market, like it was developed by 
Foucault (1999) and Foucault et al. (2005), the increase of price risk caused by increased 
volatility is due to an increase in the information asymmetry across traders. Consequently, we 
expect an increase in the placement of limit orders relative to market orders (and thus an 
increase in depth) immediately after the jump. Patient traders would then make the book 
thicker at the opposite side. At the same time, the liquidity provision by market makers could 
restore the liquidity after the jump. 
This is also what we see in the data. At the ask side we find that the depth decreases with 
23.04%, due to the increased arrival of one-sided market orders (H5). At the same time, the 
total depth at the bid side is found to be 10.76% higher than expected. The liquidity at the best 
buy (breadth) is 14.82% higher than expected. This confirms the presence of patient informed 
traders (H4).
37
 The breadth at the ask side is unusually high during the jump (8.07% higher), 
which is consistent with the prediction that market makers become active and start providing 
liquidity (H6). 
Results resiliency 
Using evidence from experimental asset markets, it was shown that a market making role 
emerges endogenously on a financial market (Bloomfield et al. 2005). This is in line with 
empirical evidence by Ahn et al. (2001), who highlight the importance of distinguishing 
between increased volatility arising from the bid side or from the ask side. Attracted by the 
increasing reward, traders will start to submit limit orders (and thus provide liquidity) at the 
side where liquidity is needed the most. 
We do find in our results that the liquidity is restored after a jump, consistent with the 
emergence of market makers who add liquidity to the book. We see that the overall volume of 
limit sell orders entered after a positive jump is 127.27% higher than expected (See Table 
12).
38
 This is only partly the result of a quote updating process (as the cancellations at this 
side are only 86.87% higher than expected, unreported). While during the jump interval, the 
increased activity of patient informed traders dominates over the increase in limit orders 
posted by market makers, this reverts in the interval immediately after the jump. After the 
jump, market makers continue to provide unusually high liquidity up till 30 minutes after the 
                                                 
37
 For negative jumps, these patient informed traders seem to be active already before the jump. They post limit 
orders at the ask side in the 60 minutes before the jump and make the book unusually imbalanced. Their impact 
on the book is also bigger (respectively 22.46% and 24.11% more liquidity during and immediately after the 
jump compared to 10.76% and 16.50% after positive jumps). 
38
 Later in this paper, we provide further evidence on order submission strategies (See p. 25, Post-jump order 
submission strategy). 
Chapter 2 
78 
 
jump. They bring the spread back to its normal level, and also restore the depth (from 20 
minutes after the jump onwards).
39
 Our findings illustrate the effectiveness of endogenous 
liquidity providers, even in a relative illiquid market and after a large price discontinuity. 
Results: asymmetries between public and private news induced jumps 
We find that for most liquidity dimensions, the dynamics of liquidity are very similar for 
jumps that are caused by public news announcements, and jumps for which this is not the 
case. A reason for this surprising symmetry could be that they are both linked with 
information, like we have argued above, and that they are in this sense also more similar than 
what one would expect. In Figure 4 we present the price reversal pattern, showing the median 
logarithmic return during the first two hours after the jump. We performed a Wilcoxon rank 
sum test on this return, and a star indicates that the return is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
We find however one interesting and strong asymmetry in tightness: for jumps that can be 
linked with public news, the spread rises with 49.90% during a positive jump interval and 
35.15% during a negative jump interval. For jumps that cannot be linked with public news, 
the spread rises only with respectively 18.52% and 17.75%. This may seem counterintuitive at 
first sight, because public information is symmetric and private information is not. We think 
this can be explained by the behavior of the liquidity providers, who are more reluctant to 
provide liquidity when a jump is caused by a public news announcement. It might be that they 
want to wait till consensus is reached on the interpretation of the news, and that they hesitate 
to provide liquidity when they know for sure that the movements are caused by information 
(even when this information is public). We find support for this in the price reversal pattern: 
the initial jump at both sides is reverted after public news announcements, while this is only to 
a much lesser extent the case for jumps that are not linked with a public news announcement. 
This also points at an insufficient liquidity provision in an early stage after the jump.  
 
6. Further Analysis  
The prior section provides a comprehensive view on how market liquidity evolves around 
the jump. However, several important issues remain unsolved: is it possible to forecast the 
jump occurrence using information available prior to the jump? Does the speed of price 
discovery remain unchanged after the jump? What kind of order placement strategy do traders 
                                                 
39
 After positive jumps, the depth an breadth become even unusually high till 40 minutes after the jump. This 
overshooting cannot be found back after negative jumps. 
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adopt after experiencing the extreme price risk due to jumps? In this section we provide 
further evidence on these issues.  
6.1 Predictability of jumps using probit analysis  
Despite the fact that we find only a very weak, if any, pre-jump liquidity pattern in the 
event study section, it is still possible that a certain dimension of the liquidity shocks is 
indicative of subsequent jumps, or multiple dimensions of the liquidity shocks jointly 
contribute to the occurrence and/or the magnititude of jumps. To formalize the linkage 
between jumps and liquidity shocks, we follow the literature by modelling intraday jumps as a 
non-linear function of liquidity shocks and news surprises (Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Jiang et 
al. 2011; Lahaye et al. 2011). To assess the predictive power of liquidity shocks prior to the 
jumps, we focus on all the single jump days and perform a probit regression as in Jiang et al. 
(2011). The restriction to days with only one intraday jump is necessary to avoid the 
contagion effect from consecutive jumps in the same day, which is common in the literature 
(Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Jiang et al. 2011). The explanatory variables in our probit regression 
are selected in an attempt to cover all dimensions of liquidity and are in line with Boudt and 
Petitjean (201x). The model specification of the probit regression looks as follows:  
 (         )
  (
                                          
                    
) 
[6.1] 
where  (         ) denotes the probability that a jump occurs conditional on a set of 
explanatory variables,   .  
In equation [6.1], the set of explanatory variables includes lagged values of spread 
(     ), trading volume (      ), absolute order flow imbalance (    ), mean depth at the 
best price (  ) and absolute depth imbalance (    ) at the best price. In addition, a 
contemporaneous informational dummy (    ) is also added to control for the possible 
announcement effect. The iid error term is denoted as  . All the liquidity variables used in 
[6.1] can be inferred from the Reuters screen, which is available to all market participants.  
The estimation results are reported in Panel A of Table 10.
40
 Consistent with our findings 
in the event study section, conventional liquidity measures offer weak, if any, predictive 
power in forecasting the occurrence of jumps after controlling the effect of informational 
                                                 
40
 Here we used maximum likelihood estimation. 
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shocks. First, none of the liquidity variables in equation [6.1] are statistically significant.
41
 
Second, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all liquidity variables are jointly zero is not 
rejected at the 10% significance level.
 42,43
  
Although the results show that overall liquidity or a specific liquidity dimension do not 
predict the occurrence of a jump, it is still possible that liquidity can predict the magnitude of 
it. Therefore, in the next step, we evaluate the impact of liquidity shocks on the magnititude of 
the jump with a Tobit regression. The Tobit model can be seen as a truncated regression that 
determines the magnititude of the jump, given there is a price jump. The model specification  
is given as follows.    
        {
     
  
 
         
        
    
         
   
     
                                             
                     
[6.2] 
where         denotes the magnitude of the observed jumps and is measured as the 
absolute value of the logarithmic return during the 10-minute interval.      
  denotes the 
latent jump magnitude.         equals      
  if      
    and is 0 otherwise. It 
further assumes that there exists a linear dependence between the latent jump magnitude 
and all the regression variables (which are the liquidity shocks and the information 
dummy). The regressors are defined identically as for Equation [6.1].  
Panel B of Table 10 presents the result for the Tobit regression. None of the liquidity 
variables are significant at the 10% level, nor do they have the expected sign. The 
informational dummy, however, is significant and explains the magnitude of the jump: when 
the jump is caused by a public news announcement, it is on average bigger.  
In sum, we find little evidence that liquidity shocks predict the occurrence of jumps or 
explain the magnititude of jumps in our sample after controlling the effect of news 
announcement. This contradicts with the findings by Jiang et al. (2011) and Boudt and 
Petitjean (201x). 
                                                 
41
 Here we used a (robust) t-test with Newey-West correction. 
42
 Here we used an F-test. 
43
 Our results remain unchanged when we use a logit regression. These results are available upon request. 
Chapter 2 
81 
 
6.2 Post-jump price discovery 
In this subsection, we further examine the price discovery process after a jump in the FX 
market. We here follow the methodology used in Evans and Lyons (2002). Prior evidence 
suggests that the informational role of transaction order flow weakens subsequent to price 
jumps in the US bond and equity market (Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Jiang et al. 2011). We 
extend the work on post-jump price discovery to the FX market by examining all the single-
jump days and non-jump days via the following model: 
                                                 [6.3] 
where      denotes 100 times the change of the logarithmic mid-quote during the 10-
minute interval t+1,     (     ) is the signed volume of transaction order flow over the 
interval t (t+1) measured in millions of euros.       is the post-jump dummy, which 
takes the value of one for the six 10-minute intervals immediately after the jump and zero 
otherwise.  
We differ from previous studies such as Jiang et al. (2011) by including the lagged order 
flow (   ) in the model specification to account for the possible price reversal in the next 
period as suggested by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). That is, we expect that both the lagged 
and current order flow would impact price discovery process, but in the opposite direction. 
Therefore, the coefficient    captures the liquidity effect of lagged order flow,    captures the 
normal price impact of order flow, and    captures the additional price impact of 
contemporaneous order flow immediately after the jump, which is robust to subsequent price 
reversals.  
The results of the regression are presented in Table 11.
44
 The coefficient on 
contemporaneous order flow is significantly positive, confirming the role of order flow in the 
price discovery process (see Evans & Lyons 2002). As expected, the coefficient on the lagged 
order flow is significantly negative but much less in magnitude than that on the current order 
flow, suggesting the existence of subsequent price reversal due to illiquidity. Finally, the 
coefficient on the interaction term between the post-jump dummy and the current order flow 
is significantly negative at the 5% level. This is consistent with prior literature that the 
informational role of post-jump order flow is less pronounced than during normal trading 
periods.  
                                                 
44
 We used Ordinary Least Squares regression to obtain these results. The t-statistics are Newey-West corrected. 
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While we confirm the stylized fact regarding post-jump price discovery,  it remains 
interesting to investigate why order flow becomes less informative immediately after jumps. 
Jiang et al. (2011) attribute it to the possibly lowered dispersion of investor belief 
immediately following the occurrence of jumps. Motivated by our findings in the event study, 
we, however, perceive it differently: the reduced informational role of (transaction) order flow 
may as well be explained by the altered order submission strategy immediately after the price 
jump, which we investigate in the next subsection. 
6.3 Post-jump order submission strategy 
In this subsection, we investigate in depth the impact of jumps on the subsequent order 
placement strategy using regression analysis. Prior studies suggest that a higher proportion of 
limit orders relative to market orders emerges immediately after enlarged asset volatility or a 
widened spread (Biais et al. 1995; Griffiths et al. 2000; Ahn et al. 2001; Cao et al. 2008). 
Motivated by our findings in the event study section, we extend the order placement literature 
by focusing on the impact of intraday jumps, rather than volatility, on the subsequent order-
flow composition. In particular, we estimate whether the occurrence of jumps leads investors 
to submit more limit orders relative to market orders, or the other way around.  
To address these questions, we use the change of market depth available at the best price 
from interval t to t+1 (         ) as a proxy of the order-flow composition. As it is argued 
by Ahn et al. (2001),           captures the difference between the net volume of newly 
placed limit orders and the volume of market orders executed during the time interval t+1. 
Therefore, we estimate the following empirical model which is similar to Equation 6 in Ahn 
et al. (2001). 
                                                      
∑                              
                                                                                                                                   [6.4] 
where           (       ) is the change of mean depth available at the best price from 
interval t (t-1) to t+1 (t),       is the post-jump dummy, which takes the value of one for 
the six 10-minute intervals immediately after the jump and zero otherwise,       is the 
volatility risk (measured as the square of the intraday return) during the interval t,  
          is an intraday dummy variable that takes the value of one if interval t+1 
belongs to the time interval k and zero otherwise, and      is the iid error term.  
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Apparently, the coefficient    measures the autocorrelation pattern of the change of 
market depth, while    controls for the typical intraday variation in liquidity variables (“time 
of day” effect). The coefficient    measures the effect of increased volatility on the 
subsequent order-flow mix and    captures the additional post-jump impact on order-flow 
composition, which is of our interest.  
The result of the regression is presented in Table 13.
45
 For the purpose of brevity, we only 
report the coefficients on the lagged changes of market depth, lagged volatility risk, the post-
jump dummy and the interaction term. Consistent with prior literature (see Ahn et al. 2001, 
among others), the coefficient on the lagged change of mean depth is significantly negative, 
supporting the self-adjusting mechanism of the order flow. That is, there will be an influx of 
more limit orders than market orders when limit orders were relatively scarce in the prior 
period, which is consistent with the conventional wisdom that market depth tends to get 
replenished to its normal shape (resiliency). Similar to the results reported in Table III of Ahn 
et al. (2001), there is no strong evidence that increased transitory volatility would lead 
investors to submit more limit orders than market orders as    is insignificantly different from 
zero (the sign of the coefficient is in fact slightly negative).
46
 Finally, the coefficient estimate 
on the interaction term between post-jump dummy and lagged volatility risk remains strongly 
positive at the 5% level, confirming our expectation that investors prefer to submit more limit 
orders instead of market orders subsequent to the occurrence of jumps. It should be noted that 
two forces contribute to the increased use of limit orders after a jump. On the one hand, the 
sudden increase of transitory volatility due to jumps makes it attractive for participants to 
adopt market making strategies, as the expected gain of supplying liquidity outweighs the 
expected loss of trading against an informed trader and holding an unwanted inventory for a 
short time span. On the other hand, even informed traders will opt for limit orders instead of 
market orders, because the cost of submitting a market order increases dramatically due to the 
rise in transitory volatility associated with the jump. As we do not have the identity of the 
traders, we cannot distinguish between these two forces.  
Overall, our evidence on traders’ post-jump order submission strategy is consistent with 
the results in the event study section: the “make or take” decision is altered following price 
jumps as more liquidity (depth) is built up in the book with newly submitted limit orders. The 
                                                 
45
 We used Ordinary Least Squares regression to obtain these results. The t-statistics are Newey-West corrected. 
46
 One possible explanation for the insignificance of    is that the relation between transitory volatility risk and 
the change of market depth does not need to be monotonically increasing, nor linear. In an unreported regression 
we find that the coefficient on the quadratic risk is highly significant and positive, indicating the relation might 
not be linear. 
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reason for a weakened post-jump price discovery process become clear: transaction order 
flow become less informative with a thick order book.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Using a unique dataset (including the complete limit order book) over a two year 
timespan, we investigated the relation between intraday jumps, news announcements and 
liquidity dynamics in the HUF/EUR interdealer market.  
First, our results conform to the general finding that jumps are frequent on financial 
markets. In a relatively illiquid FX market, such as our HUF/EUR market, we find that around 
18.2% of the sample days contain at least one intraday jump with the jump component 
contributing to nearly one-half of the realized volatility during the jump day.  
Secondly, we investigate the relation between jumps and news releases of various sorts. In 
particular, we employ a much broader dataset of news announcements which includes not 
only scheduled news releases, but also unscheduled news announcements such as polls, 
surveys, forecasts and analyses on future fundamentals. We find that scheduled news explains 
16% of the jumps, while unscheduled news explains 30.4% of the jumps, confirming that both 
news on fundamentals (scheduled news), and news which will change the market expectations 
on future fundamentals (unscheduled news) are both important sources of large exchange rate 
movements. Still nearly half of the jumps remain unexplained by (public) news 
announcements. However, we show that jumps are information-based, independent whether 
they are linked with public news or not, as they have a similarly large permanent price impact 
and are both accompanied by highly imbalanced order flows. 
Thirdly, we test the predictions from limit order book models under extreme market 
conditions by zooming in on the dynamics of various liquidity dimensions around jumps. 
Using an event-study approach, we find that prior to jumps the liquidity pattern does not 
deviate from that in normal trading periods. During the jump period, our results suggest that 
jumps do not emerge because of unusually low liquidity supply, but because of an unusually 
high demand for immediacy concentrated on one side of the order book. Moreover, a dynamic 
order placement process emerges after the jump: more limit sell (buy) orders are added to the 
book subsequent to a positive (negative) jump, which is consistent with the presence of 
endogeneous liquidity providers on the market. Attracted by the higher reward for providing 
liquidity, they submit limit orders at the side where it is needed the most. In addition, we 
detect a high level of resilience in the market, but this resilience is on average more 
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pronounced for negative jumps than for positive jumps. Another interesting asymmetry is that 
the liquidity providers tend to be more reluctant to add liquidity when confronted with a news 
announcement around the jump. By consequence the spreads increase more dramatically in 
cases of jumps with news announcements than that of jumps without news events.  
Finally, our further analyses offer more insights. First, the probit analysis shows that none 
of the liquidity variables offer predictive power for jump occurrence, which is consistent with 
the normal liquidity pattern prior to jumps documented in the event study section.  Second, we 
find that post-jump order flow is in general less informative than in normal trading periods. 
This is in line with the additional evidence from the third analysis on order submission 
strategy: more limit orders relative to market orders are submitted to the book after the jump. 
Therefore, the informational role of order flow becomes less pronounced in the thick order 
book after the jump.  
One direction for future research is to investigate the liquidity dynamics around jumps 
under different market microstructures (e.g. market with designated market makers, the 
customer FX market). This would be highly relevant for the purpose of optimal market 
design.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Average daily quote and total volume traded over the sample period. 
 
Figure 2: Intraday distribution of ticks (CET). 
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Figure 3: Intraday distribution of jumps. 
 
Figure 4: Price reversal after a jump (a star indicates significance at the 5% level). 
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Figure 5: Bid-ask spread (SWPQS) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
 
Figure 6: Volume traded (VOL) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
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Figure 7: Order imbalance (OI) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
 
 
Figure 8: Mean bid depth at best quote (BRDTHB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
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Figure 9: Mean ask depth at best quote (BRDTHA) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
 
 
Figure 10: Mean bid depth (DPTHB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
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Figure 11: Mean ask depth (DPTHA) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
 
 
Figure 12: Volume of  lim. buy orders (LOB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
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Figure 13: Volume of lim. sell orders (LOS) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window 
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TABLES 
 Whole sample 2003 2004 
Number of quotes 437,420 193,447 243,973 
Number of trades 72,622 31,978 40,644 
Average trade size 1,304,398 EUR 1,339,827 EUR 1,276,523 EUR 
Trades  1 million € 80.38% 78.89% 81.55% 
Trades >1 million € and <3 million €  13.79% 14.50% 13.23% 
Trades  3 million € 5.83% 6.61% 5.22% 
Average number of quotes per day  881.90 806.03 953.02 
Average number of trades per day 146.42 133.24 158.77 
Average daily trading volume (million €) 190.98 178.52 202.67 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 
2003 
Jan-Jun 
2003 
Jul-Dec 
2004 
Jan-Jun 
2004 
Jul-Dec 
Number of orders 89339 94151 114891 115416 
Market orders (%)     
Bid side 8.12% 7.96% 7.52% 7.96% 
Ask side 7.58% 7.58% 7.55% 7.97% 
Limit orders 
(not exec., %) 
    
Bid side 29.92% 30.16% 31.23% 28.37% 
Ask side 27.09% 27.95% 28.21% 26.11% 
Limit orders 
(at least partly exec., %) 
    
Bid side 13.27% 12.96% 12.81% 14.71% 
Ask side 14.01% 13.40% 12.67% 14.88% 
Size     
Small size (1 Mill., %) 71.16% 76.03% 78.25% 75.99% 
Medium size (2 Mill., %) 16.52% 14.38% 13.46% 14.24% 
Large (+2 Mill., %) 12.32% 9.59% 8.29% 9.77% 
Table 2: Order descriptives. 
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2003 
Jan-Jun 
2003 
Jul-Dec 
2004 
Jan-Jun 
2004 
Jul-Dec 
Average spread 
(HUF/EUR) 
0.31 0.39 0.35 0.24 
Average breadth     
Bid side 1.97 1.73 1.66 2.06 
Ask side 1.84 1.67 1.54 1.63 
Average depth     
Bid side 12.89 28.36 11.96 43.52 
Ask side 11.38 9.67 9.70 12.66 
Average number of levels     
Bidth side 6.22 6.12 6.02 6.99 
Ask side 5.64 5.27 5.83 7.35 
Table 3: Book descriptives. 
 
Panel A: Descriptives of the price process 
 
Realized 
Volatility 
All 
Continuous 
Components 
All Jump 
Components 
Significant 
Jump 
Components 
Observations 494 494 494 90 
Mean (*10
-3
) 0.33 0.30 0.03 0.17 
Median (*10
-3
) 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.06 
Standard Deviation (*10
-3
) 1.40 1.39 0.16 0.35 
Minimum (*10
-3
) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Maximum (*10
-3
) 28.30 28.30 2.07 2.07 
Skewness 17.02 17.37 8.61 3.57 
Kurtosis 329.76 339.07 87.36 16.27 
Table 4: Prevalence and size of jumps. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Jump characteristics 
 Mean Min. Med. Max. 
Standard 
Deviation 
Jump duration 
(in days) 
6.6 1.0 6.0 28.0 5.5 
Contribution to 
volatility  
(on jump day) 
42.59% 11.52% 38.67% 94.08% 22.27% 
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 Positive Jumps Negative Jumps 
Observations 65 60 
Number of 
Jump Days 56 52 
 Size Variance  Size Variance 
Mean (*10
-3
) 3.08 0.016 -2.54 0.010 
Median (*10
-3
) 2.23 0.005 -1.97 0.004 
Standard 
Deviation (*10
-
3
)  
2.50 0. 030 0.184 0.016 
Minimum (*10
-
3
) 0.59 0 -8.95 0 
Maximum (*10
-
3
) 14.42 0.208 -0.61 0.080 
Skewness 2.08 4.59 -1.73 3.04 
Kurtosis 5.90 26.39 3.15 9.78 
Table 5: Positive vs. negative jumps. 
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Time of 
Announcement 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
obs. that 
match jumps 
P(Jump|News) P(News|Jump) 
All categories   20 < 1% 16.00% 
News on 
Hungary      
GDP 9 am 8 2 25.00% 1.60% 
Public Sector 
Balance 10 am/ 5 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Current Account 
Balance 8:30 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Retail Sales 9:00 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
News on 
Germany      
CPI 8 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Wholesale Price 8 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Import Price 8 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
News on the 
United States      
PPI 2:30 pm 24 2 8.33% 1.60% 
CPI 2:30 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Real GDP 2:30 pm 8 1 12.50% 0.80% 
Tradebalance 2:30 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Consumer 
Confidence 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
New Home 
Sales 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Construction 
Spending 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
ISM Index 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
News on 
CEEC’s: 
Poland 
     
PPI 4 pm 24 2 8.33% 1.60% 
Industrial 
Output 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Table 6: Jumps and scheduled macroeconomic announcements. 
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 Explained by News 
Explained by 
Scheduled 
Announcements 
Explained by 
Unscheduled, Real-
Time News 
All jumps 58 (46.40%) 20 (16.00%) 38 (30.40%) 
Ranked by size 
of the Jump 
   
Top 15 8 (53.30%) 4 (26.70%) 4 (26.70%) 
Top 16 to 30 7 (46.70%) 2 (13.33%) 5 (33.33%) 
Top 31 to 50 11 (55.00%) 4 (20.00%) 7 (35.00%) 
Rest of the Jumps 32 (42.70%) 10 (13.33%) 22 (29.33%) 
Table 7: Share of jumps explained by news announcements. 
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  -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Tightness 
      
  
      
SWPQS -5,25% -4,36% 1,31% 0,60% -4,72% -1,56% 25,09% 18,03% -3,00% -3,06% 6,95% 6,14% 8,76% 
Immediacy 
      
  
      
VOL 16,67% -4,35% 0,00% 0,00% -11,27% 0,00% 180,00% 87,50% 25,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
OI 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 57,89% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Depth 
      
  
      
DPTHB 0,12% -0,63% -4,47% 5,11% -3,54% -5,46% 10,76% 16,50% 5,75% 1,41% 0,11% -3,11% -6,27% 
DPTHA -9,55% -3,77% -8,74% -3,72% 0,14% -6,94% -23,04% -12,91% 19,01% 18,85% 16,99% 19,15% 4,74% 
DI -3,52% -2,62% 0,94% -4,16% 0,30% 0,14% -15,81% -8,52% 0,44% 6,93% 9,15% 6,73% 3,15% 
Breadth         
  
  
  
        
BRDTHB 5,59% -1,63% -3,45% 0,62% 2,74% 2,33% 14,82% 1,28% -0,36% 3,18% 2,71% 7,67% -1,49% 
BRDTHA -2,39% 12,23% -1,70% -0,82% 2,22% -4,57% 8,07% 8,76% 11,82% 8,76% 8,79% 0,93% 7,07% 
BI 0,00% 7,00% 1,22% 0,00% -4,23% -0,98% -4,50% 5,76% 3,01% 0,00% 0,00% -3,28% 0,00% 
Table 8: Liquidity dynamics around positive jumps (Light gray: significant at 10% level, medium gray: significant at 5% level, dark gray: significant at 1% level).* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* SWPQS: Size-weighted proportional quoted spread, VOL: Volume traded, OI: Order flow imbalance, DPTHB: Mean depth at the bid side, DPTHA: Mean depth at the ask 
side, DI: Mean depth imbalance, BRDTHB: Mean depth at the best bid, BRDTHA: Mean depth at the best ask, BI: Mean imbalance of depth at the best quotes. 
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  -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Tightness 
      
  
      
SWPQS 1,69% 3,89% 2,79% 7,74% -0,83% -0,90% 23,88% 6,02% 2,24% 8,71% 6,77% -3,75% 7,94% 
Immediacy 
      
  
      
VOL 0,00% 0,00% 42,86% 6,67% 0,00% 0,00% 125,00% 50,00% 0,00% 18,92% 0,00% 20,00% 0,00% 
OI 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% -33,33% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Depth 
      
  
      
DPTHB -10,65% -12,63% -16,24% -11,08% -4,30% -11,83% -37,07% -18,77% -12,69% 3,33% -4,98% -15,35% -2,97% 
DPTHA 18,30% 16,36% 20,77% 25,60% 27,18% 7,56% 22,46% 24,11% 19,30% -0,07% 11,40% 4,91% 2,49% 
DI 10,56% 8,93% 14,83% 16,30% 10,15% 5,27% 20,08% 19,02% 14,84% 9,69% 4,93% 10,07% 2,31% 
Breadth                           
BRDTHB -2,70% -5,92% 3,76% 1,25% -6,65% 2,14% 9,59% -0,63% 0,00% 4,26% -0,02% 0,00% 1,46% 
BRDTHA 18,48% 17,19% 22,57% -1,57% 6,60% -5,71% 13,98% 2,54% -3,53% -4,64% -1,88% -3,46% 3,69% 
BI 2,03% 7,69% 0,00% 1,21% 9,58% -1,59% -1,04% 5,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Table 9: Liquidity dynamics around negative jumps (Light gray: significant at 10% level, medium gray: significant at 5% level, dark gray: significant at 1% 
level).* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* SWPQS: Size-weighted proportional quoted spread, VOL: Volume traded, OI: Order flow imbalance, DPTHB: Mean depth at the bid side, DPTHA: Mean depth at the ask 
side, DI: Mean depth imbalance, BRDTHB: Mean depth at the best bid, BRDTHA: Mean depth at the best ask, BI: Mean imbalance of depth at the best quotes. 
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α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 γ Adj. R
2 
Log-L 
Chi-
square 
F-test 
Panel A: Probit regression  
Coeff. -1.953 -18.319 -0.013 -0.300 -0.067 -0.576 2.028 6.70% -288.11 7.45  
NW s.e. 0.093 20.138 0.033 0.220 0.163 0.441 0.316     
Test stat. -21.090 -0.910 -0.410 -1.360 -0.410 -1.310 6.420     
p-value 0.000 0.363 0.685 0.172 0.683 0.192 0.000   0.19  
Panel B: Tobit regression  
Coeff. -0.013 -0.058 -0.0001 -0.002 -0.0006 -0.004 0.013 6.84% 17.72  2.1 
NW s.e. 0.001 0.041 0.0002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002     
Test stat. -9.450 -1.410 -0.470 1.320 -0.550 -1.320 5.790     
p-value 0.000 0.157 0.636 0.188 0.584 0.187 0.000    0.0627 
Table 10: Probit regression of the jump probability and Tobit regression of the jump magnitude 
 
 
 α0 α1 β0 β1 β2 Adj. R
2 
Specification 1     
Coeff. -0.000 -0.006  0.008 -0.003 22.19% 
NW s.e. 0.000 0.004  0.001 0.001  
Test stat. -0.640 -1.470  9.730 -2.500  
p-value 0.525 0.142  0.000 0.012  
Specification 2     
Coeff. -0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.008 -0.003 22.70% 
NW s.e. 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001  
Test stat. -0.530 -1.370 -3.650 9.790 -2.380  
p-value 0.597 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.018  
Table 11: Regression of price change on order flow. 
Chapter 2 
103 
 
Resiliency after positive jumps 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
LOB 188,89% 112,89% 26,87% 14,64% 0,00% -22,22% -23,02% 
LOS 127,27% 220,00% 42,86% 70,73% 14,29% 22,61% 0,00% 
LOI 13,58% -8,33% -0,37% -5,26% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
LOBB 233,33% 100,00% 0,00% -11,11% 0,00% 0,00% -25,00% 
LOSB 108,33% 185,71% 33,33% 13,95% 1,96% 1,96% -16,67% 
LOIB 14,29% -11,58% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Resiliency after negative jumps 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
LOB 126,67% 122,22% 25,00% -12,50% 0,00% 40,63% 11,24% 
LOS 220,00% 82,11% -18,37% 23,60% 23,60% 33,33% 33,33% 
LOI -15,00% 6,89% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
LOBB 122,22% 80,00% 0,00% 0,00% 11,11% 12,50% 23,08% 
LOSB 250,00% 55,56% 0,00% 0,00% 20,00% 33,33% 25,00% 
LOIB -27,87% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Table 12: Resiliency after jumps (Light gray: significant at 10% level, medium gray: significant at 5% 
level, dark gray: significant at 1% level).* 
 
* LOB: Volume of limit buy orders submitted, LOS: Volume of limit sell orders submitted, LOI: Imbalance of the 
volume of limit orders submitted, LOBB: Volume of limit orders entered at the best buy, LOSB: Volume of limit 
orders entered at the best sell, LOIB: Imbalance of the limit orders entered at the best quote. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Regression of depth change on lagged transitory volatility. 
 
 α0 α1 β0 β1 ρ1 Adj. R
2 
Coeff. -0.006 -0.078 -0.139 0.988 -0.271 6.21% 
NW s.e. 0.051 0.066 0.121 0.412 0.024  
Test stat. -0.110 -1.190 -1.150 2.400 -11.270  
p-value 0.910 0.234 0.252 0.017 0.000  
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APPENDIX I: DEFINITION OF LIQUIDITY MEASURES 
SWPQS The size-weighted proportional quoted spread, defined as the weighted 
average of the quoted spread per 10 minute interval. The weighting 
scheme uses the quantities available at the prevailing quotes as the 
weight.  
NT Number of trades, defined as the total number of transaction per 10 
minute interval. 
VOL Trading volume, defined as the total transaction volume by value per 
10 minute interval.  
OF (Transaction) Order flow, defined as the signed trading volume per 10 
minute interval. 
OI Order flow imbalance, defined as the ratio of transaction order flow to 
the total transaction volume by value per 10 minute interval. 
DPTHB Mean depth at the bid side, defined as the average quantity available at 
the bid side of the limit order book over all quotes per 10 minute 
interval. 
DPTHA Mean depth at the ask side, defined as the average quantity available at 
the ask side of the limit order book over all quotes per 10 minute 
interval. 
DI Depth imbalance, defined as the difference between DPTHA and 
DPTHB scaled by the sum of DPTHA and DPTHB per 10 minute 
interval. 
BRDTHB Mean breadth at the bid side, defined as the average quantity available 
at the best bid of the limit order book over all quotes per 10 minute 
interval. 
BRDTHA Mean breadth at the ask side, defined as the average quantity available 
at the best ask of the limit order book over all quotes per 10 minute 
interval. 
BI Breadth imbalance, defined as the difference between BRDTHA and 
BRDTHB scaled by the sum of BRDTHA and BRDTHB per 10 minute 
interval. 
LOB Limit buy order submitted, defined as the quantities (volume) of newly 
placed limit buy orders per 10 minute interval. 
LOS Limit sell order submitted at the best price, defined as the quantities 
(volume) of newly placed limit sell orders per 10 minute interval. 
LOI Limit order imbalance, defined as the difference between LOB and 
LOS, scaled by the sum of LOB and LOS per 10 minute interval. 
LOBB Limit buy order submitted at the best price, defined as the quantities 
(volume) of newly placed limit buy orders at the best price per 10 
minute interval. 
LOSB Limit sell order submitted at the best price, defined as the quantities 
(volume) of newly placed limit sell orders at the best price per 10 
minute interval. 
LOIB Limit order imbalance at the best price, defined as the difference 
between LOBB and LOSB, scaled by the sum of LOBB and LOSB per 10 
minute interval.  
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APPENDIX II: STANDARDIZATION OF THE LIQUIDITY MEASURES 
It is well known in the empirical literature that liquidity measures have seasonal patterns at 
the daily and intraday level whether they are compounded with news announcements or not 
(eg. see figure 1 Fleming & Remolona 1999). Therefore, liquidity measures need to be 
standardized to make them comparable across days and intraday periods. Moreover, the 
empirical distribution of liquidity measures is highly skewed to the right at the intraday level 
as pointed out by Plerou et al. (2005) among others. Motivated by the applications in Boudt 
and Petitjean (201x); Boudt et al. (2011), we favor median value rather than mean value for 
standardizing purpose, which deviates from previous literature ((Fleming & Remolona 1999; 
Jiang et al. 2011; Gomber et al. 2013). 
Following Boudt and Petitjean (201x), we assume that all the liquidity measures except 
spread and imbalance measures follow a multiplicative specification: On non-jump days, the 
intraday value of the liquidity measure ( denoted as       ) is the product of a latent daily 
factor     and a deterministic intradaily factor     and an i.i.d. error term      with median 1.  
                 [AII.1] 
On jump days, however, the above specification is augmented by an additive component      
associated with jumps: 
                      [AII.2] 
Given the above assumptions, the sample counterpart of the daily factor (  ̂ ) is proxied by 
the median value of the intraday liquidity measure on day i, while the sample intraday factor 
(  ̂ ) is estimated as the sample median of all the observed intraday liquidity values in 
interval j on non-jump days ( NJD ),  scaled by their respective daily factor. 
  ̂             
  ̂   
  ̂ 
 
 
[AII.3] 
It is thus straightforward to calculate the percentage deviation of the liquidity value from its 
normal (expected) level via the following equation. 
  ̃    
  ̂   
  ̂   ̂ 
   
 
[AII.4] 
where the first term in the RHS of the equation is the standardized liquidity measure.  
As the imbalance measures are bounded in (-1, +1), we opt for an additive process with the 
following specification: 
                        [AII.5] 
with      as an i.i.d. error term  with zero median and      as an additive component due to  
jumps. In the same token, the estimated daily factor (  ̂ ) is proxied by the median value of 
the intraday liquidity measure on day i. The sample intraday factor (   ̂  ), however, is 
estimated as the sample median of all the observed intraday liquidity values in interval j on 
non-jump days ( NJD ), net of their respective daily factor: 
  ̂             (  ̂      ̂ ) [AII.6] 
The deviation of the liquidity value is thus: 
  ̃      ̂       ̂    ̂  [AII.7] 
Therefore, we use the above equation to estimate the deviation for liquidity measures 
including depth imbalance, order imbalance, imbalance of newly placed limit orders and 
spread.  
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For either of the model specification, we would expect the median value of   ̃    to be zero in 
case of no (significant) jump effect on liquidity.  
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Spread Components in the Hungarian Forint- Euro Market: 
Evidence from a theoretical spread decomposition model 
1. Introduction 
Since a well-functioning foreign exchange market is of crucial importance for the 
economy, which is particularly true in the case of small open economies as most of the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC’s), there is a deep interest in the way it 
works. The microstructure approach to foreign exchange (see Lyons 2001) allows for market 
frictions, such as imperfect information and heterogeneous agents, and tries to explain the 
processing of news (price discovery), liquidity and the transaction costs on a market. In this 
context the bid-ask spread and its determinants play a crucial role. The decomposition of the 
bid-ask spread on financial markets has attracted increasing attention during the last decades 
for several reasons. It is important as an indicator of market liquidity and competition, but 
also reflects the way information is processed in the market. This is important because a 
different market structure changes the “game played between the market participants” (Rime 
2003, p. 471). It is therefore relevant for market participants, but also for the operators of 
markets in terms of an evaluation of the market design. The microstructure approach to 
foreign exchange markets has made some promising steps towards a better understanding of 
the foreign exchange market.  
The bid-ask spread is the difference between the price an active buyer must pay, and the 
revenue an active seller receives.
1
 It is common to relate the size of the spread to various 
kinds of cost components: the order processing (or handling) component, the adverse 
selection component and the inventory holding component.
2
 We contribute to the literature by 
exploiting a new dataset on the Hungarian foreign exchange market. Since this is the first 
detailed dataset available for a transition economy, it enables us to compare the spread 
components on a small and less liquid market to those of previous studies that mainly focused 
on major currencies. One may expect that components directly related to the liquidity of the 
market, namely the order processing and the inventory holding component, will be more 
                                                 
1
 One counterpart of a trade can be viewed as an active party and one counterpart as a passive party. The party 
that posts quotes and waits until they will be hit by another market participant is the passive party. The party that 
matches an existing limit order by a market or another limit order is the active party. 
2
 One may also distinguish components for the option effect and non competitive pricing (see for example Stoll 
2003). This is, however, less common. Therefore we do not follow these directions. We see the option effect as 
part of the adverse selection component. 
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important in transition economies than in the foreign exchange market for major currencies. 
There may also be more private information on a market on which trading is less intensive. 
We investigate whether this is reflected in a higher adverse selection component. 
Furthermore, the sample size of our dataset exceeds the size of most other datasets used in the 
literature by far. Finally, we will re-examine the relation between trade size and spread, which 
has been controversially discussed in the literature. 
 
2. The foreign exchange market and data description 
The foreign exchange market is a two-tier market. Trades on the foreign exchange market 
can be divided into customer trades, i.e. trades between a bank and customers (the ultimate 
end-users, for instance importing and exporting firms, mutual or hedge funds, governments 
and central banks) and interbank trades. In the following we focus on the interbank market, as 
the price formation takes place here. Customers do not have access to this interbank market. 
The majority of trades on this market are nowadays done via electronic broking systems. 
Since their introduction in 1992 their share in total transaction volume has steadily increased, 
depending on the country, from 4 to 6 per cent in 1995 to more than 55% of the interbank 
market in 2010 (BIS 1996, BIS 2010). 
There are two main platforms competing in the foreign exchange market: Reuters D3000 
and EBS (Electronic Broking System). In our analysis we rely on the Reuters D3000 system. 
As an electronic limit order book it contains buy and sell orders in a price-time priority. Euro 
sale and purchase offers are placed at limit prices. Besides these limit orders, consisting of the 
maximum respectively minimum price and the quantity offered to be traded, it is also possible 
to place a market order, i.e., an order without a specified price. They are immediately matched 
with the best corresponding limit order and thus more aggressive. Therefore the following 
matches may lead to a trade: two limit orders that are matched up by the system, or a market 
order that is matched up with the best limit order on the opposite side.  
Our dataset consists of all quotes, i.e., limit and market orders, on the HUF/EUR interbank 
market that have been placed during the years 2003 and 2004 via the Reuters D3000 broking 
system. We observe the price, the quantity in Euro that was offered or asked, whether it was a 
market or a limit order and the exact time when the order was placed and when it disappeared. 
We observe whether the order was withdrawn or whether it was executed, i.e., matched with 
another limit or market order. Using this information we can identify the executed trades that 
we need for the estimation of the empirical model by HS1997. Because at this time the 
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competing system EBS did not offer services for the HUF/EUR market, the dataset covers the 
complete trading on electronic brokerage platforms, and thus the major part of market activity 
on this minor market (trade in HUF accounted during our sample period in 2004 for only 
0.22% of the global turnover on the FX market (BIS 2005). For descriptive statistics of the 
dataset see Table 1. An in-depth description of the dataset can be found in Gereben and Kiss 
M. (2006). 
 
3. The analysis of spreads 
This section describes the different components of the spread. For a detailed discussion of 
these components see Stoll (2003). 
The order processing component (OPC) is the cost component that is most closely linked 
to the provision of services. The OPC includes the costs of labour and capital needed to 
participate in the market, such as the floor space rent, computer and informational service, and 
labour costs.  
The inventory holding component (IHC) compensates dealers for taking an unwanted 
inventory. If a dealer located in the Euro area for example buys Hungarian forint, he has to 
carry inventory costs. These costs mainly stem from two sources: first, there may be 
opportunity costs of tying up funds in the inventory. However, one may assume that the 
opportunity costs of the inventory are low on foreign exchange markets in comparison to 
equity markets. Second, a dealer experiences a substantial amount of risk: the price may 
change due to the arrival of news before he is able to offset his undesired inventory in forint. 
Thus, the inventory holding component represents this fundamental risk. The magnitude of 
the inventory costs depends on price volatility
3
, since higher volatility means a higher risk of 
an undesired price change, and on the expected time the inventory has to be held. Both are, at 
least to some extent, determined by the trading frequency. Therefore the inventory holding 
component is obviously expected to be higher on small, less liquid markets as the HUF/EUR 
market where on average only every three minutes one deal is executed, whereas the time 
between subsequent trades on major markets does not span more than a few seconds. On a 
limit order market, volatility is closely linked to the depth of the order book: the more limit 
orders in the book, the lower the volatility (Ahn et al. 2001, Chen & Wu 2009).  
                                                 
3
 There is a triangular relation between volatility, news and the inventory risk. While the fundamental risk is per 
definition related to the arrival of news, empirical research also finds evidence for a close relation between news 
arrival and volatility, see e.g. Frömmel et al. 2008, Lin et al., 2010. A news-volatility relation is also confirmed 
for the Hungarian foreign exchange market (Frömmel et al. 2011). 
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Finally, market participants face the risk of trading with a counterpart that is better 
informed. If an investor has superior information, he will sell forint if he has information 
justifying a lower price than the current one, or vice versa. The market participants may take 
this possibility into account when offering their quotes and ask an additional compensation, to 
which we will refer as the adverse selection component (ASC) of the spread. The existence of 
an ASC is justified by a couple of theoretical papers, such as Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara 
(1987) or Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). Besides these theoretical papers, empirical research 
provides evidence for the existence of an ASC (see Table 4). 
Previous research on foreign exchange market spreads focused on larger, more liquid 
markets. In a seminal paper Lyons (1995) applies microstructure models to the USD/DEM 
market and finds evidence for both an inventory and an asymmetric information effect, and 
again evidence for inventory control in Lyons (1998). The existence of both effects in the data 
is supported by Yao (1998). In contrast, Mende (2005) only finds a significant adverse 
selection component, but no consistent inventory effect. Using a VAR approach, Payne 
(2005) finds that about 60 per cent of the spread is due to asymmetric information. All these 
studies focus on the most liquid Deutsche mark (euro)/US dollar market. McGroarty et al. 
(2007) compare the results achieved by the HS1997 model for different major currencies 
(euro, US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc).  
In contrast few studies have been performed on spreads on smaller foreign exchange 
markets. An exception is Bjønnes and Rime (2005), who investigate the behaviour of a 
Norwegian Krona/Deutsche Mark dealer. They again find a significant asymmetric 
information component, but no inventory effect. For emerging markets in general and the 
Central- and Eastern European countries in specific there is to our knowledge no similar 
work.
4
 
Another strand of literature deals with the relationship between order size and the bid-ask 
spread. There are essentially three theoretical directions which can be followed to link order 
size and spread: processing cost models, inventory risk models and information cost models. 
While the first direction suggests that increasing trade size does not increase spreads (see Stoll 
1978, Hartmann 1999), inventory risk models and information cost models conclude that 
there should be a positive relation between trade size and spreads (see for instance Ho and 
Stoll 1981 for inventory costs, Kyle 1985, Admati and Pfleiderer 1988 for adverse selection 
costs). Similarly, the empirical research on the relation between trade size and spread has 
                                                 
4
 Intuitively we would expect higher spreads on these markets. For equity markets Chae & Wang (2009) find 
higher spreads for less liquid market segments. In this sense we would expect to find higher spreads for smaller 
currencies when compared to bigger currencies. 
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provided mixed results. While Lyons (1995) finds a positive relation between order size and 
spreads, most studies conclude that there is little or no relationship between spread and order 
size (Yao 1998, Bjønnes and Rime 2005). The distinction between the customer and the 
interbank market is here also important: on the customer market strategic considerations are 
more important when setting spreads (Naik et al. 1999). This difference between the customer 
and interbank market is also empirically supported: on the customer market a negative 
relation between trade size and spread size is found in the trading behaviour of a small bank in 
Germany on the USD/EUR market (Osler et al. 2010). For an online FX dealer on the 
interdealer USD/EUR market the spread is found to be independent from order size (Ding 
2009). Mende (2005) distinguishes between commercial customers (mainly nonfinancial 
corporations), financial customers (such as investment funds), and interbank trades. He finds 
that the asymmetric information component of spreads increases with order size only for more 
informed counterparties, i.e., financial customers and other banks, although the spreads for 
these trade partners are smaller than those for commercial customers. For an emerging market 
the relation between trade size and information content, which is one of the elements that 
determine the spread size, is found to be positive (Kang and Ryu 2010).
5
 
 
4. Empirical model 
There have been various attempts to estimate the different spread components, which can 
be broadly categorized into covariance based models (Stoll 1989, George et al. 1991) and  
models based on trade indicators (e.g. Madhavan et Smidt 1991, HS 1997). The models by 
Madhavan and Smidt (1991) and HS1997 have become the workhorse of spread 
decomposition. We apply the well established HS1997 model, which has the advantage of 
being widely used and at the same time to provide estimates for the adverse selection and the 
inventory holding component separately in its most advanced form (in contrast to the 
Madhavan and Smidt 1991 model). The HS1997 is based on the assumptions shown in the 
following three equations (see HS1997): 
 Vt = Vt-1 + α·S/2·Qt-1 + εt-1  (1)  
Equation (1) means that the unobservable fundamental value Vt equals the fundamental 
value Vt-1 of the previous period plus the change in value α·S/2·Qt-1 that is due to private 
information, reflected in the previous trade, plus the change in value εt-1 that is due to public 
                                                 
5
 It is also shown by (Kang and Ryu 2010) that the relation between trade size and information content depends 
on the way trade size is defined, and on whether a weighted or a normal average is used. 
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information. The component α·S/2·Qt-1, where S/2 is the half spread and Qt is a trade 
indicator, taking the value 1, if the trade was buyer initiated and -1 if it was seller initiated
6
, 
can be derived from the models by Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985). Therefore, α is the proportion of the half spread due to asymmetric information.  
 Mt = Vt + β·S/2 ∑i=1..t-1Qi (2) 
According to equation (2) the midpoint Mt of the bid-ask spread differs from the 
fundamental value by the cumulated inventory, i.e. the cumulated inventory on the respective 
day.
7
 If there were neither inventory costs nor private information the midpoint was equal to 
the fundamental value. Equation (2) is based on inventory theories of the spread (e.g. Ho and 
Stoll 1981) and means that liquidity providers adjust their midpoints on the basis of 
accumulated inventory in order to induce inventory equilibrating trades. Thus, β is the 
proportion of the half spread due to inventory holding costs.  
 Pt = Mt + S/2·Qt + t                              (3) 
Pt is the quote on the market, and Mt is the observable midpoint between bid and ask  
price.  
Equation (3) means that the HUF/EUR quote fluctuates around the midpoint by the half-
spread, depending on whether we observe a buy or sell.
8
  
Differencing equation (2) and substituting Vt by its expectation α·S/2·Qt-1 (equation 1) 
and substituting the whole expression into the differenced version of equation (3) leads then 
to a two-way decomposition by the following regression:       
 Pt = S/2·(Qt-Qt-1) + S/2·Qt-1 + et (4) 
Here Pt is the price change between two subsequent trades. Equation (4) may therefore 
be interpreted as the (private) information that is potentially incorporated in the last trade. 
S/2·(Qt-Qt-1) is the price movement due to switches between buy and sell orders, thus a jump 
between the two edges of the spread, if a buyer initiated order is followed by a seller initiated 
order and vice versa. The joint effect of asymmetric information and inventory holding is 
                                                 
6
 A trade is buyer initiated, if a buyer hits an existing limit sell order from the order book with a buy market 
order or by placing a limit buy order that is matched by the system with an active limit sell order. 
7
 Note that equation (2) assumes trades of the standard size one. Since on the HUF/EUR market 85% of all trades 
are of the minimum size of 1 million EUR this assumption seems to be justified. 
8
 The estimated spread does not necessarily equal the quoted spread (HS 1997). The difference with observed 
posted spreads is that the estimated spread reflects trades inside the spread but outside the midpoint. 
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captured by , and et reflects the arrival of public information.  For details of the derivation 
see HS1997.  
In a second step, an analysis for different trade sizes can be useful. To derive equation (4), 
the assumption, given by equation (3), was used. As trade size is not included in equation (3), 
it implicitly states that the spread is independent of the trade size. Explicitly considering trade 
size in all assumptions is thus necessary. For three size categories, this results in the following 
regression equation: 
 Pt = (S
s
/2) · D
s
(t) · Qt + (
s
-1) · (S
s
/2) · D
s
(t-1) · Qt  
 + (S
m
/2) · D
m
(t) · Qt + (
m
-1) · (S
m
/2) · D
m
(t-1) · Qt 
 + (S
l
/2) · D
l
(t) · Qt + (
l
-1) · (S
l
/2) · D
l
(t-1) · Qt+ et        (5) 
Ds is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the size of the trade falls in the “small” category 
and 0 when this is not the case. The same applies for Dm and Dl. 
As equation (4) does not allow distinguishing between the inventory effect and the 
asymmetric information effect, Huang and Stoll suggest taking the potential serial correlation 
between trade flows into account. This three-way decomposition (for the derivation we again 
refer to HS 1997) is performed by simultaneous estimation of the following model: 
                                E(Qt-1| Qt-2 ) = (1-2)Qt-2  (6)      
 Pt = S/2·Qt + (+-1)·S/2·Qt-1 - ·S/2·(1-2)Qt-2 + et (7) 
Here  is the estimated probability of a trade reversal. This probability is calculated using 
the potential serial correlation mentioned above. The model allows us to decompose the joint 
effect  = (+) of asymmetric information () and inventory holding () into its 
components. Equations (4) and (6-7) serve as our baseline regressions in the subsequent 
analysis. 
 
5. Empirical results 
This section presents the results from the two-way and three-way decomposition of the 
spread on the Hungarian forint/ euro market in 2003-2004 as described above. All estimations 
are performed using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982) and the 
Newey and West (1987) correction of the covariance matrix for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form. 
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The results for the basic two-way decomposition as in HS1997 are displayed in Table 2. 
The (estimated) average spread is 0.106 HUF for the whole sample period with the order 
processing component accounting for 42.58% of the spread and the sum of the adverse 
selection component and inventory holding component for 57.42%. The spread implies a 
revenue per one million euro round trade of roughly 420 EUR, which seems to be reasonable. 
From the most comparable study by McGroarty et al. (2007) revenues of about 44 to 206 
EUR, depending on currency and sample period, can be derived. According to their results the 
revenues were highest on the EUR/JPY market in 1999 (206 EUR) and lowest for the 
DEM/CHF market (44 EUR) in 1998. The revenues on the EUR/USD were also quite small 
(between 69 and 75 EUR). The higher revenue on the HUF/EUR market is in line with the 
notion of a smaller market. 
Applying the three-way decomposition from HS1997 the estimated spread is 0.107 HUF 
on average for the whole sample period. When we decompose the spread in three components 
by using equations (2) and (3), we find that the inventory holding costs account for 40.09% of 
the spread. The order processing costs account for 38.34% of the spread and the adverse 
selection costs for 21.57% of the spread (see Table 3).  
Although the share of the inventory holding premium on the HUF/EUR market is of 
comparable size as found by McGroarty et al. (2007) for major markets, it should be stressed 
that it is larger in absolute terms, due to the larger spread on the HUF/EUR market. While 
according to their results the share of inventory effects in the total costs of a one million EUR 
round trade normally does not exceed 87 EUR
9
 we find costs of 168.38 EUR (40.09% of 420 
EUR). Thus, inventory holding costs do play a prominent role on this market. This can be 
explained by the fact that we are dealing with a smaller and less liquid market. Additionally, 
this finding can be related to a higher prevalence of carry trading on the HUF/EUR market, 
due to the interest differential between both currencies during our sample period. 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) provide extensive and convincing evidence of a higher currency 
crash risk for currencies involved in carry trading. They show that investment currencies are 
vulnerable to massive and sudden unwinding of carry trade schemes when the liquidity dries 
up for the carry-trade investors. They also find that insurance against downside risk becomes 
more expensive during and after this unwinding. For a trader this means that the inventory 
holding cost for HUF is higher than for currencies which are not involved in carry trades. 
Unfortunately we are not able to observe the share of carry trades in the total trading volume. 
                                                 
9
 The only exception is the EUR/JPY in the post EMU sample with 134 EUR. 
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In order to check the robustness of these results the spreads are decomposed for two 
obvious subsamples, namely the trades executed in 2003 and the trades executed in 2004 (see 
Table 2). Starting again with the two-way decomposition the spread is estimated to be 0.133 
HUF for 2003, whereas it declines in 2004 to 0.086 HUF. This decrease is statistically 
significant.
10
 The sum of the adverse selection and inventory holding component accounts for 
56.43% of the total spread in 2003 and for 57.87% of it in 2004. Despite the slight relative 
increase for this combined component it lowers in absolute value with one third in 2004 
compared to 2003. We performed the same analysis for each half year (See Table 2). Figure 1 
visualizes the results of this analysis using the two-way decomposition. The estimated spread 
declines each half-year. This decline is statistically significant between the second half of 
2003 – first half of 2004 and first half of 2004 – second half of 2004.  
When we apply the three-way decomposition we again find the absolute spread to be 
decreasing each half year. This decrease is statistically significant between the second half of 
2003 – first half of 2004 and the first half of 2004 – second half of 2004. The relative 
inventory holding component decreases quite strongly, especially over the last half year. The 
relative adverse selection component increases strongly over time: in the second half of 2004 
it is almost twice as big as in the first half of 2003. The order processing cost, again, decreases 
as in the two-way decomposition. 
Both approaches yield declining spreads over time. An explanation for this could be 
provided by the increased trading volume in the course of the deepening market over the 
sample period. In the two-way decomposition both components tend to decrease over time in 
absolute terms, whereas over the same period the average daily trading volume went up from 
178.52 million euro in 2003 to 202.67 euro in 2004. This result is in line with theoretical 
models predicting that higher trading activity leads to lower spreads, since higher trading 
activity lowers waiting costs (Parlour 1998, Foucault et al. 2005, Rosu 2009).  
On the level of individual spread components, theory suggests that there is a direct 
negative effect of the trading volume on the order processing component and the inventory 
holding component (Stoll 1978).
11
 In contrast, there is no direct relation between trading 
volume and the adverse selection costs, since in these models there is only a role for the 
                                                 
10
 We verified the statistical significance of spread changes in this paragraph by doing a t-test on year-specific 
dummies in an adapted regression setup. In this case for example we estimated ΔPt = S/2•(Qt-Qt-1) + S/2•(Qt-
Qt-1) •D2004+ λ•S/2•Qt-1 + et.  A t-test on the coefficient of the dummy (here: D2004) indicates whether the 
difference between both years is statistically significant. 
11
 For the order processing component this is the consequence of the possibility to distribute the fixed costs over 
more trades. The inventory holding component decreases, because the time between two consecutive trades 
becomes shorter and the dealer can revert his position at lower risk. 
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proportion of informed traders in the market (Glosten and Milgrom 1985) and size of an 
individual trade (Easly and O’Hara 1987). In our three-way decomposition results we find 
each half-year an absolute decrease in inventory holding costs and order processing costs per 
unit traded (except for a minor increase in inventory holding costs in the second half of 2003), 
whereas we do not find a decrease in absolute terms of the adverse selection costs over time. 
In our data we find consequently support for the theoretical relationship between trading 
activity and the spread components. One should, however, note that there may be a 
bidirectional causality between trading activity and spread size, i.e. higher trading activity 
may lead to lower spreads, but lower spreads may also attract traders and therefore increase 
trading activity. Previous work on the Helsinki stock market dealt with this endogeneity and 
showed that the linkage can be significant in both directions, both economically and 
statistically (Linnainmaa and Roçu 2009). Addressing the endogeneity issue falls beyond the 
scope of the model we use in this paper. A second reason for the decrease of the spread may 
be the lower volatility throughout the year 2004. In contrast, 2003 was characterized by the 
turmoil on the HUF/EUR market, including the speculative attack against the forint in 
January, the shift of the band in June and the increase of the interest rate by the central bank 
in December (see Gereben and Kiss M. 2006). Still, this volatility effect would not be 
consistent with the decreasing absolute order processing component. 
As an extension we verify the relation between spread and trade size, by performing the 
two-way decomposition for different trade sizes (equation 5). The information on the 
frequency of trades provided in Table 1 suggests that it is reasonable to split up the trades into 
trades of 1 million euro (the minimum trade size: small trades), trades exceeding 1, but less 
than 3 million euro (medium trades) and trades of 3 million euro or more (large trades). Small 
trades account for more than 80 per cent of all trades. Our results for the HUF/EUR market 
are presented in Table 2 and Figure 2. We find that the spread is significantly
12
 and positively 
related to trade size. We verified whether the difference in spread size between the different 
trade size categories could be driven by the fact that large trades loose relative importance in 
2004, when the overall spread size decreased on the market, by estimating trade-specific 
spreads for each year separately. The significant difference between the estimated spread on 
small and large trades remained. The estimated spread on large trades is, over the whole 
dataset, 32.35% higher than the spread on small trades. This difference is also economically 
                                                 
12
 After estimating equation (5) we performed a t-test on the coefficients of the size-specific dummies to check 
the significance. 
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significant.
13
 The positive relation we observe is consistent with what other authors find on 
the interbank market. (Osler et al. 2010). 
From a theoretical point of view we would expect the share of the adverse selection 
component and inventory holding premium on the one hand and the order processing 
component on the other hand to evolve with trade size in opposite directions: one would 
assume that the sum of the inventory holding and the adverse selection component increases 
with the trade size, because large trades are more difficult to offset and potentially contain 
more information. In contrast, the order processing component is expected to remain constant 
in absolute terms, as the share of the fixed costs covered by a trade only linearly depends on 
the trade size. This is also what we find in the data: while there seems to be no relation 
between trade size and the absolute size of the order processing component, we find a strong 
positive relation between trade size and the sum of the absolute adverse selection and 
inventory holding component. So, the order processing cost is indeed fixed per unit traded, 
whereas the adverse selection and inventory holding component increases per unit with trade 
size. This results in relatively decreasing order processing costs with trade size, and relative 
increasing costs for the combined component of inventory and adverse selection costs. 
Table 4 summarizes our results for the two- and the three-way decomposition in 
comparison with previous studies. Despite the different setups of the studies in terms of 
counterparties, trading mechanisms and sample periods we can draw some interesting 
conclusions:  
Taking the two-way decomposition as a reasonable starting point (see Table 4a) the two 
studies on minor markets (Bjønnes and Rime 2005 and our study) find shares of the order 
processing costs of 50 and 43 % respectively, and are thus located at the upper range of 
estimates of the OPC. Interestingly the two estimates of higher shares of OPC are by 
McGroarty et al. (2007) on the DEM/USD and EUR/USD market respectively, thus the 
largest and most liquid FX market. However, one has to keep in mind that we are talking 
about relative shares. Since the spread is much bigger in minor markets in absolute terms, our 
43% correspond with about 181 EUR, which exceeds the whole estimated spreads (consisting 
of all three components) for all currencies but the EUR/JPY in the post EMU sample of 
McGroarty et al. (2007). 
The three-way decomposition allows a comparison of the results on the inventory holding 
and the adverse selection component. Table 4b shows the results of our study in comparison 
                                                 
13
 If a trader sells 3 million Euros on the interbank market he would, on average, pay  603,97 EUR under the 
form of deviation from the midpoint if he submits three orders of one million each. If he submits one large order 
he would pay, on average, 799,13 EUR.   
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with results from previous empirical work. The early studies by Lyons (1995) and Yao (1997) 
find evidence for an inventory holding premium, but are less comparable (due to the sample 
period and/or the high share of customer trades). The more comparable analyses, however, 
still provide inconsistent results. While Mende (2005) and Bjønnes and Rime (2005) do not 
find any evidence for an inventory holding premium,  McGroarty et al. (2007) find an 
inventory holding component of various size, between 37 and 56% for the pre-EMU sample, 
and between 42 and 70% for the post-EMU period. They also extensively discuss these 
differing results and trace them back to the differences in individual dealer’s data and market 
wide data. Since our dataset is very similar and might even cover a larger share of the market 
(due to the absence of competing brokerage systems at that time), it is not surprising that our 
results corroborate with theirs, and provide additional evidence for the presence of an 
inventory holding premium.  
Summing up, and taking into account the difficulties in comparing the various studies, we 
find an order processing component that is large in absolute terms, but also located at the 
upper range in relative terms compared to previous studies. Furthermore we find a substantial 
share of the inventory holding premium, which contradicts the recent studies by Mende 
(2005) and Bjønnes and Rime (2005), but is in line with the comparable study by McGroarty 
et al. (2007).  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we apply the well established spread decomposition model by Huang and 
Stoll (1997) to a new and large dataset on the Hungarian forint/ euro market. The main results 
are in line with existing studies on more liquid markets.  Inventory holding costs account on 
average for 40% of the spread. Order processing costs and adverse selection costs represent 
on average respectively 38% and 21% of the spread. 
Furthermore, we find that the increased trading volume that the market experienced during 
the transition process coincided with a decreasing spread size. In the end, adverse selection 
costs became more important. Order processing and inventory holding costs have declined 
over time. 
Finally, we find a close relation between spreads and the order size: the spread 
considerably increases with order size. While the order processing component remains stable, 
the other components show a substantial increase.  
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Summing up, our analysis confirms most of the results from previous theoretical and 
empirical studies, but also points at the differences between minor interbank market segments 
with low liquidity, competition and trading activity compared to major currency markets.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: Decomposition by half-year. 
 
 
Figure 2: Decomposition by trade size.
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TABLES 
 
 
 Whole sample 2003 2004 
Number of quotes 437,420 193,447 243,973 
Number of trades
a,b
 72,622 31,978 40,644 
Average trade size 1,304,398 EUR 1,339,827 EUR 1,276,523 EUR 
Trades  1 million € 80.38% 78.89% 81.55% 
Trades >1 million € and <3 million €  13.79% 14.50% 13.23% 
Trades  3 million € 5.83% 6.61% 5.22% 
Average number of quotes per day  881.90 806.03 953.02 
Average number of trades per day 146.42 133.24 158.77 
Average daily trading volume (million 
€) 
190.98 178.52 202.67 
Average spread (basis points)
c
 4.18 5.20 3.42 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the dataset 
 
a
 The buy and sell are together counted as 1 trade;
 b
 On days with a minimum volume and 
during the office hours; 
c
 Estimated with the two-way decomposition 
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 Half-Spread 
λ * Half-
Spread 
R² Spread ASC+IHC
a
 OPC
b
 
Whole 
sample 
0.053 
(64.43) *** 
0.031 
(59.50) *** 
0.10 0.106 
0.061 0.045 
57.42% 42.58% 
2003 
0.067 
(48.31) *** 
0.038 
(41.55) *** 
0.11 0.133 
0.075 0.058 
56.43% 43.57% 
2004 
0.043 
(47.37) *** 
0.025 
(47.01) *** 
0.10 0.086 
0.050 0.036 
57.87% 42.13% 
2003 jan-
jun 
0.067 
(29.58) *** 
0.036 
(24.87) *** 
0.09 0.134 
0.073 0.062 
54.16% 45.84% 
2003 jul-dec 
0.066 
(43.97) *** 
0.038 
(36.19) *** 
0.13 0.132 
0.077 0.056 
58.15% 41.85% 
2004 jan-
jun 
0.054 
(31.98) *** 
0.031 
(33.58) *** 
0.10 0.109 
0.063 0.046 
57.62% 42.38% 
2004 jul-dec 
0.033 
(46.96) *** 
0.019 
(38.68) *** 
0.13 0.066 
0.038 0.028 
57.41% 42.59% 
 Half-Spread 
(λ-1)* Half-
Spread 
R² Spread ASC+IHC
a
 OPC
b
 
Small trades 
0.051 
(60.64) *** 
-0.023 
(-29.34) *** 
0.10 0.102 
0.056 0.046 
54.80% 45.20% 
Medium 
trades 
0.061 
(36.78) *** 
-0.023 
(-19.81) *** 
0.10 0.123 
0.078 0.045 
63.23% 36.77% 
Large trades 
0.067 
(30.75) *** 
-0.022 
(-13.35) *** 
0.10 0.135 
0.090 0.045 
66.79% 33.21% 
Table 2: Two-way decomposition of the spread. 
a
 Adverse selection component + inventory holding component (in absolute (HUF) and 
relative values); 
b
 Order processing component (in absolute (HUF) and relative values); *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, t-values in parentheses 
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 (1-2π) Half-Spread 
(α+β-1)  
* Half-Spread 
α   
* Half-Spread  
*(1-2π) 
π Spread OPCa ASCb IHCc 
Whole sample 
0.454 
(136.36) *** 
0.054 
(89.34) *** 
-0.021 
(-31.98) *** 
0.005 
(8.74) *** 
0.27 0.107 
0.041 0.023 0.043 
38.34% 21.57% 40.09% 
2003 
0.471 
(94.70) *** 
0.067 
(61.35) *** 
-0.027 
(-22.77) *** 
0.006 
(5.09) *** 
0.26 0.134 
0.054 0.024 0.057 
39.95% 17.65% 42.40% 
2004 
0.441 
(98.38) *** 
0.043 
(67.51) *** 
-0.016 
(-23.47) *** 
0.005 
(7.83) *** 
0.28 0.087 
0.032 0.023 0.032 
37.10% 26.32% 36.59% 
2003 jan-jun 
0.473 
(66.42) *** 
0.068 
(38.50) *** 
-0.029 
(-15.30) *** 
0.005 
(2.88) *** 
0.26 0.136 
0.058 0.021 0.056 
42.72% 15.83% 41.46% 
2003 jul-dec 
0.469 
(67.50) *** 
0.066 
(50.20) *** 
-0.025 
(-17.37) *** 
0.006 
(4.57) *** 
0.27 0.133 
0.049 0.026 0.057 
37.28% 19.42% 43.30% 
2004 jan-jun 
0.455 
(70.13) *** 
0.055 
(45.97) *** 
-0.021 
(-16.22) *** 
0.006 
(4.68) *** 
0.27 0.110 
0.042 0.025 0.044 
37.85% 22.40% 39.75% 
2004 jul-dec 
0.428 
(69.14) *** 
0.033 
(56.53) *** 
-0.012 
(-19.62) *** 
0.0045 
(7.59) *** 
0.29 0.067 
0.025 0.021 0.021 
36.87% 31.35% 31.78% 
Table 3: Three-way decomposition of the spread. 
 
a 
Order processing component (in absolute (HUF) and relative values); 
b
 Adverse selection component (in absolute (HUF) and relative values); 
c 
Inventory holding component (in absolute and relative values); *** indicates significance at the 1% level, t-values in parentheses. 
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 Market Period # obs. Types of trades CP
a
 Spread components Market Fraction 
     IHC+ASC
b
 OPC
b
 
Minor markets          
This study HUF/EUR Jan 2003- 
Dec 2004 
(2 years) 
71,630 Complete trading on 
Reuters D3000 
IB 57% 43% Whole (electronic) 
market 
Bjønnes/Rime 
(2005)
c
 
NOK/DEM Feb 1998 
(5 days) 
144 Direct and indirect 
trades 
C+IB 50% 50% Market maker, 
customer share of 
18% 
Major markets          
Lyons (1995) DEM/USD Aug 1992 
(5 days) 
838 Direct and brokered 
trades  
IB 49% 51% Large share of 
indirect trades 
Bjønnes/Rime 
(2005)
d
 
DEM/USD Feb 1998 
(5 days) 
169-430 Direct and indirect 
trades 
(C+)IB 81% 19% One dealer, 
customer share of 
3% 
McGroarty et 
al. (2007) 
USD/JPY 
USD/CHF 
DEM/USD 
DEM/JPY 
DEM/CHF 
Aug-Sept 2008 
(20 days) 
 
399,124 
42,952 
484,005 
128,064 
73,898 
Complete EBS trading IB 72% 
86% 
56% 
91% 
74% 
28% 
14% 
44% 
9% 
26% 
Major fraction of 
electronic market 
McGroarty et 
al. (2007) 
USD/JPY 
USD/CHF 
EUR/USD 
EUR/JPY 
EUR/CHF 
Aug-Sept 2009 
(20 days) 
225,825 
72,939 
310,300 
42,743 
29,654 
Complete EBS trading IB 64% 
81% 
45% 
79% 
67% 
36% 
19% 
55% 
21% 
33% 
Major fraction of 
electronic market 
Table 4a: Comparison with selected previous studies (Two-way decomposition). 
a 
Counterparty: C = customer, IB = interbank;
 b 
IHC: inventory component, ASC: adverse selection component, OPC: order processing component; 
c
 
Dealer 1 in the sample; 
d 
Dealer 3 in the sample, dealers 2 and 4 trade less in DEM/USD and are not considered here.  
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 Market Period # obs. Types of trades CP
a
 Spread components Market Fraction 
     IHC
b
 ASC
b
 OPC
b
 
Minor markets          
This study HUF/EUR Jan 2003- 
Dec 2004 
(2 years) 
71,630 Complete trading on 
Reuters D3000 
IB 40 % 21% 38% Whole (electronic) 
market 
Bjønnes/Rime (2005)
c
 NOK/DEM Feb 1998 
(5 days) 
144 Direct and indirect trades C+IB 0% 49% 51% Market maker, customer 
share of 18% 
Major markets          
Lyons (1995) DEM/USD Aug 1992 
(5 days) 
838 Direct and indirect trades  IB 30% 15% 45% Large share of indirect 
trades 
Yao (1998) DEM/USD Nov-Dec 1995 
(25 days) 
4,518 Direct and indirect trades C+IB 70% 23% 7% High share of customer 
trades (75% of  profits)  
Mende (2005) EUR/USD Jul-Nov 2001 
(87 days) 
2,859 Direct and indirect trades C+IB 0% <40%  >60%   
Bjønnes/Rime (2005)
d
 DEM/USD Feb 1998 
(5 days) 
169-430 Direct and indirect trades (C+)IB 0% 72% 28% Customer share of 3% 
McGroarty et al. (2007) USD/JPY 
USD/CHF 
DEM/USD 
DEM/JPY 
DEM/CHF 
Aug-Sept 
2008 
(20 days) 
 
399,124 
42,952 
484,005 
128,064 
73,898 
Complete EBS trading IB 43% 
56% 
38% 
50% 
37% 
29% 
29% 
25% 
36% 
45% 
28% 
15% 
37% 
13% 
15% 
major fraction of 
electronic market 
McGroarty et al. (2007) USD/JPY 
USD/CHF 
EUR/USD 
EUR/JPY 
EUR/CHF 
Aug-Sept 
2009 
(20 days) 
225,825 
72,939 
310,300 
42,743 
29,654 
Complete EBS trading IB 61% 
70% 
42% 
65% 
45% 
7% 
17% 
9% 
18% 
33% 
32% 
13% 
49% 
16% 
21% 
major fraction of 
electronic market 
Table 4b: Comparison with selected previous studies (Three-way decomposition). 
a
 Counterparty: C = customer, IB = interbank; 
b
 IHC: inventory component, ASC: adverse selection component, OPC: order processing component; 
c
 Dealer 1 in the sample; 
d
 Dealer 3 in the sample, dealers 2 and 4 trade less in DEM/USD and are not considered here. 
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Abstract 
We study the tightness of the complete electronic interbank foreign exchange market for the 
HUF/ EUR over a two year period. First, we review the cost components that a liquidity 
provider on this type of market faces, and integrate them in an empirical spread 
decomposition model. Second, we estimate the bid-ask spread components on an intraday 
basis, and find that order processing costs account for 47.09% of the spread and that, the 
combined inventory holding and adverse selection risk component accounts for 52.52% of the 
spread. In addition, we provide evidence for an endogenous tick size that accounts for one 
third of the order processing costs and we also estimate the number of liquidity providers 
based on the risk component. Third, we apply the model to some interesting spread patterns. 
Using our model we investigate the stylized difference in spreads between peak-times and 
non-peak times. We find that the combined compensation for inventory holding and adverse 
selection risk increases during non-peak times, particularly because the risk that a liquidity 
provider will have to carry an inventory overnight rises. Furthermore, we apply the model to 
the interesting spread pattern around a speculative attack. Here, credibility of the exchange 
rate band, competition amongst liquidity providers and increased volatility are key in 
understanding what happens during this episode of extreme turmoil. 
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Bid-Ask Spread Components on the Foreign Exchange Market: 
Quantifying the Risk Component 
1. Introduction 
Liquidity captures how easy it is to convert an asset into cash, and is a key-variable of 
interest when investigating financial markets. Moreover, liquidity also determines the speed at 
which information about an asset can be processed and it as well affects the asset’s expected 
return. From a society point of view, liquidity is important for the stability of the global 
financial system. In the literature, many different indicators are used to characterize the 
liquidity of a market. In fact, liquidity can be seen as a multi-dimensional variable: one can 
distinguish volume (how much trade there is on a market), depth (the quantity available on the 
market over different prices), immediacy (the speed at which an order can be executed), 
resiliency (the speed at which new orders enter the market if the quantity available on the 
market gets depleted) and tightness (the difference between what you pay when you buy an 
asset and what you get when you sell an asset).
60
 In this work we focus on this last dimension 
– the tightness/ bid-ask spread – on a specific foreign exchange market. It is this bid-ask 
spread that is the cause of a difference between the price at which transactions take place and 
the theoretical mid-quote observed on the market. These costs are important for market 
participants and influence the price discovery process.
61
 We aim to contribute to the 
understanding of this liquidity dimension by investigating the link with the different types of 
costs that liquidity providers face. 
From the first paper that introduced an early concept of market microstructure onwards 
(Garman (1976 )), bid-ask spreads received a considerable amount of attention in what later 
became a distinct field of finance research.
62
 The price difference between bid and ask prices 
is in general treated as a compensation for the costs liquidity providers incur on the market. 
Their costs can be divided in three categories: order processing costs, inventory holding costs 
and adverse selection costs (Tinic (1972 )). There exists a vast amount of work that tries to 
seize the importance of each of these components. Early structural models include (Ho and 
                                                 
60
 Concerning the definition of tightness, every transaction of course involves a buyer and a seller. To be more 
specific, the bid-ask spread is the difference between the price an active buyer pays and the revenue an active 
seller receives. 
61
 For the HUF/ EUR market, which represented in 2004 only 0.22% of the global turnover on the FOREX 
market, this cost sums up to 59.99 Million EUR in 2003 and 61.85 Million EUR in 2004. 
62
 In this early model, the spread emerged as a result of dealers who set optimal bid and ask quotes assuming that 
market activity follows a Poisson-process. 
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Stoll (1981); Huang and Stoll (1997); Stoll (1978 )). Empirical models follow a somewhat 
different approach and do not impose a complete structural model that describes the trading 
process. They do not impose strong assumptions on the behaviour of traders and the way how 
they interact, but model each component separately and explicitly (the most notable example 
– that inspired us and to which we will refer a lot – being developed by Bollen, Smith and 
Whaley (2004)).  
In this paper, we will apply an empirical spread decomposition model to a very extensive 
dataset on Hungarian forint/ euro interbank trading for 2003 and 2004. The Hungarian forint 
was traded exclusively vis-à-vis the euro during this sample period (trades from other 
currencies took place by using the euro as vehicle currency). The HUF/ EUR is a minor 
market, which accounted for 0.22% of the global turnover in 2004 (BIS (2004 )), and 
according to the latest record accounts for 0.4% of the global turnover (BIS (2010 )). An 
interesting characteristic of the HUF/ EUR market is that there was a strong liquidity increase/ 
transaction cost decrease over the sample period. This strong liquidity variation over a 
relatively short amount of time is the result of an integration process, and distinguishes this 
foreign exchange market from others. 
A typical feature of the interbank foreign exchange market that we study, is that it has no 
designated market makers. Still, attracted by potential profits, some participants can play the 
role of liquidity provider. This leads to the emergence of what has been labelled endogenous 
liquidity provision in theoretical, experimental and empirical work (Anand and Venkataraman 
(2013); Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005 )). For the same HUF/ EUR market, and using the 
same data, it was argued that endogenous liquidity providers were active around jumps 
(Frömmel, Han and Van Gysegem (2013 )). 
The contribution of this paper is at least threefold. First, we provide results of an empirical 
spread decomposition model for the foreign exchange market. Although the literature refers 
often to insights from the empirical spread decomposition model, results for this type of 
model are relatively scarce. Full results are currently only available for Nasdaq stocks. Our 
work allows to review the impact on the results of the very different microstructure of this 
type of market (e.g. specialists vs. endogenous liquidity providers). Second, we apply the 
model on an intraday, hourly basis. This frequency is more in line with the frequency at which 
liquidity provision takes place. An additional advantage is that the intraday pattern is not 
averaged out. Furthermore, we take the partly fixed and partly variable nature of order 
processing costs into account. Third, we provide some interesting applications of this type of 
models: we look to the stylized intraday spread pattern from a cost component perspective 
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and we apply the model to a period of major turmoil on the market (i.e. a speculative attack 
against the Hungarian forint). 
 
2. The foreign exchange market: characteristics and advantages 
The foreign exchange market is the largest financial market in the world: the daily 
turnover of the global foreign exchange spot market was for 2010 estimated at $ 1.5 trillion 
(BIS (2010 )), which is approximately 15 times the global GDP that is generated on a daily 
basis.
63
 In addition to its overwhelming size, the foreign exchange market has some other 
distinctive features. First of all, the market has a two-tier structure. One tier consists of trade 
between customers and banks. The customers are then the actual end-users of the currencies 
and can be further split up in non-dealer financial institutions on the one hand (such as hedge 
funds) and corporations and governments on the other hand (such as importing and exporting 
firms). However, also retail investors and algorithmic traders represent an increasing amount 
of the trading activity (King, Osler and Rime (2011 )).
64
 A second tier consists of interbank 
trading. It is in this second tier that the price formation takes place and where the spot 
exchange rates are set. These spot exchange rates are the reference prices for all other foreign 
exchange deals (e.g. on the dealer-customer market). A second distinctive feature of the 
foreign exchange market is that it is a decentralized market (without designated market 
makers). It is an electronic, order-driven market where participants can trade by posting a 
market order or a limit order. A market order is immediately matched with the best available 
outstanding order at the opposite side of the book. Limit orders stay in the book until they are 
matched with an incoming market order or until they are cancelled by the participant who 
placed the order. A third distinctive feature is that there are no official opening and closing 
times (in principle, there are trades 24h a day except for the weekends).   
The foreign exchange market has advantages over other markets for microstructure 
researchers. First of all, trading is really continuous as it is not interrupted by specific 
opening/ closing procedures and/ or batch auctions that lead to breaks in the timeseries. 
Secondly, many participants have access to this market, and they can all observe all 
outstanding buy and sell orders in the marketplace (there is no hidden liquidity, like iceberg 
orders etc.). It is therefore often argued that the foreign exchange market is the real-world 
                                                 
63
 Assuming on average 20 working days per month. The Worldbank estimates the global GDP for 2010 at $ 63 
trillion. 
64
 Their share in trading on the overall foreign exchange market has risen from 20% in 1998 to more than 50% in 
2010.  
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market that resembles perfect competition most closely. This is in line with the assumptions 
behind most models in microstructure research, and makes the interpretation of our results 
less ambiguous. The specific dataset we are working with offers additional advantages: it is a 
very complete dataset (we cover all electronic trading of this currency pair), and it has an 
unusually long time span of two years. These characteristics ensure the representativeness and 
robustness of the results we obtain, and allow us to investigate the variation over time. 
 
3. Cost components of the bid-ask spread 
The bid-ask spread is the source of revenues for liquidity providers. However, providing 
liquidity also comes with a cost. The first to categorize these costs was Tinic (1972). He 
identified three broad cost components, and his categorization was the starting point for an 
extensive literature that deals with the theoretical modelling of these costs and testing their 
empirical relevance. 
Order processing costs (OPC)  
The first category concerns the general costs of providing market making services. These 
costs are partly fixed (e.g. wages of traders, floor space rent, subscriptions to trading 
platforms and information providers,…). These fixed costs have to be covered while 
providing liquidity, and can be spread over all transactions of the liquidity providers. Another 
part of the order processing costs is variable and thus incurred each time there is a trade (e.g. 
exchange, clearing and settlement fees, attention by traders,… ). The fact that part of the order 
processing costs is variable has implications for the spread and price dynamics.
65
 
Inventory holding costs (IHC) 
Secondly, providing liquidity implies that you take positions and hold an inventory. This 
inventory is unwanted in the sense that a liquidity provider does not want to be exposed to 
price movements. Theoretical models predict that this results in a process in which liquidity 
providers adapt their spread based on their inventory of risky assets. They change their quotes 
in order to induce inventory equilibrating trades (Amihud and Mendelson (1980); Ho and 
Stoll (1981 )). In addition to the risk of an adverse price movement, holding an inventory also 
                                                 
65
 For variable order processing costs and an interesting model dealing with the implications for price dynamics, 
see p.101-106 of Foucault, Thierry, Marco Pagano, and Ailsa Röell, 2013, Market liquidity: Theory, evidence 
and policy,  (Oxford University Press, USA). 
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comes with an opportunity cost for the funds invested in the inventory, as this inventory needs 
to be financed on a continuous basis (Demsetz (1968 )). 
Adverse selection costs (ASC) 
Thirdly, there is also a cost associated with engaging in a transaction with a market 
participant who has superior information. The first to analyse the asymmetric information 
problem for a dealer when she has to decide on the bid and ask quotes was (Bagehot (1971 )). 
A formal treatment of this problem involves splitting up the market participants looking for 
execution into two categories, based on their motivation: informed traders, who have private 
information on the real value of the underlying quote, and uninformed traders (Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985 )). This last category was initially considered to trade for liquidity reasons or 
to hedge themselves. Later, another type of traders was added: traders who think they have 
private information without actually having it. This subcategory can then be labelled as noise 
traders.
66
 Both informed and uninformed traders pay the spread in order to get executed. The 
informed traders know, however, that when selling (buying), the bid (ask) quote they get 
(pay) is too high (low), and does not correspond to the true, underlying value. Liquidity 
providers only know that this type of traders exists, but cannot know in advance whether a 
specific trade is liquidity or information motivated. This leads to a problem of adverse 
selection, and liquidity providers will ask a compensation for the associated risk. While 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) treat this problem in a quote driven framework where traders 
arrive sequentially, Kyle (1985) models this problem in an order driven framework, similar to 
a batch auction. This last setting is more similar to the foreign exchange market. 
As a clarification, adverse selection costs are not linked to the presence of information per 
se in the market. When the information is symmetric, there will be no adverse selection cost 
for the liquidity provider. The risk of new, symmetrically spread, information disclosed after 
the transaction and leading to price movements is fully contained in the inventory holding 
costs. 
 
4. Model 
Above we outlined the theoretical foundations for the main cost categories that liquidity 
suppliers face when they want to add liquidity to the book. In this chapter we will follow the 
literature in assuming that the spread is a function of these three cost components: 
                                                 
66
 For an extensive discussion that clarifies the difference between these different types of traders (which are 
used in many cases interchangeably), see Bloomfield, O’hara and Saar (2009).  
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       (              )     (Eq. 1) 
      
We now develop an empirical spread decomposition model and focus on how to model 
each cost component. 
Order processing component  
Because of their partly fixed nature, order processing costs are expected to be negatively 
related to the volume traded. Empirical work found evidence for this negative relation 
between some measure of volume traded and the spread (Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004); 
Branch and Freed (1977); Harris (1994); Stoll (1978); Tinic (1972); Tinic and West (1972); 
Tinic and West (1974 )). However, volume traded also carries information. When splitting up 
the volume traded in an expected and an unexpected component, one could argue that 
unexpected deviations from normal intraday trading volume point at private information, and 
consequently push the exchange rate up or down. This was confirmed in various empirical 
studies (Danielsson and Payne (2011); Easley and O'Hara (1992 )). This substantial part of the 
volume traded will by consequence rather be related to private information, and not to order 
processing costs. Additionally, it has been noted that the relation between volume traded and 
spread could be obfuscated by the fact that participants are active on multiple markets over 
which they can distribute their fixed costs. Moreover, above we referred to the notion that not 
all costs of order processing are fixed: some of them are incurred each time there is a trade. 
We include this in our model as a constant that is not depending on the volume traded. 
Following the insights on the nature of order processing costs (partly variable, partly 
fixed) and the nature of volume traded (partly expected, partly unexpected) we model the 
OPC as partly fixed and partly depending on the expected volume traded. Here we differ from 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004). This specification is consistent with a broad definition of 
order processing costs, which includes clearing and settlement fees, tick-size and non-
competitive rents.
67
 All these costs have in common that they are covered by revenues under 
the form of a mark-up (partly a mark-up per trade, and partly a mark-up over all expected 
trades per interval) on top of the risk components. The resulting order processing costs per 
time-interval are consequently modelled as: 
                                                 
67
 A separate variable indicating the level of competition, such as the modified Herfindahl index, would make it 
possible to split this component further up. This data is, however, not available. For an extensive analysis of the 
link between competition and bid-ask spreads on this type of markets, see Huang and Masulis (1999).  
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                    (Eq. 2) 
 
With OPC being equal to the order processing cost and EXP TV being equal to the 
expected volume traded. 
Risk component 
The notion that liquidity providers are aware of the risk of adverse changes in the price of 
assets in their inventory (inventory holding costs) was tested empirically in the literature using 
various proxies for these price changes. A logical class of proxies for price movements that 
can be easily transferred to the foreign exchange market are volatility-related proxies. For 
different markets, a positive relation between volatility and bid-ask spreads was reported 
(Bollerslev and Melvin (1994); Branch and Freed (1977); Harris (1994); Stoll (1978); Tinic 
(1972 )).  
The presence of asymmetric information (adverse selection costs) in a market is, because 
of its very nature, difficult to detect for market participants and researchers. Early ex post 
proxies on equity markets included inter alia the number of specialist stocks in which a certain 
market maker was active (Tinic and West (1972 )) and trading volume over market 
capitalization (Stoll (1978 )). On the foreign exchange market different adverse selection 
proxies were used. Some authors used quoting frequency on the Reuters EFX system 
(Phylaktis and Chen (2010 )). The more active in quoting on Reuters, the more informed a 
bank seems to be. Related to this, the size of the counterparty (Bjønnes, Osler and Rime 
(2008 )) was also shown to be related to private information. These authors find that large 
traders are the most informed (and connect in that way with what Stoll (1978) found for the 
equity market). Another, interesting approach consists of looking to the price impact 
(Menkhoff and Schmeling (2010 )). Using an extensive inter-dealer FX trading dataset with 
counter-party identities, it has been shown that orders by counterparties who have superior 
information have a greater price impact (Moore and Payne (2011 )). Finally, asymmetric 
information was also found to be related to order flow characteristics. Theoretical models 
have shown that information enters the market when informed participants take liquidity, 
rather than when participants add liquidity (Evans and Lyons (2006); King, Sarno and Sojli 
(2010 )). Additionally, when dealers think they have information (e.g. after accepting a large 
order from a financial institution on the customer-side) they are found to take liquidity in the 
direction of the information (Bjønnes, Osler and Rime (2008); Osler, Mende and Menkhoff 
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(2011 )). In a next stage, it is widely documented that, because of their (private) information 
content, order flow drives the price in the spot FX market (Evans and Lyons (2002 )).  
In general terms, one can treat this two risk components in one common framework. The 
compensation required by the liquidity provider for taking the inventory holding and the 
adverse selection risk after accommodating, for example, a sell order will be equal to the 
expected loss when the quote moves adversely times the probability of an adverse quote 
movement: 
       (       )     (    )    (Eq. 2) 
 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) show that the expected cost of accommodating an order 
can be quantified as the price of an at-the-money option with the time that the stock is held in 
inventory as expiration. This finding is very intuitive: such an option would yield a pay-off 
structure that is compensating the loss when the price of the asset in inventory changes 
adversely. For example, if a liquidity provider has no inventory and is accommodating an 
active buy (sell) order, she will be short (long) the asset. A call-option (put-option) will hedge 
her position. The midquote immediately prior to the submission of the active order will be the 
true price. This will also be the strike. The combined inventory holding and adverse selection 
costs (the risk component) will thus be equal to an at-the-money option. The value of this 
option is given by (Black and Scholes (1973); Merton (1973 )): 
      [  (    √ )   ]     (Eq. 3) 
 
With S being equal to the true price, here the midquote, σ being equal to the annualized 
standard deviation of the return, t being equal to the time between two offsetting trades 
expressed in years, and N(∙) is the cumulative standard normal density function. This formula 
is identical for valuing an at-the money call option and an at-the-money put option. 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) further explore the effect of a stochastic time between 
offsetting trades and also the effect of taking into account that the combined, hedged position 
of the liquidity provider still makes it possible to profit from advantageous price changes. 
They conclude that under realistic parameter settings, both features only have a minor effect 
on the calculated risk component. 
Formally, we can now combine the cost components mentioned above in a regression 
model:  
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                                (Eq. 4) 
 
With SPRD is the observed intraday spread, Exp TV is the expected volume traded and 
RISK is the premium for the combined inventory holding and adverse selection risk. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Data 
In this work, we use an unusually rich and complete tick-by-tick dataset for the years 2003 
and 2004. Our dataset consists of all quotes, i.e., limit and market orders, on the HUF/EUR 
interbank market that have been placed via the Reuters D3000 broking system. This was the 
only platform that offered services for this currency pair during our sample period, so we 
cover the complete electronic trading. We observe the price, the quantity in euro that was 
offered or asked, whether it was a market or a limit order and the exact time when the order 
was placed and when it disappeared. We observe whether the order was withdrawn or whether 
it was executed, i.e., matched with another limit or market order. We use the data to 
reconstruct the limit order book at the intraday level. This allows us to determine the mid-
quote and the quoted spread at any point in time. We aggregate the tick-by-tick data and 
information from the reconstructed limit order book (both at market event frequency) to 
twelve hourly observations per day (from 7am till 7pm). This way, we obtain 6060 hourly 
intervals which cover the hours with the highest market activity (See Figure 2 for the intraday 
distribution of ticks, which is a measure for how active traders are). 
The quote and the volume traded over the two years contained in our dataset are shown in 
Figure 1. An important event clearly stands out: there was a speculative attack against the top 
of the currency band in January 2003, followed by a central bank intervention which brought 
the quote back to its target value. Table 1 presents some summary statistics. 
5.2 The bid-ask spread and its determinants 
In this work we focus on the quoted spread, as this is the relevant spread for a market 
participant who is looking for execution.
68
 Interdealer bid-ask spreads on currency markets 
                                                 
68
 Some works, especially dealing with stock market spreads, focus also partly (or fully) on the effective spread 
(being the difference between the price at which a transaction takes place and the prevailing quote from the other 
side of the book). These authors typically find that the effective spread is smaller than the quoted spread (i.a. 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004)). This is possible because in some markets, participants can negotiate directly 
for a better quote, or because there is hidden liquidity available in the book. In our market, negotiations are not 
directly observed and there is no hidden liquidity. Therefore, the effective spread will be at least as high as the 
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are in general low. They range from roughly 0.5-2 basispoints on liquid markets to 40 
basispoints on less liquid markets (King, Osler and Rime (2011); Osler, Mende and Menkhoff 
(2011 )).
69
 We see that for our market the half-year average quoted spread lies between 0.25 
HUF/ EUR and 0.39 HUF/ EUR. This corresponds to respectively 9.99 and 15.01 basispoints. 
We distinguish for each interval the time-weighted spread and the last spread observed in the 
book.
70
  
The volume traded per hourly interval is expressed in million EUR. The minimum size of 
a trade is 1 million EUR, and all quantities traded are multiples of this minimum size. Most of 
the trades, 80.38%, that take place actually have the minimum size, 13.79% of the trades are 
for 2 million EUR and the remaining 5.83% are for at least 3 million EUR. The fact that 
trades for the minimum size dominate is consistent with a widespread use of order splitting 
strategies by traders (in an attempt to minimize the market impact, see also Kyle (1985)). The 
average expected volume traded increased each half year from 7.58 million EUR to 12.08 
million EUR per hourly interval 
The volatility is calculated as the annualized standard deviation over the last 30 ten 
minutes intervals, such that it reflects the volatility over a frequency that is relevant for 
liquidity suppliers. The distribution of these volatilities is right-skewed. The time between 
trades is expressed in minutes, assuming that the volume traded during each interval is evenly 
distributed during the interval. When used to calculate the option value, the time between two 
trades is annualized.  
 5.3 Intraday patterns 
As we undertake an intraday analysis, we are automatically concerned about the intraday 
pattern that characterizes our variables. Therefore, we calculate for the two-year sample 
period the intraday pattern for the bid-ask spread and the quantity traded, which can be found 
respectively in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
71
 The spread pattern is U-shaped. This contrasts to the 
W-shaped pattern found for the USD/ DEM spot market (Danielsson and Payne (2011 )), but 
is consistent with what other authors found for a wide array of foreign exchange markets 
(McGroarty, ap Gwilym and Thomas (2009 )). The intraday volume pattern is found to be M-
                                                                                                                                                        
quoted spread (it will be higher if the order walks up the book). We focus by consequence only on the quoted 
spread. 
69
 Although we should keep in mind that this is still very liquid compared to stock markets. The spread on 
Nasdaq stocks found by Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) corresponds to respectively 203.68, 108.67 and 61.88 
basispoints for selective months. 
70
 The time-weighted spread is calculated by multiplying each observed quote during an interval with the relative 
time it was observed. 
71
 These patterns were obtained using the median, and not the mean, to increase robustness. 
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shaped. This result is consistent with what other authors found for the foreign exchange 
market (Danielsson and Payne (2011); McGroarty, ap Gwilym and Thomas (2009 )), but 
differs from the widely documented U-shaped pattern on other financial markets. We will use 
the pattern of the quantity traded as proxy for the expected quantity traded, in order to 
determine the order processing component. To take changing expectations into account, the 
pattern of expected trading volume is updated every half-year. 
5.4 Results 
Bivariate correlations 
As a first step, we analyse the bivariate correlations between the variables we will use in 
the regression analysis (See Table 3). The correlations of all explanatory variables with the 
time-weighted quoted spread are significant at the 1% level.
72
 The correlations with the non-
time weighted quoted spread are consistently lower (and unexpected trading volume becomes 
even insignificant). The large difference in correlations underlines the importance of choosing 
the right spread variable. The input variables used to quantify the risk component have at the 
individual level a lower correlation with the spread (23% for volatility and 38% for the time 
between two trades) than the correlation between spread and the modelled component (which 
is 56%). The correlation between the spread and the expected quantity traded has the right 
sign. 
In a similar analysis for a set of liquid currencies (the currency pairs consisting of USD, 
JPY, CHF and EUR (DEM)), a very low correlation between the bid-ask spread and the 
volatility (1%-9%) was found (McGroarty, ap Gwilym and Thomas (2009 )). The low results 
were, according to the authors, evidence for the hypothesis that liquidity provision on the 
foreign exchange market is very different from stock and bond markets, as no inventory needs 
to be managed (McGroarty, ap Gwilym and Thomas (2006 )). Our results challenge this 
hypothesis. Possible reasons for our different results include that the results in the former 
work were obtained using the last quotes for each interval and not the time-weighted quotes, 
and that we are dealing with a less liquid currency for which the inventory risk is obviously 
bigger.   
                                                 
72
 We use a t-test, with   
            √                        
√              
. 
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Decomposition results 
In Table 4 we present the results for the intraday empirical spread decomposition model 
for the whole sample period and for each half-year separately.
73
 The intraday pattern, used to 
discriminate between expected and unexpected values is updated each half-year. All 
coefficients have the expected sign, and the coefficients on the order processing component 
and risk component are always statistically significant. In order to verify the validity of the 
model, we compare the explanatory power with that of a specification in which the spread is 
regressed on the input variables to our model, in an ad hoc specification (See Table 5). The R-
squared for this specification is considerably lower, and the components are more difficult to 
interpret. This underlines the value added of the model in understanding the drivers of the bid-
ask spread. When comparing the intraday explanatory power of our model with the interdaily 
analysis by Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) on the stock market, we see that it performs 
slightly weaker, with an R-squared in the range of 30.85%-40.95% where they have an R-
squared of 54.40%-80.22% using a similar specification for selective months. They also run 
an ad-hoc specification, which has an R-squared in the range of 36.99%-57.68%. For the pink 
sheet market, and using daily data, a linear ad hoc model that incorporates the most-cited 
explanatory variables for spreads is found to yield an adjusted R-squared of 56% (Bollen and 
Christie (2009 )).
74
 The lower explanatory power for our market could be the result of a lower 
degree of efficiency in the behaviour of liquidity providers for this minor market, in 
comparison with the NASDAQ market which is widely followed and has designated market 
makers. 
When we look at the size of the individual cost components, we find that the order 
processing component accounts on average for 47.09% of the intraday spread. This is in line 
with other order processing cost estimates for the foreign exchange market using theoretical 
spread decomposition models: 51% for the NOK/ DEM market (Bjønnes and Rime (2005 )), 
45% for the DEM/ USD market (Lyons (1995 )) and 38% for the HUF/ EUR market using a 
theoretical model for the same sample period (Frömmel and Van Gysegem (2012 )). 
We defined the order processing component broad, so that it also includes tick-size. A 
distinct characteristic of the foreign exchange limit order book we are dealing with is the very 
low, seemingly irrelevant, tick size. In fact, quotes can in theory be submitted at a resolution 
                                                 
73
 We verified whether the results we obtain are possibly spurious by performing an Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test on the timeseries of the variables. We can conclude that there is no such risk. Additionally, the value of the 
Durbin-Watson statistic on the residuals was always found to be bigger than the R-squared of each individual 
regression. 
74
 Pink Sheet stocks do not need to meet certain minimum listing standards, and are traded over-the-counter. As 
such, information on these stocks is not always available. Stocks are not listed on this market, only quoted. 
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up to 0.0001 HUF/EUR. In that sense, tick size could be thought of as being a negligible part 
of the order processing component. However, if we look to the quotes submitted to the limit 
order book, the possibility to enter quotes up to such a high resolution is not used by market 
participants. We rather see the emergence of an endogenous tick size (Bollen and Christie 
(2009 )). Figure 5 shows the distribution of all best quotes in the book during the two sample 
years over their first decimal number. We see that quotes like x.4xxx and x.6xxx are less 
prevalent than x.5xxx, and that quotes like x.9xxx and x.1xxx are less prevalent than x.0xxx. 
Thus, participants seem to round their quotes at the first decimal level. Figure 6 shows the 
same distribution for the second decimal. Here it is very clear that the quotes are strongly 
concentrated on x.x0xx and x.x5xx. Although there is no relevant exchange-mandated tick-
size, 0.05 HUF/ EUR emerges as an endogenous tick size (roughly one third of the order 
processing component). This reflects that the low tick-size is not considered to be optimal. In 
this context, the tick size does not need to be interpreted as a cost, as is done in some other 
works, but rather as a (fixed) source of revenues for the liquidity provider.  
The expected volume traded is very significant, both in economical and statistical terms. 
We find that if the expected volume traded is 10% higher (which corresponds to roughly one 
extra trade at the minimum size above the average), the spread is c.p. 4.50% lower.  
We pointed out earlier in this work that liquidity providers will value the risk associated 
with adding liquidity to the book. We find that our modelled risk component accounts on 
average for more than half of the spread (52.52%), and is highly significant throughout the 
half-year periods.
75
 So, the combined inventory holding and adverse selection risk clearly 
explains to a large extent the intraday bid-ask spread. The average volatility throughout the 
dataset is 5.25%. When the volatility is one standard deviation higher, the spread will c.p. be 
62.74% higher. We see that the low spread in the last half year (23.90% lower than the two-
year average) is caused by a decrease of the risk component: both the size of the costs and the 
reaction to this cost by the liquidity providers went down. The smaller size of the cost was at 
its turn caused by a very low volatility and a below average time between two trades. 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) further use the option approach to isolate the adverse 
selection component. They argue that the relevant option will be out-of-the-money when 
                                                 
75
 We verified the robustness of the size of the option component by using a more advanced option valuation 
method that takes the presence of jumps into account. We therefore apply Merton’s mixed jump-diffusion model 
(Merton, 1976) and use the jump characteristics for this market as reported in Frömmel, Han and Van Gysegem 
(2013). For the whole sample period, we find that the R-squared only increases slightly (from 34.69% to 
34.77%). The risk component becomes slightly more important, and explains in this case 55.81% of the spread 
instead of 52.52%. The effect remains similar over various subsamples. 
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providing liquidity to an uninformed trader, with the bid (ask) as the strike price for the put 
(call) option when the liquidity provider accommodates a market sell (buy) order, and the 
mid-quote as true price. The relevant option will be in-the-money when dealing with an 
informed liquidity taker with, again, the bid (ask) as the strike price but a true price that is 
lower (bigger) than the bid (ask) of the put (call) option. This approach, which is very 
interesting from a conceptual point of view, comes however with a lot of uncertainty. 
Obviously, the magnitude of the difference between the bid/ ask price and the true price is 
unknown. Therefore, Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) compare this specification for a range 
of deviations and conclude, based on the explanatory power of the model, that it is most likely 
between 9% and 12%. Whilst keeping the additional uncertainty in mind, we followed an 
identical approach. Independent of the deviation we do not find a significant effect, both 
statistically and economically.  
Our results for this further decomposition thus differ from the results for the same dataset 
when applying a structural spread decomposition methodology. Using this methodology it 
was found that although it is the smallest cost component, adverse selection costs still account 
for 21% of the spread (Frömmel and Van Gysegem (2012 )). Bollen, Smith and Whaley 
(2004) also find clear evidence for an adverse selection component. The difference with their 
results could lie in the very different market microstructure on the market they study: on the 
NASDAQ, liquidity is provided by designated market makers (specialists), whereas on our 
market liquidity is provided endogenously. It could be that this type of liquidity providers 
does not price adverse selection separately (or to a lesser extent), because the amount of 
adverse selection on this market is low or because it is difficult to detect. However, as noted 
above the further decomposition of the risk component comes with a lot of additional 
uncertainty. Our results could in that sense just be an illustration of this uncertainty. 
Estimate for the number of liquidity providers 
The valuation of the risk component requires information on the time between two trades 
(See eq. 3). In our dataset we observe all trades together, and are not able to see how long the 
time between two trades is for an individual liquidity provider. Consequently, we used the 
average time between two trades as indicator for the time the currencies stay in the inventory 
of the liquidity provider. Still, the number of liquidity providers active on the market is 
unknown, but is likely to be higher than one. In that sense, our calculated risk premium is 
underestimating the risk premium an individual liquidity provider faces: she will have to wait 
longer before her unwanted inventory is matched with another order. Bollen, Smith and 
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Whaley (2004) show that in these circumstances the number of liquidity providers can be 
estimated from the data. They argue that in the regression that combines all cost components, 
the coefficient on the risk component should be one, as liquidity providers are perfectly 
hedged against this premium. If we then set this coefficient equal to one, we can estimate the 
length of the holding period: 
                        ( )      (Eq. 5) 
With SPRD is the observed intraday spread, Exp TV is the expected volume traded, RISK 
is the modelled combined inventory holding and adverse selection premium and t is the 
time between trades. 
The estimate for the number of active liquidity providers can be easily calculated: the 
coefficient   ̂ from equation 4 can be used as a scaling factor for the average square root of 
the time between trades. We follow this approach and find that the estimated number of active 
liquidity providers is 15 for the whole sample period, 27 for the first half of 2003, 10 for the 
second half of 2003, 17 for the first half of 2004 and 7 for the second half of 2004.
76
 The 
variation over the sample is quite large. The very high number in the first half of 2003 can be 
explained by the speculative attacks (cf. supra) and the turmoil on the market. We distinguish 
two different views on the link between the turmoil on the market and the number of liquidity 
providers we find to be active, depending on how liquidity providers perceived the credibility 
of the exchange rate band. If they considered the band to be very credible, it was a very 
interesting time to provide liquidity as they took a very low risk in terms of adverse price 
changes (which is basically what the inventory holding cost is about). It can be that this made 
that more market participants were actively providing liquidity, attracted by the low risk. 
They later left when the price risk increased again. Alternatively, if they considered the band 
to be not credible they could have been worried about the risk of big price shifts once the 
exchange rate breaks through the band. This makes that the inventory holding cost estimate 
that we obtained using the option model is too low (as the expected volatility was not equal to 
the ex post measured volatility). The high coefficient on the cost component is in that case not 
due to a higher number of liquidity providers, but rather to a cost estimate that is not in line 
with the perceived cost by liquidity providers in the market. 
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 Assuming, naively, that all liquidity are equally actively involved in adding liquidity to the book. 
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6. Applications  
The model we developed and used above allows us to analyse the tightness on an intraday 
basis. In this section we will use it to investigate two interesting spread patterns: the stylized 
intraday pattern in tightness, and the remarkable spread pattern around a speculative attack 
against the HUF. 
6.1 Peak vs. non-peak times 
A first application of the model deals with the analysis of spread components during 
“peak” and “non-peak” times. It is a well-known fact that many variables related to the 
activity on a financial market follow an intraday pattern (See for our market Figure 3 and 
Figure 4). While our results were obtained with data for the most active trading hours (7am 
till 7pm), there still is a considerable amount of variation in activity over the hours included in 
our dataset. Based on the intraday distribution of the number of ticks, we are able to define 
“peak” and “non-peak” times (See Figure 2). We see that from 3pm onwards the activity 
starts to decline drastically. We will use this as cut-off point, and we will have by 
consequence 8 intervals per day during peak times and 4 during non-peak times (which results 
in 4040 observations during peak-times and 2020 observations during non-peak times).  
If we look at the difference in spread, there is – as expected – a considerable difference 
between peak and non-peak times (during non-peak times the spread is more than double as 
high, see Figure 3). The average spread over the whole sample period during peak times is 
0.23 HUF/ EUR, while during non-peak times it is 0.51 HUF/ EUR. Furthermore, we 
investigate whether this stylized pattern has any relation with the cost components, and if 
there is a relation, which cost components are responsible for these distinct bid-ask spreads. 
For this purpose we introduce a dummy variable for non-peak intervals in the model we 
applied earlier. The results can be found in Table 6. A first important finding is that compared 
to peak-times and controlling for the lower volume traded, both constituents of the order 
processing component are not significantly higher during non-peak times. For the risk 
component, the picture is different: this component is significantly (in both statistical and 
economical terms) higher during non-peak times (the coefficient is more than twice as large, 
the absolute size of the component is almost four times as large). Clearly, both the cost 
estimate itself and the sensitivity to changes in the calculated cost went up. Taking into 
account the different behaviour of liquidity providers during non-peak times versus peak-
times increases the explanatory power of the model slightly (the R-squared goes from 34.54% 
to 38.11%). 
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The total size of the risk component consists of the calculated option premium and its 
coefficient in the intraday spread regression. First, we elaborate on the causes of the increase 
in the calculated size of the risk component during non-peak times. There we see that is not 
the volatility that increased during non-peak times (in fact, over the whole sample period it 
goes even down from 5.60% during peak times to 4.54% during non-peak times). It is rather 
the time between two trades that goes up from 9.31 minutes on average during peak-times to 
37.80 minutes on average during non-peak times.  
Second, we found that the sensitivity to changes in the calculated size of the cost 
component increases during non-peak times. Obviously, the increasing time between two 
trades still underestimates the increase in actual risk during non-peak times. At the end of the 
trading day, it is not only the time the liquidity provider expects her currencies to stay in her 
inventory that increases. There are two additional costs, which are both related to the risk that 
the liquidity provider has to keep her position overnight, and will have to wait till the next day 
in order to unload her inventory. One cost element of holding the inventory overnight is that 
there is the risk of bigger (adverse) price changes by the time that she starts to trade again the 
next day. A second element is that she will have to pay an overnight interest rate. Our findings 
can be related to earlier work that showed that dealers on the foreign exchange market try to 
end the day (and a fortiori the week) with an empty inventory (Bessembinder (1994); Huang 
and Masulis (1999 )). It is argued for that matter that this effect is stronger on the foreign 
exchange market than on the stock market (Bjønnes and Rime (2005 )). 
6.2 Speculative attacks 
In the data section we referred briefly to the speculative attack against the stronger edge of 
the Hungarian forint band in January 2003. At this time, the official exchange rate band of the 
Hungarian central bank was between 234.69 HUF/ EUR and 317.52 HUF/ EUR (276.10 
HUF/ EUR ± 15%). In 2002, the government demand increased by 4% of the GDP, which 
was higher than expected. In the same year, also the wage growth increased more than 
expected. Both events did put the HUF/ EUR target under pressure. After the referendum on 
EU enlargement in October 2002, the upward pressure on the HUF/ EUR quote increased 
even more, because international investors were demanding long-term government securities 
(convergence trades). Shortly after New Year 2003, there was a growing belief amongst 
market players that the central bank would have to abandon the exchange rate target. Hedge 
funds were trying to force a further appreciation of the forint. The central bank, however, 
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intervened on 15 and 16 January 2003, and bought 5.2 billion EUR on the market. After this 
intervention, the quote moved back inside the band.  
We are interested in what role (endogenous) liquidity providers played before, during and 
after the speculative attack. More specifically we will use the methodology outlined above to 
analyse the spread set on the market. Figure 9 shows the evolution of the volume traded and 
the average time-weighted bid-ask spread in a three week timeframe around the speculative 
attack. We see a very large variation in the bid-ask spread during this timeframe. 
Interestingly, we find the spread to be gradually decreasing before the attack. The mean 
spread in the week before the attack was on average 0.13 HUF/ EUR while the average over 
the whole first half-year of 2003 was 0.32 HUF/ EUR. The attack impacts the quoted spread 
drastically, and in the week after the attack it is on average 0.53 HUF/ EUR. The build-up 
towards the attack should have been accompanied by uncertainty about the HUF/ EUR quote, 
and in that sense the unusually low spread prior to the attack is difficult to understand. Also, 
the unusually high spread after the attack could have multiple causes. We will investigate 
them below. 
In order to understand how the liquidity provision was impacted by the attack, we apply 
the model for the three weeks around the attack. We recalculate the coefficients on each 
component for each week, which allows us to get a precise view on how the behaviour of 
liquidity providers changed during our timeframe.
77
 The results can be found in Table 7. Prior 
to the speculative attack, the absolute order processing component has approximately the 
same size as the usual order processing component (in this paragraph, we use – given the 
variation of the results over time (cf. supra) – as usual the average result for the first half-year 
of 2003). They are respectively 0.1020 HUF/ EUR and 0.1123 HUF/ EUR. So, the low spread 
clearly stems from a lower risk component which is in absolute size 87.75% lower than usual. 
Both the value of the cost and the sensitivity to this cost are drastically lower (respectively 
67.75% and 62.01% lower). This makes sense if we take into account that when the price is 
close to the strong band, it can only move in one direction as long as the band is maintained. It 
is clear that liquidity providers at this stage were not questioning the credibility of the band, 
and were considering the risk of adverse price changes to be much lower than usual.  
In the week of the speculative attack, the spread rises with 42.85%. Still, the absolute 
order processing component decreases by 52.84%. Possible reason could here be that more 
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 Here we made the trade-off between having more robust estimates but neglecting the changing dynamics in 
the weeks around the attack when choosing for longer periods and having not enough observations to draw 
reasonable conclusions from our regressions but having a potentially more detailed view on the dynamics when 
opting for shorter periods. 
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participants start to follow the market very closely in the run-up to the attack. The increased 
competition that results from this erodes the fixed component of the spread (which also 
contains competitive rents, as argued earlier in the paper). Here the absolute size of the order 
processing component (0.0481 HUF/ EUR) becomes even slightly smaller than the 
endogenous tick size we found (0.05 HUF/ EUR). Key to understanding what drives the 
spread is here, again, the risk component: both the sensitivity to the cost and the cost itself 
increase greatly (respectively by 131.00% and by 128.68%). The increase in sensitivity can be 
linked to the increased competition that already affected the order processing component 
(when more liquidity providers are active, the difference between the average time between 
two trades on the market and the average time between two trades for an individual liquidity 
provider becomes bigger). The increase in the cost itself stems from the very high volatility 
during this week. The combined effect makes that the risk component is more than four times 
larger than the risk component in the week before the attack. 
In the week after the attack, the spread is more than three times higher than in the week 
before this extreme event. Clearly, the fact that the attack actually happened made the market 
less tight and therefore illiquid, even if the central bank intervened successfully directly after 
the attack. The higher spread after the attack stems from an increase in both the order 
processing and the risk component compared to the pre-attack week. The order processing 
component and sensitivity to the order processing cost increased. Both could be explained by 
reduced competition after the attack. Additionally, the calculated risk component also went up 
by 353.49%. This is clearly the effect of the unusually low volatility that has been replaced by 
unusually high volatility. The sensitivity to the risk component almost doubled compared to 
the pre-attack week: now the quote can again move in two directions (as it shifted inside the 
band). Consequently, accommodating orders becomes more risky for liquidity providers, and 
they do ask a compensation for this. 
Using the weekly coefficients, we also calculate the estimated daily spread components 
during the three weeks around the attack. Figure 10 shows the resulting components and the 
observed spread per day. We see that the model is able to track the day-to-day dynamics of 
the quoted spread. Figure 10 further illustrates how the order processing costs and risk 
component are driven by conditions on the market (number of liquidity providers/ 
competition, (un)certainty, market activity), and how this is directly reflected in the quoted 
spread. 
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7. Summary 
In this work, we applied an empirical spread decomposition model to the HUF/ EUR 
market. Our data covers the complete electronic interbank market –where the price formation 
takes place– for a timespan of two years. We use intraday data coming from a tick-by-tick 
database and the reconstructed limit order book.  
We examine the costs of providing liquidity in this type of market, and briefly summarize 
how these costs are treated in related literature. In a second step, these costs are quantified and 
the model is applied. We find that order processing accounts for 47.09% and the combined 
risk component accounts for 52.52% of the quoted spread. Over our sample period, we see a 
considerable amount of variation in their size. Although there is no exchange-mandated tick 
size, we do find evidence for an endogenous tick size of 0.05 HUF/ EUR. This tick size 
represents roughly one third of the order processing costs. The combined inventory holding 
and adverse selection risk is modelled as an option, and the costs are sized using option 
valuation. We can confirm that the option based model performs better than an ad hoc 
specification. We also find that the sensitivity of liquidity providers to the option value varies 
over time. We can partially explain this variation by a changing number of liquidity providers. 
When we try to split up the risk component further into a separate inventory holding and 
adverse selection component, we cannot find evidence for adverse selection. This is in 
contrast with existing NASDAQ results.  
We further examine two interesting cases. During non-peak times, the spread is more than 
twice as high as during peak times. We use our model to investigate this discrepancy in more 
detail, and find that it is especially a higher risk component that is the cause. When we 
elaborate on this, we see that the average time between two trades increases but that liquidity 
providers are also concerned about the risk that they will have to carry their unwanted 
inventory overnight. 
We also detect an interesting spread pattern around a speculative attack. As a second 
application, we study the dynamics of the cost components around this attack. We find an 
extremely high willingness to provide liquidity prior to the attack which results from the low 
risk component prior to the attack. During the attack, the risk component obviously increases 
and the order processing costs go down, which could be the result of increasing competition 
amongst liquidity providers. After the attack and the intervention by the central bank spreads 
rise massively. Now, both components go up: order processing costs rise again, and a strong 
increase in volatility makes that the inventory holding costs go up.  
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Overall, this paper demonstrates the relevance of an option based spread decomposition 
approach for understanding how liquidity is provided on an interbank foreign exchange 
market. An interesting avenue for further research would be to employ data at the level of 
individual liquidity providers to study the heterogeneity amongst them and measure the ex 
post risk of holding an inventory. These findings could then further be integrated in a refined 
model of liquidity provision.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Average daily quote and total volume traded over the sample period 
 
Figure 2: Number of ticks per hour (CET). 
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Figure 3: Expected bid-ask spread (HUF/ EUR; Intraday median) 
 
 
Figure 4: Expected quantity traded (Mill HUF; Intraday median) 
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Figure 5: First decimal number of best bid/ best ask (HUF/EUR) 
 
Figure 6: Second decimal number of best bid/ best ask (HUF/ EUR) 
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Figure 7: First dec. bid-ask spread (HUF/ EUR) 
 
Figure 8: Second dec. bid-ask spread (HUF/ EUR) 
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Figure 9: Spread and volume traded around the speculative attack 
 
 
Figure 10: Spread components around the speculative attack (January 2003)
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TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 Whole sample 2003 2004 
Number of quotes 437,420 193,447 243,973 
Number of trades 72,622 31,978 40,644 
Average trade size 1,304,398 EUR 1,339,827 EUR 1,276,523 EUR 
Trades  1 million € 80.38% 78.89% 81.55% 
Trades >1 million € and <3 million €  13.79% 14.50% 13.23% 
Trades  3 million € 5.83% 6.61% 5.22% 
Average number of quotes per day  881.90 806.03 953.02 
Average number of trades per day 146.42 133.24 158.77 
Average daily trading volume (million €) 190.98 178.52 202.67 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
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Distribution of regression variables  
 25%  Median 75% Mean 
Quoted Spread 
(time weighted average) 
0.15 0.21 0.34 0.32 
Quoted Spread 
(last observation) 
0.13 0.20 0.35 0.34 
Volume Traded 
(million EUR) 
2 9 20 16 
Expected Volume Traded 
(million EUR) 
6.25 12 15 10.19 
Mid-Quote 
(time weighted; HUF/ EUR) 
246.13 251.14 258.11 252.59 
Volatility 
 
2.24% 3.83% 6.11% 5.25% 
Intra-Trade Time 
(minutes) 
3 6.67 30 18.80 
Mean of regression variables over time  
 2003 Jan-Jun 2003 Jul-Dec 2004 Jan-Jun 2004 Jul-Dec 
Quoted Spread 
(time weighted average) 
0.32 0.39 0.35 0.25 
Quoted Spread 
(last observation) 
0.32 0.39 0.39 0.25 
Volume Traded 
(million EUR) 
15.96 13.86 16.08 18.04 
Expected Volume Traded 
(million EUR) 
7.58 9.08 11.88 12.08 
Mid-Quote 
(time weighted; HUF/ EUR) 
247.26 259.80 256.02 247.32 
Volatility 
 
5.21% 6.08% 5.85% 3.90% 
Intra-Trade Time 
(minutes) 
21.86 19.64 16.55 17.30 
Table 2: Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression 
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Spread 
(time weight.) 
Spread 
(latest) 
Volume 
(expected) 
Volume 
(unexpected) 
Volatility 
Time 
btwn. trades 
Option 
Spread 
(time weight.) 
1.00 0.34 -0.35 -0.05 0.23 0.38 0.56 
Spread 
(latest) 
0.34 1.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.14 0.18 
Volume 
(expected) 
-0.35 -0.13 1.00 0.06 0.04 -0.67 -0.30 
Volume 
(unexpected) 
-0.05 -0.01 0.06 1.00 0.29 -0.26 -0.12 
Volatility 
 
0.23 0.07 0.04 0.29 1.00 -0.14 0.60 
Time 
btwn. trades 
0.38 0.14 -0.67 -0.26 -0.14 1.00 0.43 
Option 
 
0.56 0.18 -0.30 -0.12 0.60 0.43 1.00 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
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Period Statistic Mean Quoted 
Spread 
Order Proc. Comp. Risk Comp. R
2
 
   Constant  E[Vol. Traded]   
2003-2004 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.3246 
0.2920 
(8.95) 
 
-0.0137 
(-10.97) 
10.1868 
3.9302 
(7.07) 
0.0434 
 
 
34.69% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp 
 0.1529 
47.09% 
0.1705 
52.52% 
 
2003 Jan-Jun Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.3185 
0.2473 
(4.88) 
-0.0178 
(-7.99) 
7.5833 
5.1544 
(4.65) 
0.0400 
 
 
40.95% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp. 
 0.1123 
35.26% 
0.2064 
64.80% 
 
2003 Jul-Dec Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.3899 
0.4111 
(10.10) 
-0.0205 
(-8.38) 
9.0833 
3.1225 
(6.38) 
0.0528 
 
 
30.85% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp. 
 0.2251 
57.74% 
0.1648 
42.26% 
 
2004 Jan- Jun Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.3453 
0.3021 
(3.81) 
 
-0.0134 
(-4.70) 
11.8750 
4.1700 
(3.60) 
0.0486 
 
 
33.75% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp. 
 0.1428 
41.35% 
0.2025 
58.65% 
 
2004 Jul-Dec Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.2470 
0.3007 
(5.53) 
-0.0118 
(-5.75) 
12.0833 
2.5738 
(2.38) 
0.0324 
 
 
35.17% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp. 
 0.1584 
64.11% 
0.0833 
33.73% 
 
Table 4: Regression results and spread components. 
 
The option value was calculated under the assumption that there is one liquidity provider - the patterns were updated each half year - all t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity 
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Statistic Constant E[Vol. Traded] Intra-trade time Volatility   
R
2
 
Coefficient 0.2085 -0.0106 58.6324 2.1611    23.53% 
(t-statistic) (8.08) (-9.97) (12.10) (7.44)   
Mean  10.1868 0.0019 0.0525   
Average share in average spread size 64.23% -33.32% 34.32% 34.95%   
Table 5: Regression with ad hoc specification 
The patterns were updated each half year - all t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 
 
 
 
Timing Statistic Mean Quoted 
Spread 
Order Proc. Comp. Risk Comp. R
2
 
   Constant  E[Vol. Traded]   
Peak Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.2305 
0.2155 
(7.52) 
 
-0.0054 
(-5.52) 
13.70 
2.5428 
(4.02) 
0.0343 
37.93% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp 
 0.1416 
61.41% 
0.0872 
37.84% 
Non-peak Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.5096 
0.2257 
(0.16) 
-0.0110 
(-1.90) 
3.17 
5.2225 
(2.50) 
0.0616 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp. 
 0.1909 
37.46% 
0.3217 
63.13% 
 
Table 6: Spread components during peak and non-peak times 
The patterns were updated each half year - all t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
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Timing Statistic Mean Quoted 
Spread 
Order Proc. Comp. Risk Comp. R
2
 
   Constant  E[Vol. Traded]   
Week before 
attack 
(6-10/01) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.1272 
0.1713 
(8.99) 
 
-0.0091 
(-6.26) 
7.58 
1.9581 
(1.74) 
0.0129 48.98% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp 
 0.1020 
80.15% 
0.0253 
19.85% 
Week of 
attack 
(13-17/01) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.1817 
0.1018 
(1.93) 
-0.0071 
(-1.31) 
7.58 
4.5233 
(5.90) 
0.0295 59.87% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp. 
 0.0481 
26.48% 
0.1336 
73.52% 
Week after 
attack 
(20-24/01) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean 
 
 
0.5338 
0.4830 
(3.45) 
-0.0383 
(-3.78) 
7.58 
5.8272 
(4.69) 
0.0585 54.35% 
 Abs. Size Comp. 
Rel. Size Comp. 
 0.1929 
36.13% 
0.3409 
63.87% 
Table 7: Spread components around speculative attack 
The patterns were updated each half year - all t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
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Technical Note 
The Reconstruction of the HUF/ EUR Limit Order Book using Book Data 
In order to answer the research questions in this thesis, data from the limit order book at 
the intraday level was useful, and in many cases indispensable. Our dataset consists of all 
quotes, i.e., limit and market orders, on the HUF/EUR interbank market that have been placed 
during the years 2003 and 2004 via the Reuters D3000 broking system. We observe the price, 
the quantity in euro that was offered or asked, whether it was a market or a limit order and the 
exact time when the order was placed and when it disappeared. We observe whether the order 
was withdrawn or whether it was executed, i.e., matched with another limit or market order. 
Using this information we reconstruct the limit order book at the intraday level. 
The raw tick-by-tick data we have consists for the two years together of 437421 rows of 
28 columns containing numerical data and 3 columns containing strings. A substantial part of 
the information is double (see Appendix ). We start from an empty limit order and trade book. 
Each time the book changes, we observe this change. From the raw data we can extract all 
incoming market and limit orders for the book , with for each order the time of entering, the 
time of removal or cancelation, the type of order
1
, the quantity inserted, the quantity traded 
and the reason of removal.
2
 The timestamp comes with 10 ms (0.01 sec.) precision. The 
orders are sorted on the time of entering. It is this information that forms the input for the 
limit order book reconstruction.  
 A new limit or market order and the cancelation of an existing limit order are events that 
lead to such a change. For the first type of events, the submission of limit orders or market 
orders, the event time will be the time of entering plus a latency factor.
3,4
 All activated limit 
orders are added to the relevant side of the book.
5
 The first and last state of the book in which 
each order can be found back is indexed. If the order is a market order or a marketable limit 
                                                 
1
 The types are: limit buy, limit sell, market buy or market sell order. 
2
 These reasons are: „EntryCancelled“, „EntryHeld“, „EntryHit“, „EntryRemoved“, „EntryTaken“, „N/A“ and 
„UnsolicitedCancel“. 
3
 Except if the time of removal for this order was not reported. If this was the case the order was neglected. This 
was the case for 5579 out of 437421 orders.  
4
 This latency factor accounts for the small delay in the registration at the trading platform, cf. infra 
5
 Activated orders are the orders which have been entered before the event time, and which have not left the 
book at the event time. Activated orders should not be confused with active orders (i.e. orders which initiate a 
trade). 
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order it is verified with which activated order(s) the current order was matched.
6,7
 The orders 
that can be filled completely among these activated orders, which can obviously only be 
found at the other side of the book, leave the book. They are identified by comparing their 
time of removal with the time at which the market or marketable order entered the book. 
However, it can also be that market or marketable orders fill activated orders only partly.
8
 
Because the order was only partly filled, it did not leave the book. In this case we adapt the 
liquidity of the activated order to the actual available liquidity for future orders. We identify 
these cases by checking whether the sum of the available volume(s) from the activated orders 
that leave the relevant side of the book at the time the market or marketable order was entered 
is smaller than the traded volume of the market or marketable order. If this is the case, the 
remaining volume of the market or marketable order is subtracted from the activated order 
that has the same quote.  
Some marketable limit orders might not have been filled immediately: their quantity is 
bigger than the quantity of the activated order(s) with which it could be matched. In this case, 
the marketable limit order will stay in the book until new orders enter the book (or until the 
order is canceled). For all limit orders added to the book it is verified whether activated limit 
orders leave the other side of the book exactly when the limit order was entered. In contrast to 
the cases above, here the quantity of the freshly entered (and not the previously activated) 
limit order should be adapted: the quantity that was traded immediately is subtracted from the 
order size. 
The limit book updates outlined above do all take place when certain orders enter the 
book. A third type of events that lead to limit order book updates are cancelations of existing 
limit orders in the book. For this reason it is verified whether after each order, one of the 
orders (or whether several ones) leave the book before the next order is submitted to the 
trading platform.
9
 Each time this happens, a new event is identified and added to the time 
series of limit order book states. The event time will here be the removal time of the order.
10
 
Again, to obtain the new order book state the post-event orders are sorted according to price 
and time priority. 
                                                 
6
 A marketable limit order is a limit order that can be immediately executed, because its price or equal to or 
better than the best quote from the opposite side of the book. 
7
 First we only treat marketable limit orders which are immediately completely filled. 
8
 A combination is also possible, i.e. the market or marketable order is partly matched with an activated order 
that was completely filled and partly with an activated order that was not completely filled. 
9
 Except if the order leaves the book in the last 800 ms. before the next order is entered. If this is the case, there 
is no separate event added for this event as delay in reporting could be responsible fort he timegap. 
10
 Here no latency factor is added, as delay in the registration process is irrelevant for this type of updates 
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The output of the limit order book reconstruction process is a series of observations in 
event-time (every time the order book is updated, a new event is initiated), with for each event 
a timestamp at 10 ms. precision and all orders at the bid and ask side (with their respective 
quotes, quantities, record numbers, entering and removal times). For very short periods, zero 
or negative spreads can be observed. Their presence can be explained by the absence of 
clearing agreements between certain banks (in this case, the two banks who have posted the 
best orders at the respective sides of the book do not have such an agreement). As other 
banks, which do have clearing agreements with the issuers of the best orders from both sides, 
can take advantage of this situation, this zero or negative spreads are short-lived.  
The output of the limit order book reconstruction process is a series of observations in 
event-time (every time the order book is updated, a new event is initiated), with for each event 
a timestamp at 10 ms. precision and all orders at the bid and ask side (with their respective 
quotes, quantities, record numbers, entering and removal times). For very short periods zero 
or negative spreads can be observed. Their presence can be explained by the absence of 
clearing agreements between certain banks (in this case, the two banks who have posted the 
best orders at the respective sides of the book do not have such an agreement). As other 
banks, which do have clearing agreements with the issuers of the best orders from both sides, 
can take advantage of this situation, these zero or negative spreads are short-lived. Timeseries 
are made by looking at the intervals needed. The information from the book is merged 
according to certain rules (e.g. values corresponding to the first state, last state, lowest and 
highest value, volume and time-weighted value,…). Legally recognized holidays in Hungary 
are left out.
11
 Weekend days as well. 
To conclude, we present an example of the level of detail the reconstructed book offers 
(See Figure 1). The dynamics between orders and midquote can now be observed in detail. 
This figure contains all euro buy orders (green) and all euro sell orders (red) on Feb. 13, 2003 
from 15:45 till 16:15. Now we can observe the dynamics after a news announcement. At 
15:57, Fitch affirms the Hungarian A long term foreign currency rating with a stable outlook. 
Immediately after this announcement there is a lot of volatility in the market because euro buy 
orders are added to the book, and euro sell orders are canceled or executed. During this 
process the midquote jumps up and down, and by 16:13 the quote seems to evolve to a new 
exchange rate level. This microscopic data was very important to answer our research 
                                                 
11
 For 2003 these were: 1/01, 15/03, 21/04, 1/05, 9/06, 20/08, 23/10, 1/11, 25/12 and 26/12. For 2004 these were: 
1/01, 15/03, 12/04, 1/05, 31/05, 20/08, 23/10, 1/11, 25/12 and 26/12. 
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questions, and can now further be used to study a plethora of issues related to the interaction 
on financial markets.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: Detail of the reconstructed book (Feb. 13, 2003 from 15:45 till 16:15) 
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APPENDIX: ORIGINAL DATA 
 
The raw data was consisting of 28 columns. Below the original description, explanation and 
type of data are summarized. 
Col. 1: “Nap seged”; Numerical variable; Day in the month (1-31) 
Col. 2: “Dátum”; Numerical variable; Datum in DD/MM/YYYY format 
Col. 3: “Nap”; Numerical variable; Day in the month (1-31)  
Col. 4: “Hónap”; Numerical variable; Month (1-12) 
Col. 5: “Év”; Numerical variable; Year (2003-2004) 
Col. 6: “Hét Napja”; Numerical variable; Day of the week (1-7) 
Col. 7: “Day_entered2”; Numerical variable; Datum in DD/MM/YYYY format 
Col. 8: “TIMEENTERED2”; String;  Time at which the order was entered (GMT) in 
DD/MM/YYYY HH:MM:SS.MMM format (precise up to 0.01 sec.) 
Col. 9: “Hour_ent”; Numerical variable; Hour at which the order was entered (GMT +1) 
Col. 10: “Beadás perce”; Numerical variable; Minute of the day (GMT +1) during which the 
order was entered (1-1440) 
Col. 11: “Kikerülés perce”; Numerical variable; Minute of the day (GMT +1) during which 
the order was removed (1-1440) 
Col. 12: “TIMEREMOVED_2”; String; Time at which the order was removed (GMT) in 
DD/MM/YYYY HH:MM:SS.MMM format (precise up to 0.01 sec.) 
Col. 12: “Hour_rem”; Numerical variable; Hour at which the order was removed (GMT +1) 
Col. 13: “Enter-remove különbség (second)”; Numerical variable; Seconds between time of 
entering and time of removal (precise up to 0.01 sec.) 
Col. 14: “TIMEENTERED”; String;  Time at which the order was entered (GMT) in 
DD/MM/YYYY HH:MM:SS.MMM format (precise up to 0.01 sec.) 
Col. 15: “Day_entered2”: Numerical variable; Datum in DD/MM/YYYY format 
Col. 16: “Hour_enter1”: Numerical variable; Hour at which the order was entered (GMT) (1-
12) 
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Col.17: “Hour_enter2”: Numerical variable; Contains 12 if the time in the previous column is 
p.m. and 0 if it was a.m. (0 or 12) 
Col. 18: “Hour_enter”: Numerical variable; Hour at which the order was entered (GMT) (1-
24) 
Col. 13: “Hour_enter_fin”; Numerical variable; Hour at which the order was entered (GMT) 
(1-24) 
Col. 14: “Minute_enter_1”; Numerical variable; Minute, second and millisecond at which the 
order was entered (:MM:SS.MMM)  
Col. 15: “Minute_enter_1”; Numerical variable; Minute, second and millisecond at which the 
order was entered (:MM:SS.MMM or :M:SS.MMM if minute is smaller than 10) 
Col. 16: “Minute_enter_1”; Numerical variable; Minute, second and millisecond at which the 
order was entered (:MM:SS.MMM or :M:S.MMM if minute and/or second is smaller than 10) 
Col. 17: “QUOTE”; Numerical variable; Quote of the order or price at which the market order 
was executed (up to 0.01 HUF/EUR) 
Col. 16: “QUANTITYENTERED”; Numerical variable 
Col. 17: “QUANTITYTRADED”; Numerical variable 
Col. 18: “ENTRYTYPE”; Numerical variable 
Col. 19: “MSGREMOVED”; String 
Col. 20: “Hour_removed_fin”; Numerical variable 
Col. 21: “Minute_removed”; Numerical variable 
Col. 22: “Time_ent”; Numerical variable 
Col. 23: “Minute_ent”; Numerical variable 
Col. 24: “Second_ent”; Numerical variable 
Col. 25: “Time (second) entered”; Numerical variable 
Col. 26: “Minute_rem”; Numerical variable 
Col. 27: “Second_rem”; Numerical variable 
Col. 28: “Time (second) removed”: Numerical variable 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
